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Abstract
Dans cette the`se, nous e´tudions l’utilisation de marche´s de pre´dictions pour l’e´valuation
de nouvelles technologies. Nous nous inte´ressons plus particulie`rement aux capacite´s des
marche´s de pre´dictions a` e´valuer des proble´matiques complexes, aux contraintes de concep-
tion pour une telle utilisation et a` leur efficacite´ par rapport a` des techniques traditionnelles.
Pour ce faire, nous avons suivi une approche Design Science, de´veloppant ite´rativement
plusieurs prototypes, les instanciant, puis les e´valuant avant d’en raffiner la conception.
Ceci nous a permis de faire de multiples contributions tant pratiques que the´oriques.
Nous avons tout d’abord montre´ que les marche´s de pre´dictions e´taient adapte´s pour
correctement appre´cier des proble´matiques complexes. Nous avons e´galement de´veloppe´
une typologie de facteurs de conception ainsi que des propositions de conception pour
l’utilisation de ces marche´s dans des contextes d’e´valuation technologique. Ensuite, nous
avons montre´ que ces marche´s pouvaient re´soudre une partie des proble`mes lie´s a` la gestion
des portes-feuille de projets de recherche et de´veloppement et proposons une feuille de route
pour leur mise en oeuvre. Finalement, en comparant la mise en oeuvre et les re´sultats d’
une me´thode de de´cision multi-crite`re et d’un marche´ de pre´diction, nous avons montre´ que
ces derniers e´taient plus efficaces, tout en offrant des re´sultats semblables. Nous proposons
e´galement un cadre de comparaison des me´thodes d’e´valuation technologiques, permettant
de cerner au mieux les besoins en fonction de facteurs de contingence. En conclusion,
notre recherche ouvre un nouveau champ d’application des marche´s de pre´diction et devrait
permettre d’acce´le´rer leur adoption par les entreprises.
In this thesis, we study the use of prediction markets for technology assessment. We
particularly focus on their ability to assess complex issues, the design constraints required
for such applications and their efficacy compared to traditional techniques. To achieve
this, we followed a design science research paradigm, iteratively developing, instantiating,
evaluating and refining the design of our artifacts. This allowed us to make multiple
contributions, both practical and theoretical.
We first showed that prediction markets are adequate for properly assessing complex
issues. We also developed a typology of design factors and design propositions for using
these markets in a technology assessment context. Then, we showed that they are able to
solve some issues related to the R&D portfolio management process and we proposed a
roadmap for their implementation. Finally, by comparing the instantiation and the results
of a multi-criteria decision method and a prediction market, we showed that the latter are
more efficient, while offering similar results. We also proposed a framework for comparing
vii
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forecasting methods, to identify the constraints based on contingency factors. In conclusion,
our research opens a new field of application of prediction markets and should help hasten
their adoption by enterprises.
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1.1 Background and Research Context
The research presented in this thesis was part of the National Centre of Competence in
Research “Mobile Information and Communication Systems” (NCCR MICS) sponsored by
the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). The project is tackling all the technological
challenges that have to be addressed in order for wireless sensor networks to realize their
full potential, from the study of fundamental principles to the development of platforms,
and to their deployment in applications (mainly in the environmental area).
This research was part of the “In-network information management” project. Its
main objective was to design and operate a prediction market to assess technological
projects running under NCCR MICS. Emerging in 2005, prediction markets had no real
implementations in this context. Prediction markets are using the tools and methods for
trading commodity and financial futures to predict the outcome of future events. Such
electronic markets, trading on claims concerning political events or sports results, have
proven to be an accurate predictor of future events, and should have applications to
technology foresight and R&D portfolio management.
We decided to follow two tracks to achieve this research. The first one is to evaluate
the possibility of using prediction markets for R&D portfolio management. This involves
designing, running and evaluating prediction markets in various contexts given that it is
almost impossible to evaluate them in a real R&D context. This is so mainly because,
in order to evaluate their ability to correctly balance R&D portfolios in a real context,
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this research should have been run during the whole R&D process, i.e. a decade, from the
project idea to the commercialization. So we chose various related contexts to develop and
test our designs and then made a theoretical evaluation of our model.
The second track is to compare prediction markets to another technological forecasting
method to evaluate the efficiency and the accuracy of prediction markets in such a setup.
For this part, we were able to run a prediction market based on the claims produced by
previous multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) experiment on mobile payment. This
will support our assumption that prediction markets are good at solving such issues
and, furthermore, will help us conclude that prediction markets are an appropriate tool
for R&D portfolio management, given their ability to correctly assess new technological
projects.
1.2 Relevance and Research Objective
In industry or in universities, it is still very difficult to evaluate, choose and pursue the
“right” projects. By right, we understand the projects that will bring the most payback in
terms of revenue, image, results or recognition as defined in the organization’s strategy.
This is even more difficult for technological projects, whose life could be very short due to
a rapid turnover.
Our research assumption is that a specifically designed prediction market could improve
the R&D portfolio management process. In our context, prediction markets are future
electronics markets concerning the potential projects of the portfolio. Prediction markets
collect information coming from different actors, who trade on the market, and then
aggregate this information at an automatically negotiated equilibrium price corresponding
to the valuation of the project. All actors directly or indirectly linked to the project can
trade (buy or sell) contracts concerning the projects, based on their own appreciation of
the project. The traders are both the leaders and teams of the project, and also the senior
management, people from marketing, finance and all the other businesses units concerned
with R&D. Their specialized expertise of a particular company activity, such as research –
but also marketing, sales, customer care or finance – will enable them to build their own
opinion about the project, from the particular viewpoint of their activity field. The result
of all aggregated appreciations will de facto include a multitude of implicit criteria related
to all company activities.
In addition, prediction markets are very powerful tools for discovering and aggregating
the information shared between many people. Thus, using prediction markets should not
only make the whole process more effective, but also increase the quality of the decisions,
based on information that is more comprehensive.
Our approach is based on the intuition that the information needed to manage the
portfolios is generally available within the company in a subjective form. Also predic-
tion markets are able to discover and incorporate this information without the need for
quantifying these data through a resource-intensive process.
Consequently, supported by a prediction market artifact, managers should be able
to make their decisions in a faster way, while being better informed. Therefore we will
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evaluate the relevance of our research assumption in three ways: global process improvement
(wider participation, effective data collection and user-friendliness of the method), better
data accuracy (accurate and up-to-date data) and increased quality of decisions. These
evaluations will be made during the testing of our different prototypes and will be completed
by interviews with decision makers involved in the process.
Our research question is to demonstrate that specifically designed prediction markets are
able to efficiently solve complex technological forecasting issues. This implies studying the
design principles of these prediction markets, their adequacy for solving complex claims
and their efficiency compared to other tools.
Based on this research question, our research objective is to design a prediction market
to support the assessment of new technologies, particularly from the R&D portfolio
management perspective. During this research, we will iteratively design, build and
evaluate an information technology (IT) artifact in various contexts to study the design
factors, the underlying process and the efficiency of these markets.
1.3 Rigor and Theoretical Frameworks
Our work takes place at the intersection of three research domains: technology manage-
ment, market theories and crowd motivation.
1.3.1 Technology management
Technology management embraces a whole range of concepts such as R&D management,
innovation, assessment of new technologies, etc. There are some attempts to structure
technology management based on a process approach [61], resulting in a process-based
technology management framework. In our case, we chose to use and improve the Levary
and Han technological forecasting framework [101].
1.3.2 Market theories
Hayek’s hypothesis [83] and Fama’s efficient market hypothesis [45] are the foundations
of the whole prediction markets literature. There are a lot of publications related to the
market mechanisms of prediction markets. This includes information gathering, information
aggregation, manipulations, etc. Kambil and van Heck [89] studied electronic markets
from the MIS point of view. They identified ten distinct processes that support exchange
relations. Moreover, they proposed a stakeholder-process analysis framework for comparing
different instantiations of markets.
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1.3.3 Crowd motivation
Titmuss’s hypothesis that monetary compensation tends to undermine civic duty [164]
has been recently “rediscovered” and numerous studies examined the effects of monetary
rewards on motivation. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee [49] developed a new framework to
study the crowding out of intrinsic motivation when price incentives are introduced. They
tend to bridge the gap between econometric and social psychology research on motivation.
Recently, Roberts and al. [139] published a new framework to study the motivation of
crowds participating in open-source software (OSS) projects.
These three domains can be used solely or in combination to answer our research
question. The technology management perspective will help us understand the needs of
firms regarding their competitiveness and their sustainability as well as their foresight
expectations. The market perspective will help us to understand why prediction markets
are so successful in efficiently aggregating dispersed information and how to design them.
Finally, the crowd motivation perspective will help us to understand the motivations of
traders sharing information with the platform and how to strengthen their involvement in
the overall process.
In this thesis, we mostly focus on technology management and market efficiency. An
extensive literature review on prediction markets is presented in chapter 2. Technology
management is introduced in chapters 6 and 7.
1.4 Research Approach and Methodology
As stated in the previous section, we will not be able to follow new technology projects
from start to finish, mainly because of the length of the overall process, which exceeds the
timeframe of this thesis.
So in order to test our assumptions, we decided to tackle the problem from a number of
perspectives. These perspectives are the design factors of a prediction market, their ability
to support a given part of the R&D portfolio management process and their ability to
operate more efficiently than other technological forecasting methods.
To address these issues, we chose to follow an iterative approach, allowing us to test
our design in a specific context, evaluate it and build the results into the next prototype.
The most suitable research paradigm in this context is indubitably the design science one.
Hevner et al. propose a design science research framework for information systems research.
We will use their approach, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, focusing on the build–evaluate
loop, to conduct our research. These iterations enable us to build and assess an artifact,
before its being refined and reassessed.
In order to build our artifact, following the Hevner et al. framework, we started examining
the relevance of our research, interviewing researchers in the NCCR-MICS projects but
also reviewing some literature on R&D portfolio management, enabling us to identify the
main business needs. We then made an extensive literature survey on prediction markets
to identify and apply the current knowledge to our artifact, ensuring the rigor of our
research.
We then started our three iterations in various contexts, building and evaluating our
artifact as presented in part III of this thesis. These multiple evaluations and refinements
led us formulate our contributions to both the environment and the knowledge base.
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Develop/Build
Assess
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Environment Knowledge base
Applications in
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Additions to the 
knowledge base
Justify/Evaluate
Applicable
knowledge
Business
needs
Figure 1.1: Information systems research framework, according to Hevner et al.
1.5 Contributions
Our research aims to provide multiple theoretical and practical contributions. These
will be presented in a more detailed way in chapter 8 but are briefly summarized in this
section.
1.5.1 Managerial contributions
Five prediction markets design propositions
The application of prediction markets for technology foresight requires careful choice of
design for the artifact. Based on our evaluations of various experiments, we summarized
our findings in five propositions for running prediction markets in a technology assessment
context.
R&D portfolio management process supported by prediction markets
In order to tackle three main issues encountered in the R&D portfolio management
process, i.e. (1) selecting the right criteria, (2) collecting the data, (3) and negotiating
the portfolio between the different stakeholders, we propose a new process, aided by a
prediction market. We also develop a roadmap to implement it in companies.
1.5.2 Methodological contributions
Technology foresight comparison framework
In the process of benchmarking our technology foresight methods, we developed a
comparison framework for such methods. This allows us to better understand the relations
between the context in which the assessment is done and the requirements of the artifact
in this same context.
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1.5.3 Theoretical contributions
Typology to support the design of prediction markets
Resulting from our literature review and our first experiment, we developed an exhaustive
typology of design factors to support the construction of prediction market artifacts. These
factors could be combined to address specific assessment needs. We also provide prediction
market settings for three different contexts based on this typology.
IPO process for prediction markets
Technology foresight being a continuous process, we had to develop a way for participants
to submit or propose new ideas. We therefore developed an IPO process to support the
creation and the evaluation of new ideas (projects or technologies) without the need for a
human review process.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
Starting with chapter 2 we present the prediction market approach to forecast uncertainty.
This extensive literature review helps us to understand the global environment of prediction
markets and also provide a major contribution to the knowledge needed for ensuring the
rigor of the following chapters.
Chapter 3 presents the methodology we used to pursue our research objectives. Beside
an introduction to design science, we also present our design process.
Chapter 4 is the starting point of our design work on the artifact. We first identified the
business needs and the general requirements, before defining the main design factors. We
finally built the first artifact, the MarMix prototype.
Chapters 5–7 are the results of three subsequent iterations. The first iteration, presented
in chapter 5, presents our multiple experiments of prediction markets as collective forecasting
tools in various contexts. This chapter led us to discover the main issues using prediction
markets in our particular context and enable us to formulate our design propositions.
Chapter 6 builds on the results from chapter 5 and proposes a new prediction market
supported R&D portfolio management process. We start by presenting the relevance of our
approach and then, describe the theory we will use to build our artifact, we establish the
foundations of our approach. We finish by presenting a proposal to run prediction markets
to support this process and drafting a roadmap for stakeholders.
Chapter 7 is the final step in our design process. Building on our findings, we design
and run a prediction market for technological forecasting. To achieve this goal, we made
a benchmark between a prediction market and an MCDM process. In order to assess
the strength of both approaches, we developed a comparison framework for technological
forecasting methods. Finally we determined the key success factors of both methods.
Finally, chapter 8 summarizes our research process using the guidelines from Hevner
et al. and presents our contributions, supported by Gregor’s Information Systems Design
Theory. We also discuss some final thoughts about what has been accomplished and what
could be done for further research.
Chapter 2
Using markets to forecast
uncertainty
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In this chapter, we start by presenting an extensive review of the prediction markets
literature, giving the reader a strong understanding of this area, and conclude with the
presentation of three open problems of interest to us that will be addressed in the rest of
this thesis.
2.1 Introduction
In August 2004, Google raised $1.4 billion for its IPO. For the first time, Google used an
auction mechanism to define its IPO price. However, the IPO price was 15.3% under the
first-day market capitalization. This resulted in a waste of $350 million for Google. At the
same time, Joyce Berg from the University of Iowa was experimenting with a prediction
market “to forecast the market capitalization of Google at the close of the first day of
trading”[17]. Iowa’s prediction market was only 4% over it. This could have saved Google
$225 million.
The underlying idea of prediction markets is based on Hayek’s hypothesis [83] and the
efficient market hypothesis [45]. In his critiques of central planning in democracy, Hayek
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claims that in competitive markets the information scattered among all participants is
efficiently aggregated in the price function. Furthermore, Fama [45] found that in an
efficient market, each new available piece of information is instantly incorporated into the
price of a security. Thus, the current price of a security represents the traders’ expectation
about the future value of the underlying product.
Built on these findings, prediction markets use the same concepts to predict the outcome
of uncertain future events. The securities are linked to future events, and the value of the
securities represents the aggregated expectation of the traders regarding the outcome of
the event.
To illustrate the functioning of a prediction market, we will take a current outcome
from the Foresight Exchange 1 as an example. The “Claim Terr10 – Another US Terrorist
< 2010” aims at predicting the supervening of a terrorist attack against the USA before
1/1/2010.
“After Sept. 15, 2001 and before 1/1/2011, official US government sources
will claim (in reference to events occurring after Sept. 15, 2001) that a major
act or set of connected acts of terrorism, war, crime or rebellion has resulted in
at least 200 human deaths in the United States within some 48 hour period.
The U.S. government sources must clearly claim that the deaths involve use
of deadly force with intent which originated outside official U.S. government
channels”.
In this case, this “Claim Terr10 – Another US Terrorist < 2011” share will pay the
following: {
$100 if an attack occurs before 1/1/2011;
$0 otherwise.
The price p of the security represents the expected payoff, assuming the fact that we are
in an efficient market. If T represents a terrorist attack against the USA, and Pr(T ) the
probability that an attack occurs before 1/1/2011, then the price p would be:
p = Pr(T )× 100 + [1− Pr(T )]× 0
At any given time, we can derive Pr(T ) from p, which represents the consensus among
the traders regarding the probability that an attack will occur before 1/1/2011.
As presented in Figure 2.1, the price for the share was $4. This means that the traders
agreed that the probability of a terrorist attack was 4% at the end of 2009. As seen in
Figure 2.1, this price has changed a lot during the last seven years. This is due to the
fact that traders kept receiving new information during this period, which led them to
adapt their beliefs about this issue. In the case of new information arising concerning the
probability of an attack against the USA before the end of 2011, traders would buy shares
at the current price, which in turn will raise the price on the market.
This security is a winner-takes-all contract used to predict the outcome of binary events.
As stated, it pays off only if the underlying event occurs and the price represents its
occurring probability. Markets of this type have applications to decision-making, and have
proved to be an accurate predictor of future events.
1. http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=Terr10
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Figure 2.1: Variation of “Claim Terr10” price on Foresight Exchange
2.2 Definitions
There are many definitions and terminologies for prediction markets. The most common
are Idea Futures markets (IF), prediction markets, information markets, virtual stock
markets (VSM), securities trading of concepts markets (STOC), decision markets and
collective forecasting market. Hanson, one of the inventors of this concept wrote:
“Information markets can be used to elicit a collective estimate of the
expected value or probability of a random variable, reflecting information
dispersed across an entire population of traders. The market prediction is
not usually an average or median of individual opinions, but is a complex
summarization reflecting the game-theoretic interplay of traders as they obtain
and leverage information, and as they react to the actions of others obtaining
and leveraging their own information.” [82]
In his attempt to legalize prediction markets used for research purposes, Bell [8] proposed
some definitions to characterize scientific prediction exchanges (SPEx):
1. A scientific prediction exchange is a forum that uses instrumentalities
of interstate commerce to facilitate the buying and selling of prediction
certificates.
2. A prediction certificate is a document promising to pay its bearer a specified
amount of money on condition that a designated prediction judge names
as true the document’s prediction claim or claims.
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3. A prediction claim is an answer to an unresolved question of science, tech-
nology, or public policy that can be resolved primarily by the application
of skill. A prediction claim is not an answer to an unresolved question
about the outcome of a sporting event or contest, or the future value of
a securities transaction currently regulated by the Securities Exchange
Commission.
Currently, researchers from different disciplines study prediction markets: politics,
economy, law, finance, decision science and computer science. This leads to various research
topics and applications. Moreover, each of them tends to use different terminologies to
name these markets. In Table 2.1, we summarize the most used concepts and show their
particularities.
Table 2.1: Various implementations of the market concept
Concepts Outcome Implementations
Prediction market Real and testable propositions SPEx, NewsFuture
Information market Knowledge aggregation VSM
Preference market Simple preference STOC
Idea market Idea generation Imagination Market
Decision market Policies N/A
In the following sections, we will review the prediction market literature under four main
categories: (1) general description and open problems, (2) theoretical works, (3) applications
and (4) law and policy. These main categories are taken from the classification framework
based on the nature of prediction markets research used by Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos [165]
in their literature review.
2.3 General description
Prediction markets, given their origin, are powerful tools for decision making. They
provide incentives for both revelation and discovery of information and provide an algorithm
to aggregate this information [171]. Given these incentives, they also support our collective
ability to share information [74]. They help the evolution of ideas, “creating a visible
consensus of relevant experts, and better incentives for honesty and care when making
contributions” [72]. Moreover, they provide this aggregated information in the form of an
easily understandable indicator, the price of the shares.
Researches and experiments shows that the main benefits of prediction markets are:
efficiency, freedom, flexibility and motivation [109]. They help to make contributors aware
of the topic’s underlying issues and motivate them to rapidly share their beliefs with
the rest of the players. In an organization, these markets encourage collaborators to
position themselves regarding the outcome of the company’s relevant issues and support the
company in becoming more transparent in the way they assess these issues. Leveraging the
knowledge of the whole organization, prediction markets are drivers to initiate explanations
and to increase comprehension within the company [141].
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Empirical evidence and economic theories suggest that prediction markets’ predictions
“equal or outperform predictions made by groups, voting, experts, and opinion averaging”
[44]. Often used to assess corporate or political issues, deliberating groups frequently fail to
make good predictions. They are subject to various biases, the most important being social
pressures and group dynamics, leading to incomplete information disclosure. “As a result,
deliberation often produces a series of unfortunate results: the amplification of errors,
hidden profiles, cascade effects, and group polarization” [160]. Prediction markets tend to
reduce these errors, providing economic rewards for completely disclosing information and
for correcting others’ predictions [161]. Their aggregation mechanism reduces individual
errors instead of amplifying them as happens in group deliberation. This often leads to
better and more informed decisions.
Spann and Skiera [156] evaluate the potential use and different design possibilities as
well as the forecast accuracy and performance of prediction markets compared to expert
prediction for their application to business forecasting. Furthermore, they propose a new
validity test for prediction markets’ forecasts.
Graefe and Weinhardt [58] and Berg et al. [14] found that prediction markets are also
good predictors for long-term problems. Comparing prediction markets with the Delphi
method Graefe and Weinhardt [58] conclude that both offer similar results for long-term
forecasts. Moreover, due to the underlying trading mechanism, prediction markets are
able to provide an “implicit mechanism for measuring participants’ confidence as well as
weighting their judgments” [58]. Berg et al. [14] found that “prediction markets prove
accurate at long and short forecasting horizons, in absolute terms and relative to natural
alternative forecasts”. In addition, they are thriftier in terms of resource consumption
compared to Delphi studies.
2.4 Information gathering
Traders on a prediction market, as well as on other markets like stock exchanges, are
motivated by their potential trading profits. Prediction markets derive two benefits from
this motivation: it attracts traders to be active on the market, sharing information and
beliefs, and it helps in gathering information. In an equilibrium state, the only way to
improve one’s profit is to add new information into the market. This results in a great
incentive to discover more information and share it in the market [173]. Moreover, because
of the opportunity for realizing bigger profits by being the first to discover new information,
prediction markets are very fast in aggregating new information. Slamka et al. [151]
found in experiments that new information was incorporated in less than 90 seconds on
average. They also found that the predictive accuracy increased as consequence of this new
information. Wolfers and Zitzewitz [174] also found that market prices rapidly respond to
new information and thus that few arbitrage opportunities exist.
Researches on prediction markets [68, 100] show that “the most informed answer will
come from an efficient market” [44]. Berg et al. [14] studied the efficiency of prediction
markets and concluded that the time series of prices is “consistent with efficient random
walks”. Rhode and Strumpf [138] reached the same conclusion studying a century of
presidential betting markets. To achieve this efficiency, prediction markets should remain
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liquid, allowing traders to continuously update probabilities. Kambil [88] suggests three
criteria to guarantee this liquidity: enough traders, enough knowledgeable participants and
enough incentive to trade. Comparing prediction markets and financial markets, Tetlock
[162] concludes that the former stay efficient despite low liquidity and volume. Christiansen
[33] studied the efficiency of small markets and found that markets above a minimum
threshold of 16 participants remain efficient. However, we currently lack real world studies
to determine a threshold function based on the forecasting goal of the market. This could
lead to less efficient markets and result in poor predictions.
2.5 Information aggregation
The main function of prediction markets is to gather and aggregate dispersed information
and publish it for all to see [132]. This aggregating mechanism is based on an efficient
market hypothesis. At the equilibrium price, all available information is aggregated in
the price [46]. It is then accepted that the equilibrium price corresponds to the traders’
mean belief regarding the outcome. Manski [112] found that there could be a substantial
difference between the traders’ mean belief that the outcome will occur and its equilibrium
price when traded as a binary contract. He based his demonstration on the fact that
traders are willing to risk a fixed amount. Gjerstad [57] responded, showing that both the
risk aversion and the distribution of traders’ beliefs affect the equilibrium price. He stated
that “for coefficients of relative risk aversion near those estimated in empirical studies
and for plausible belief distributions, the equilibrium price is very near the traders’ mean
belief”. Wolfers and Zitzewitz [172] and Snowberg et al. [153] came to the same conclusions.
However, they also found that the “efficacy of the forecasts may be undermined somewhat
for prices close to $0 or $1, when the distribution of beliefs is either especially disperse,
or when trading volumes are somehow constrained, or motivated by an unusual degree of
risk-acceptance”.
Servan-Schreiber [145] proposes that “the key driver of accuracy seems to be the betting
proposition itself: on the one hand, a wager attracts contrarians, which enhances the
diversity of opinions that are aggregated. On the other hand, the mere prospect of reward
or loss promotes more objective, less passionate thinking, thereby enhancing the opinions
that are aggregated”. Berg et al. [14] in their study of the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM)
conclude that the market outperformed traditional forecasting methods and that the
predictions were very accurate. Chen et al. [30] did some experiments on the equilibrium
of prediction markets and suggest that (1) prediction markets are guaranteed to converge
to an equilibrium, representing a consensus among the traders; (2) they converge to the
equilibrium in at most n rounds of trading, where n is the number of traders; (3) the
best possible prediction it can make is the direct communication equilibrium, at which
price it equals the expectation of the value of the function based on the information of all
traders; but (4) a prediction market is not guaranteed to converge to this best possible
prediction.
Wu et al. [176] studied the overconfidence and found that “overconfidence is a widespread
phenomenon which is influenced by a number of factors, such as, the difficulty of the
judgment task, the amount and nature of outcome feedback, and the gender and culture
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of the trader”. Nevertheless, given that the overconfidence is not equally spread among
traders, this will result in potential trading profits for the less overconfident ones. On the
same topic, Wolfers and Zitzewitz [172] shows that it is important for prediction markets
to attract enough uninformed traders. These traders will issue a flow of uninformed orders,
inducing trading profit opportunities for more informed traders and resulting in better
forecasting.
Finally, Gruca and Berg [63] propose that prediction markets are able to improve upon
publicly available information. In the case of biased public information, traders, motivated
by their potential trading profits, are encouraged to “de-bias” this information. This will
result in more accurate predictions than those generated by the public information.
2.6 Manipulations
Like traditional markets, prediction markets could be subject to foul play or other
distortions. We will address the two principal ones: bubbles and manipulations.
Bubbles are mostly the result of biased public information and group dynamics. Frequent
in traditional financial markets, they also appear in prediction markets. As the same rules
should apply to both types of exchange, we have currently no way to detect these bubbles
in prediction markets. Thus, in experimental markets, bubbles often burst and this results
in more accurate predictions [171]. Recent political prediction markets were subject to
these bubbles.
In prediction markets, manipulations are a lesser concern than in traditional markets.
In both cases, manipulations result in profit opportunities. Manipulations will lead
manipulators to lose money, increasing the reward for informed traders and thus ultimately
improving the price accuracy [78]. Moreover, in most prediction markets, traders receive the
same endowment of play money or are constrained by spending caps, limiting their ability
to consistently manipulate the market. Rhode and Strumpf [138] studied a century of
manipulations in prediction and betting markets and found that attempts at manipulating
these markets generally failed. Furthermore, he suggests that it is difficult and expensive
to manipulate prediction markets beyond short periods of time. Moreover, Hanson and
Opera [82] found “that a manipulator can substitute for a liquidity trader or for trader
irrationality to produce an information market equilibrium”.
Finally, even if the same distortions and foul play exist as in traditional markets, we
have seen that the outcomes of these manipulations mostly favor better prediction accuracy.
Moreover, these manipulations are typically reverted in a short time.
2.7 Market mechanisms
The central aspect of the prediction market aggregation mechanism is how buyers and
sellers are matched. A match between a buy and a sell order results in the aggregation of
new information and in the creation of a new equilibrium price. The most widely used
trading mechanism is the continuous double auction (CDA). To improve the liquidity and
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accuracy of prediction markets, they also often rely on automated market makers. The
most used algorithms are the market scoring rules (MSR) and the dynamic pari-mutuel
markets (DPM).
The main idea in incorporating a market maker is to allow traders to trade at different
times, serving as an intermediary. The market maker substitutes for traders having different
trading times. Thus, it allows the first to trade at a given time, making an offer, and then
later, making the opposite offer to other traders. It is a way of allowing asynchronous
trading on prediction markets. “By adjusting prices in his favor, a market maker can even
profit from providing this service” [81]. Moreover, market makers can encourage trading
activity. “Losses of a market maker are gains to its traders, and the prospect of such
gains should entice more trading”. When the number of participants is small, market
makers prevent falling in illiquid markets [1]. Pennock [126] summarizes the advantages
of market makers “with regard to three desirable properties of trading mechanisms for
prediction markets, namely continuous incorporation of information, guaranteed liquidity,
and avoidance of financial risk for the market operator”.
2.7.1 Continuous Double Auction
The continuous double auction (CDA) is the most used trading mechanism in prediction
markets, as it is in financial markets. It allows traders to submit buy or sell orders which
are directly executed against opposite orders or stored in an order book. Orders that
are queued in the order book are processed iteratively as soon as opposite orders are
submitted or they are cancelled as soon as they expire. The main advantage of this
mechanism is that it poses no financial risk for the market operator. This is the main
reason for their implementation in most real money markets. “Moreover, the CDA allows
for continuous information incorporation into prices and consequently traders are capable
of quickly reacting to events in case of liquid markets” [108]. However, the CDA could lead
to situations where the market became illiquid with few traders as this is often the case
with prediction markets, when the bid–ask spread is too broad or when the order book is
empty. Thus, to solve this issue, one should consider the implementation of an automatic
market maker.
2.7.2 Market Scoring Rules
Hanson is the father of the market scoring rules (MSR) and its variations. “In practice,
scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit
good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting
estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals” [80].
Thus, the MSR provides infinite liquidity to the market given a defined range. MSR could
be seen as “sequentially used proper scoring rules maintaining a probability distribution
over all events” [108]. Traders can improve the prediction, changing the probability by
moving the price to a new prediction. New information is immediately incorporated as the
probability change. Berg and Proebsting [12] derived all necessary formulae to implement
an MSR.
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Abramowicz [1] describes a quadratic market scoring rule which is an adaptation of
Hanson’s MSR. “Its prime virtue is that it provides uniform liquidity across the probability
or prediction spectrum. Market participants will thus have the same incentive to do research
that is expected to produce an expected change in the market prediction, regardless of the
current prediction”.
2.7.3 Dynamic Pari-Mutuel
A dynamic pari-mutuel (DPM) acts as hybrid between a pari-mutuel market and a
CDA, inheriting some of the advantages of both. “Like a pari-mutuel market, a DPM
offers infinite buy-in liquidity and zero risk for the market institution; like a CDA, a
DPM can continuously react to new information, dynamically incorporate information into
prices, and allow traders to lock in gains or limit losses by selling prior to event resolution”
[126]. Offering infinite buy-in liquidity, the DPM “acts as a one-sided market maker
always offering to sell at some price and moving the price according to demand” [108].
Traders wanting to sell have to use the order book as the DPM makes no buy offers. The
pari-mutuel being redistributive, money goes in a central pool and is redistributed among
the winners. Thus, there are no risks for the market operator. Luckner [108] highlights a
shortcoming of DPM. Given that there is no incentive to buy early, the best strategy is to
wait until the last moment to buy. The first real life implementation of the DPM was the
Yahoo! Tech Buzz Game run in 2005 [111].
Finally, we will review two topics related to the trading mechanism: the endowment and
the payment scheme.
Seemann et al. [144] did extensive research on the effect of stock endowments on the
liquidity of prediction markets. They found that the stock endowments significantly improve
the liquidity of the markets. Stock endowments motivate participants to trade stocks that
they would never have considered otherwise. Moreover, in order to free liquidity, they have
to trade a part of their stock endowment, bringing more information to the market. They
also discovered that traders who received stock endowments traded more than twice as
many stocks than other participants. In conclusion, they recommend to “provide stock
and cash endowment to participants instead of pure cash endowments wherever feasible”
[144].
Considering the payment scheme, Luckner [107] showed that performance-based payment
schemes do not necessarily lead to better prediction accuracy. He explains this with the
risk aversion of traders. Competitive environments like rank-order tournaments should
produce the best prediction accuracy. Rank-order tournaments are the most used payment
scheme in current prediction markets.
2.8 Applications
There are different uses and case studies of prediction markets. On one side, we have
numerous public prediction markets like the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), Foresight
Exchange (FX), Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX), InklingMarkets or NewsFutures. On
the other side, there are more and more experiments being made within organizations.
Unfortunately, they are poorly investigated and there is a real lack of studies concerning
these business applications. However, we found relevant reports on applications by HP,
Google, Siemens, BestBuy and GE.
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2.8.1 Public prediction markets
Public play-money prediction markets are mostly showcases for prediction markets
software vendors. Their main goal is to demonstrate their functionality and their capabilities.
We will see later that there is a huge gap between these public marketplaces and their
implementation in business contexts. On their side, real-money prediction markets, with
the exception of the IEM, are mostly related to gambling platforms.
To attract enough traders or gamblers, public prediction markets have to choose sticky
claims and to focus on mass interest topics like sport events, box office, elections or
“people”-related news.
Iowa Electronic Market IEM is a well-known real-money prediction market, run by
the University of Iowa [16]. Created in 1988, it is the longest-running real-money prediction
market. Often cited for its election markets [48], the IEM was also used for many different
topics like the Google IPO [17], the incidence of influenza or movie box office receipts [62, 64].
After 20 years of experiments, the IEM is the richest source of studies on prediction markets.
Berg et al. [20] summarize the main facts learned from these experiments. First of all,
traders are not a random sample of the voting population. This is a very important finding
regarding prediction markets [65]. It confirms that the traders must not be representative
of the aimed population. This mostly explains their efficiency compared to polls. Next,
traders are biased by their preferences. Even if they are asked to predict the outcome of
an issue, they tend to act with their own preference in mind. However, the presence of
informed traders and their expectation of making a profit efficiently correct this deviation.
Further, Gruca and Berg [63] and Berg et al. [13] found that the IEM prices are accurate,
both relative to the next best alternative (polls) and in absolute terms. Berg et al. [13]
also show that “IEM prices were more stable than polls, responded less to transient events
than polls, and were closer to election outcomes than the average poll when the election
was more than one week away”. Finally, they found that the IEM prices respond quickly to
news [127]. Such ability was already well known in traditional stock markets. For example,
Maloney and Mulherin [110] found that in 1986, the NYSE correctly identified the guilty
company for the crash of Challenger within hours, whereas it took months for the experts
to come to the same conclusion.
Hollywood Stock Exchange HSX is a prediction market along the same lines as the
IEM, which allows people to use virtual currency to speculate on movie-related questions
like box office success and outcomes of the Oscars awards. Pennock et al. [128] found that
“prices of movie stocks are good predictors of actual box office performance, and that prices
of award securities serve as accurate likelihood assessments of eventual winners”. They
also observed that traders underpriced the best-performing movies while they overpriced
worst-performing ones. This phenomenon, also called the favourite-longshot bias, was
heavily studied [18, 42, 94, 152] but no significant effect on the market accuracy was
detected. Finally, Pennock et al. [128] compared the results of the HSX market with five
experts’ opinions and found that the market’s score surpassed the scores of all five experts
individually, and of their consensus.
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TradeSports and Intrade Both these real-money public prediction markets or gambling
forums were run by the same company but are now separated. Created initially for sports
events, they now hosts a rich set of political, financial, entertainment and sports contracts.
Borghesi [23] studied the 2002, 2003 and 2004 NFL seasons on TradeSports and found
that “asset values differ significantly from prices only between kickoff and contract expiry”.
Moreover, he discovered that the contracts are subject to being overpriced after new
information arrive—in this case, a goal—especially when the incoming news is negative.
Tetlock [162] observed that “there is a significant reverse favorite-longshot bias in contracts
based on sports games on TradeSports; but there is no such bias in financial contracts”.
This is surprising, considering that both the players and the market mechanism were
the same. So in conclusion, he found that financial markets for short-term contracts are
relatively efficient despite numerous obstacles to arbitrage.
Finally, TradeSports was subject to two studies on the incidence of real-money versus
play-money on the market accuracy. Servan-Schreiber et al. [146] and Rosenbloom and
Notz [140] compared the results of both TradeSports and NewsFuture. The first ones
compared the 2003/04 NFL season on both markets. They found, as expected, that the
prediction markets were both more accurate than individual humans. Furthermore, they
found that the play-money market performed as well as the real-money market. They tried
to explain this similarity by the presence of “two opposing forces: real-money markets
may better motivate information discovery while play-money markets may yield more
efficient information aggregation. Rosenbloom and Notz [140], in their study, used a
sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) to compare the results of NFL, DJIA and US
team sports (basketball and baseball) markets. Like Servan-Schreiber et al. [146], they
found no statistical differences between the real-money and play-money NFL markets.
However, the DJIA market showed that TradeSports was clearly superior to the play-money
NewsFutures. Unfortunately there are currently no theoretical explanations to understand
this difference. Thus, if these results could be replicated, it could severely trouble the
adoption of prediction markets for business applications given the legal and technical
hurdles linked to the use of real-money platforms.
Foresight Exchange FX is a play-money prediction market to test the ability to predict
the outcome of future events, check the odds of upcoming events, and make bets on, among
other things, science and technology events. It was launched in 1994 as a testbed for
Hanson’s Idea Future market. Although it has been running for a long time now, there are
almost no studies concerning its design or mechanism. Five years after the launch of FX,
Kittlitz [91] published his experiences and raised some issues. The first one refers to the
claim wording. As FX was the first market offering traders the possibility of creating their
own claims, they encountered various problems concerning claim wording and judgment.
To overcome these issues, they implemented a dedicated mailing-list to discuss the wording
of claims before their release on the market. Furthermore, as FX assesses mostly long-term
issues, Pennock et al. [129] found that its forecasts “strongly correlate with outcome
frequencies”. Thus, it is not yet known if prediction markets are able to provide reliable
forecasts of events which will only be settled in 10 or more years.
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Tech Buzz Game Yahoo! Research launched its play-money market in collaboration
with O’Reilly concerning the future of technology. It is also the first market using the
dynamic pari-mutuel (DPM) automated market maker algorithm from Pennock [126].
Each share on the platform was associated with a buzz score–the number of search for
a certain word during the past seven days on yahoo.com. Traders were invited to trade
according to both the stock price and the buzz score, buying stocks where prices appear low
compared to expected future buzz scores [111]. Chen et al. [31] studied more carefully the
predictability of DPMs. They examined whether prices of stocks follow their underlying
values and also “whether buzz scores increase (decrease) over time in the future when the
market implied buzz scores are higher (lower) than the current actual buzz scores”. Both
methods confirmed that the DPM succeeds in forecasting event trends. Moreover, they
compared human traders with robots placing random orders. Evidences show that, on
average, traders made a profit whereas robots made loss, confirming the predictability of
DPMs.
Policy Analysis Market A final example of public prediction markets is the contro-
versial and rapidly aborted PAM, or FutureMap [79, 77, 137, 134] sponsored by the US
Department of Defense, which was intending to allow speculating about strategic and
geopolitical issues. The cancellation of the project was more a reaction against its su-
pervisor, John Poindexter, and the Bush administration who named it to this function
than against the project itself. Thus, the resignation of Poindexter ensured the end of the
project.
The goal of the project was to test the ability of prediction markets to forecast overall
geopolitical trends. Using a new combinatorial trading technology (MSR) it should have
been able to estimate the effects of various policies, for example, betting “on the chance of
high levels of civil unrest in Saudi Arabia in the fourth quarter of 2004, conditional on the
US moving its troops out of there two quarters earlier” [79].
After the cancellation, Hanson, the main researcher working on this project, presented
five design issues related to real terrorism futures [79], as this was the main argument used
by the senators against the policy analysis market: (1) combinatorics, (2) manipulation,
(3) moral hazard, (4) hiding prices and (5) decision selection bias. He also shows that these
problems are not insurmountable and that real terrorism futures appears to be technically
realistic. In March 2007, Weigle, a colonel at the US Army War College, wrote a proposal
to use prediction markets as another tool in the intelligence kitbag [170]. He concludes
that prediction markets “will not reveal brilliant insights about terrorist intentions; they
won’t provide tactical initiative but may prevent strategic surprise”.
2.8.2 Enterprise prediction markets
There are currently many companies running experiments on prediction markets to
support business forecasts. These forecasts are very broad: sales, new products, project
management, etc. Thus, there is currently not much published research on these internal
markets. We will therefore focus on some published experiments made by Siemens, Google,
HP, GE and Rite Solutions, which present interesting results and are an important source
of inspiration for our own design. Most results were related to the behavior of the markets
in the business environment rather than to modeling issues, giving us more insight on
real-life setups.
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Siemens In 1997, the University of Technology Vienna ran a six-month prediction market
experiment at Siemens Austria to support decisions in project management [123, 122].
Given that project management techniques often fail to rapidly recognize delays and
problems, generally due to a unwillingness to inform about these issues, Siemens was
looking for a tool to better collect this information from knowledgeable people. In fact,
people involved in these problems could be afraid of suffering negative feedback when
communicating about them. So, in order to improve their project management process,
Siemens decided to use prediction markets as a tool to anonymously aggregate and evaluate
information on project issues. They ran an internal prediction market to predict the progress
(due date) of a software project to improve their conventional planning tools.
Two hundred engineers were asked to invest real money in the market to predict the
finishing date as exactly as possible. Sixty people invested 100 ATS of their own money in
addition to 200 ATS provided as an endowment by the company after a brief introductory
meeting. The question asked was: “Can the project be finished in the planned time
horizon”. Traders could choose to invest in a winner-takes-all contract or a contract with a
linear payoff function based on the delay (sooner or later) in weeks. Ortner [122] found
that after a month, the price on the two markets was quite stable. Moreover, at the end
of the experiment, “25% of the traders mentioned that they had problems with the use
of the market”. He suggests that traders need some time to become familiar with the
tool (concepts) and the software (user interface) before producing relevant aggregated
information. He also noticed that in order to be more productive, participants need an
extensive training before opening the market.
The results of the market were impressive as they correctly predicted a delay of 2–3 weeks
(13 days in practice) 3 month before the scheduled deadline. Participants “anticipated
new information, rumors and personal feelings long before official sources published official
statements”. Based on this success, Siemens ran a second experiment “to predict shifts in
estimated expenditures of large software projects”.
Google From 2005 to 2007, Google launched the largest corporate prediction market
experiments. The market was used to forecast product launch dates, new office openings
and many other items of strategic importance to Google. Each quarter, they created about
25–30 different markets based on winner-takes-all claims. The payoff was a lottery incentive
based on traders’ performance.
Cowgill et al. [37] show that the market suffered some biases, remaining reasonably
efficient. These biases were mostly due to employee optimism and favorite bias. Studying
these biases, Cowgill et al. [37] found that they were “partly driven by the trading of
newly hired employees”, more experienced employees being better calibrated. This finding
suggests that “corporate prediction markets may perform better as collective experience
increases”. This seems to go against recent experiments lasting couple of minutes or
hours.
Moreover, Cowgill et al. [37] found that the prediction market was able to provide
insight into how organizations process information. They observed the physical location in
the buildings of employees placing orders. They also followed the frequent office moves
of the traders. They concluded that there is a strong correlation between the opinions
expressed on the market and the physical proximity of employees.
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HP Plott and Chen [133] present the deployment of a real-money information aggregation
mechanism (IAM) inside Hewlett-Packard for the purpose of making printer sales forecasts,
showing that IAM performed better than traditional methods employed inside Hewlett-
Packard. Between 7 and 24 traders from marketing and finance departments as well from
HP Labs were active on 12 one-week markets during the three years of the experiment.
Traders from HP Labs where included in the experiment to increase the liquidity of
the market, although they had no real information to share on the market. There were
important participation variations between the markets with a tendency to lose participants
over time, ending with seven active participants for the final experiment. Moreover, the
markets were only open during lunch and after work time.
Despite there being a very low participation, Plott and Chen [133] show that (1) IAM
predictions outperformed official HP forecasts, (2) market probability distributions are
consistent with actual outcomes and (3) “IAM makes accurate qualitative predictions
about the direction that the actual outcome will occur (above or below) relative to the
official forecast”. Furthermore, this experiment shows that prediction markets could be
efficiently used in a corporate environment. The main advantages of prediction markets
in this context are their flexibility (they can aggregate any type of information spread
throughout an organization), their scalability (they can support any number of participants,
geographical repartition or duration) and their incentive to reveal the truth. However, in
spite of these results, the main unresolved issue encountered during these experiments was
the lack of participation and the difficulty of motivating them to be active on the market,
as shown in other real-world experiments.
GE In order to elicit and rank-order ideas on new technologies, products and research
areas, GE designed the Imagination Market and used it more than ten times in various
contexts and for different purposes [96, 157]. The Imagination Market is a “preference
market” designed to support the ideation process for large and globally distributed teams,
allowing continuous contributions and ranking of ideas [96]. They chose to use such
markets to overcome the principal issues they encountered with traditional methods like
brainstorming sessions or suggestion boxes and studied the effectiveness of information
markets “as an idea generation and ranking tool” [96].
LaComb et al. [97] made a very in-depth study of designing information markets,
discussing various common issues like payoff functions, incentive mechanisms and market
mechanisms. She proposes a comprehensive list of information market design factors to
help building such tools. Nevertheless, given the variety of applications potentially based
on information markets, this list is more a specifically targeted subset for the Imagination
Market.
Two different experiments ran at GE [96, 157] conclude that information markets are
quite good at supporting ideation processes, but don’t overcome traditional methods
for ranking elicited ideas. The additional benefits resulting from this approach include
“providing immediate feedback, allowing visibility of all ideas to all contributors, and being
a fun mechanism for consensus building”. In conclusion, GE’s experiments show that
information markets are more efficient in generating and eliciting ideas than traditional
methods, resulting in more valuable ideas for the enterprise. However, they are not better
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in ranking these ideas, given the results of the experiments. To be sure that this is really the
case, one would have to do further research in this area, using both approaches (traditional
and information market) on the same sample.
Rite-Solutions The Innovation Engine is an information market based on the same
principles as the Imagination Market from GE. The goal of the Innovation Engine is
to “develop a mechanism that could operationalize innovation by tapping the collective
genius in the organization in a non-intimidating, fun way to generate these good ideas
continuously” [98]. The engine works with the whole ideation process in the company,
supporting each step of the process. Employees can draft a new idea, find a broker to help
them to refine their idea and make the IPO. Once announced, the idea can be bought by
other employees and added to their portfolio, raising the price of this idea. The 20 most
valued ideas are budgeted to get official support from the company. After that, they enter
a phase where all employees can work on these ideas given their own competencies and
preferences for supporting the realization of the inventors’ ideas. If successful, the idea is
removed from the market and the inventor and investors are rewarded based on a reward
plan elaborated at the same time as the budget.
As Lavoie [98] is the CEO of the company, the findings from this case are based on
his own experiences with the engine in solving innovation process issues. First, it allows
every employee to be part of the process, not only the leaders or the most extrovert. This
allows the majority of the intellectual bandwidth to drive the company. It also supports
24/7 innovation, compared to “just-in-time” innovation as implied by traditional methods.
Finally, it provokes thought. Employees are motivated to participate in the process, buying
shares of good ideas or helping inventors to take their idea further. So far the results using
the Innovation Engine at Rite-Solutions are very encouraging and have generated many
successful ideas resulting in new products or patents.
The Rite-Solutions study confirms the results obtained at GE, stating that information
markets are very efficient in supporting an ideation process. Furthermore, given the
relative lack of success in ranking ideas at GE, the Innovation Engine approach should be
considered for further developments. Not only using financial valuation, but also valuing
the willingness to actively support the idea working on it, this approach seems to be
better at catching the real value of the ideas. This approach goes one step further in
crowd-sourcing the ideation process.
2.8.3 Experiments with business prediction markets
STOC The MIT Securities Trading of Concepts or STOC used the pricing mechanism for
marketing research using a pseudo-securities market to measure preferences relating to new
products. Participants were asked to “express their preferences over new product concepts
by trading virtual securities” [27]. This application differs from traditional prediction
markets in that there is no external objective “truth” that can be used to settle the market.
It must be put in the family of the preference markets. In three experiments, between
20 and 60 participants were asked to give their preferences on bicycle pumps, crossover
vehicles and laptop bags. Each experiment was empirically tested against preferences
24 CHAPTER 2. USING MARKETS TO FORECAST UNCERTAINTY
measured through traditional methods. The “experiments reveal that the market prices of
securities designed to represent product concepts are remarkably efficient, accurate, and
internally consistent measures of preferences, even when conducted with relatively few
traders” [27].
The goal of STOC is to assess preferences for product concepts that may never come
into existence and may never have actual outcomes, like assessing R&D portfolios. Traders
were given 10–60 minutes to give their preferences, buying or selling product concepts.
Unlike prediction markets, the only information available was the product information,
the trader’s personal preferences, their expectation of others’ preferences and the price
movements. The only incentive was peer recognition. Using a volume-weighted average
price (VWAP) they tried to predict potential market share for various product prototypes.
Results are encouraging, as the STOC performed better than traditional methods in the
majority of the cases. Chan et al. [27] also “note the importance of clear and salient stimuli,
and the need for training and priming traders prior to the start of STOC games”. Lack
of good stimuli led to bad results, as did the lack of good claim description in traditional
prediction markets.
New Product Development “Preference markets address the need for scalable, fast
and engaging market research in new product development (NPD)” [38]. Currently, with
the emergence of crowd-sourcing, companies are confronted with new issues related to
NPD. To address customers’ needs and propositions, they need to prioritize hundreds of
design decisions. To support this process, preference markets offers a flexible prioritization
methodology for product features and concepts. The benefits of these markets include
“speed (less than one hour per trading experiment), scalability (question capacity grows
linearly with the number of traders) and flexibility (features and concepts can be tested
simultaneously)” [38].
To address these issues, Dahan et al. [38] designed a preference market based on a double-
auction mechanism with a random end to avoid boundary effects at the end of trading.
Stocks were representing various mutually exclusive product choices. The scalability was
assured by randomly assigning small groups of traders to small groups of stocks, where
the same stocks were traded by more than one group, to allow for cross-testing between
the trader groups. They found that “preference markets can be scalable by virtue of an
experimental design that matches traders with a convenient number of stocks, and creating
trading links between the groups” [38]. They also validated the idea that self preferences
influence expectations of others more than others influence self preferences. Moreover,
Soukhoroukova and Spann [155] show that preference markets for NPD are very efficient
in terms of required participants compared to traditional methods requiring more than
ten times as many participants. Furthermore, it is relatively easy to find participants for
preference market experiments, compared with traditional market research methods.
2.9 Law and policy
2.9.1 Legality and regulation
Since 1988 and the launch of the IEM, the legality of prediction markets is a recurring
topic among scientists. In February 1992, the IEM received a no-action letter from the
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CFTC concerning the 2002 presidential election market that allowed them to run academic
prediction market experiments with small investments ($500). 2 Thus, this no-action letter
concerns only the IEM and does not preclude having to comply with state laws.
Currently, there are two main legal issues concerning prediction markets in the USA:
compliance with the CFTC and with the gambling regulations. Concerning the CFTC,
even if the “means and ends of prediction materially differ from the means and ends of
commodity futures markets” [9] they would probably be subject the CFTC regulation.
Bell [9] argues that the “laws that menace prediction markets do so almost accidentally.
Those statutes and regulations arose in response to quite different transactions, long before
anyone had even conceived of prediction markets”. Thus, the current uncertainty holds
back operators from running such markets, which slows down the research [105], and it
also discourages people using them, being afraid of committing a crime by so doing.
However, there are some signs that prediction markets could avoid the CFTC regulation.
First of all, prediction markets differs from securities markets in that they transfer wealth
between informed and less foresighted traders while securities markets merely amass it [9].
Thus, prediction markets could fall under the “hybrid instrument” exclusion from CFTC
jurisdiction, “winning their preemptive protection from state gaming and bucket shop laws”
[9]. Moreover, being subject to CFTC regulations will definitely raise the opportunity cost
of running such markets. Many papers discuss strategies to deal with this issue. First of
all, companies operating internal prediction markets should ensure that their markets do
not support significant hedging functions and treat their market’s claims and prices as
trade secrets [10]. Furthermore, they should clearly notify the traders that the market
does not deal in CFTC regulated instruments.
In the case of a regulation, Hahn [69] proposes that the federal government “implements
a clear policy that allows information markets that serve a useful economic purpose”
and that the CFTC regulates them. To lower the impact of this regulation on small
experiments, they also propose that small-stake prediction markets that limit the size of
investments or stay below certain volume or revenue caps should be exempted from the
CFTC regulations. Furthermore, in the case of internal prediction markets, firms should
be allowed to self-certify their prediction market contracts. However, Bell [9] proposes the
creation of a federal Scientific Prediction Exchange Act to guarantee that the CFTC would
have no authority over scientific prediction exchanges, arguing that CFTC regulations will
unavoidably restrain the adoption of these tools.
The second issue concerning gambling regulations should be addressed at both federal
and state levels. There are currently two ways of dealing with it. The easiest one is for it
to fall under the CFTC regulation. In this case, prediction markets will be protected from
state laws. The other one is to demonstrate that prediction markets do not comply with the
requirements of the gambling laws. As gambling supposes prize, chance and consideration,
prediction markets emphasize skill-based trading rather than chance. Furthermore, reducing
the revenues or forbidding traders from investing their own funds will definitely protect
them from these laws [10].
2. No-action letter from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) Division of Trading and Markets, to George R. Neumann, Professor of Economics, University of
Iowa (5 February 1992); http://www.cftc.gov/files/foia/repfoia/foirf0503b002.pdf
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However, for Bell [9] the most probable solution is that “prediction markets will win
legal status under US law by default, thanks to what people come to accept as an ordinary
and beneficial practice rather than what courts, politicians, or regulators proclaim”.
Finally, 19 scholars wrote an open letter in Science, asking the CFTC and Congress to
free prediction markets of unnecessary government restrictions [5]. They propose three
scenarios where the use of prediction markets should be eligible for safe harbor treatments:
first, the not-for-profit platforms operated by research institutions for research purposes,
like the IEM; second, platforms operated by government agencies like, the PAM project;
third, internal markets operated by corporations with no research goals but limited to
their employees or contractors. These exchanges should be self-regulated, given that their
operators would make reasonable efforts to keep them free from fraud and manipulation.
Moreover, the operators of these markets should be able to test various designs, incentives,
payoff functions and manipulation schemes to improve their overall design and help the
progress of science.
At the same time, the CFTC issued a Request for Public Comment on Concept Release
on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts 3. This request seems to show
a real willingness on the part of the CFTC to consider reasonable options and arguments
for regulating prediction markets. Thus, at the moment, the CFTC seems to only consider
not-for-profit, IEM-like prediction markets as exempt from its jurisdiction.
2.9.2 Public policy and decision making
Many scholars are studying the implications of using prediction markets for public policy.
For Ledyard [100] policy analysis is about the acquisition and organization of dispersed
information in order to better inform a decision that has to be made. In the context
of political decisions, prediction markets “could lead to large potential gains for both
individuals, firms, decision makers and the society” [21]. As individuals and firms could
better assess their risks based on the probability of various outcomes, decision makers could
measure the perceived impact of their decisions, and the society at large would benefit
from more informed decisions [76]. For example, Wolfers and Zitzewitz [175] studied the
impact of an increase in the probability of war in Iraq on the oil price. They found that a
10% increase in the probability of war was accompanied by a $1 increase in spot oil prices
[175].
We will now consider two applications of prediction markets related to public policy.
The first one is designed to inform about the consequences of the decisions (advised policy)
[21, 44, 76, 100, 175] and the second is designed to inform about the costs and benefits of
different projects (performance-based policy) [67, 70].
3. http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/
e8-9981a.pdf
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Advised policy The role of the prediction market is to estimate the consequences of
decisions. To achieve this goal, policymakers should create markets offering conditional
shares related to the consequences of the policy if it is enforced or not. For example, in the
case of the US health insurance, such a market could offer shares based on the estimate of
US lifespan in 2020 given that president Obama was able to enforce his project, while other
shares will estimate the lifespan given that his project was not enforced. The difference
between the two predictions will give the aggregated estimate of the impact of Obama’s
project on the US lifespan, giving an indicator of the effectiveness of his reform.
To apply prediction markets to policy situations, one should consider two aspects [100].
The first one is that such markets would deal with many correlated contracts. Traditional
market mechanisms are not able to support this. Ledyard [100] proposes using Hanson
market-scoring rule function supporting conditional contracts [80]. The second is to leverage
enough incentive to achieve accurate aggregation of information.
Einbinder [44] distinguishes three types of decisions that should benefit from the use
of prediction markets. The first, contingency decisions, are incidental to the prediction
and have no impact on the decision itself. For example, a citizen would sell land if the
prediction that a motorway will be built nearby rose, but selling land would not impact the
prediction itself. The second type of decision affects the prediction but not the definition of
the underlying claim. For example, a low prediction for a vote concerning a new museum
could motivate politicians to invest more resources in the campaign and hopefully affect
the prediction, but the change in the prediction itself will not affect the vote. The last type
of decision affects both the prediction and the definition of the underlying claim. In this
case, decisions are based on the prediction. For example, one should only enforce a policy
if the prediction is greater than a certain percentage. A bad prediction would impact the
policy but also the prediction itself, because the cancellation of the policy will also cancel
the underlying claim.
Hanson [76] presents seven design issues when dealing with policy markets. These issues
concern: the importance of enough of the claims to attract traders; their strong influence
to limit the noise; the clear enough settlement rules to avoid ambiguities; the presence of
measured outcomes to identify how they were influenced by the decision; the participation
of enough informed traders; the creation of enough incentive to disclose all information;
the guarantee of the anonymity of the traders; and the difficulty of changing the reality to
modify the prediction. In conclusion, policy markets “will not function effectively without
the ability to create distinct options that have a measurable influence on relevant aggregate
outcomes, and the problem has to be important enough to be worth paying to give traders,
some of them insiders, enough incentive to trade” [76].
Performance-based policy This approach combines the use of prediction markets with
payments for performance. Hahn and Tetlock [70] present “a framework for designing
contracts that provides information on the costs, benefits, and net benefits of different
policy proposals”. The underlying idea is that the policymaker specifies a performance
measure for project benefits and lets it be estimated by a prediction market. The prediction
market will estimate the performance measure with and without project realization (this
is like our previous example on US health insurance). The difference between the two
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estimations is the benefit of the project. Then the government, based on the expected
benefit will decide to auction the right to implement the project. The resulting auction
price is the net benefit. At the end, if the net benefit from auction is greater than the
minimum acceptable price, government decides to fund. This process allows government
to rely on a more informed assessment of policy proposals. Moreover, carefully analyzing
the benefits of each policy will enable a greater availability of assets for financing priority
projects.
Hahn and Tetlock [67] show the benefits of using such a method. The contracts could
be based on numerous contingencies and could address most of the policies; these markets
could efficiently assess critical public policy issues; they provide a strong foundation for
implementing a variety of government oversight mechanisms; and they could provide more
transparency in governmental decision making.
In conclusion, “combining information markets with paying for performance has the
potential to improve how policies are delivered. In addition to providing economic benefits,
the system will enable lawmakers to hold bureaucrats more accountable for results. And
ultimately, voters will be able to hold their elected officials more accountable for expenditures
on economic development” [70]. This new process could substantially change the nature of
legislative and regulatory oversight.
2.10 Open problems
Based on the previous literature review and on our interests, we can draw out three
problems currently not addressed by the research community and that we will address
in this thesis: (1) key design factors for prediction markets based on the instantiation
context, (2) appropriateness of prediction markets for complex predictions (R&D, technology
foresight, ideation, . . . ) and (3) efficiency of prediction markets compared to traditional
forecasting methods. There are of course more problems to be addressed in the areas of
aggregation mechanisms, legality, efficiency versus adequacy or market maker algorithms,
but they are outside the scope of this research.
2.10.1 Key design factors for prediction markets based on the instanti-
ation context
Currently, there are several studies presenting some design factors for prediction markets
applied to some specific context. Therefore, it is currently not possible to rely on these
factors for building a prediction market platform for a specific usage. We propose to
develop a set of necessary design factors to support the design of specific prediction markets
based on their implementation context. Our goal is to support the requirement engineering
process by providing all the design factors and their values for generic or specific prediction
market designs. In Part II, we will collect, define and instantiate these design factors for
various prediction market applications.
Practitioners need an exhaustive typology of design factors to support the development
and the instantiation of prediction markets in companies.
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2.10.2 Appropriateness of prediction markets for complex predictions
Our previous literature survey shows various usages of prediction markets, mostly for
elections (which must be distinguished from policies, which are complex issues), sports
and entertainment issues. The common denominator of these applications is the relative
simplicity of the issues addressed. They can be mostly summarized by “will the event X
occurs at time t”, where X can be the result of an election, a given number of entries at
the box office, a score during a game, even an event conditional to an other one.
We propose to explore new instantiations of prediction markets to solve complex R&D or
technological issues. Given their ability to aggregate bits of dispersed information among
various stakeholders, prediction markets should be able to help solving complex forecasting
issues. Our goal is to design and evaluate new prediction markets to solve forecasting
issues in the field of R&D portfolio management and technological foresight. In Part III,
we will present three innovative designs and usages of prediction markets.
Research should demonstrate that prediction markets are appropriate and accurate when
applied to complex issues like technology assessment.
2.10.3 Efficiency of prediction markets compared to traditional forecast-
ing methods
Finally, even if prediction markets seems to be able to accurately predict the outcome of
various issues, their adoption will largely depend on their efficiency compared to established
methods, techniques and tools. Various studies showed that the adoption of new technologies
or products depends on their internal and external qualities, but also on the effort needed
to switch from the old one to the new one. In our context, this effort will be concerned
with implementing a new method, using a new tool, learning a new technique, etc. To be
successfully diffused and adopted, the benefit of using prediction markets should overcome
the effort needed to use them.
Given that there is little room to dramatically improve the accuracy of predictions to
overcome the effort needed for their adoption, we propose to show that prediction markets
could be more efficient than traditional approaches in specific contexts. Our goal is to
show that for specific activities like technological forecasting, prediction markets are more
efficient than traditional methods and lead to comparable results. In chapter 7, we will
compare two technological forecasting methods and examine their key success factors.
Research should demonstrate that prediction markets are efficient compared to traditional
approaches for addressing the assessment of technologies.

Part II
Design Process
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This chapter introduces design science as a type of theory in information systems (IS).
We then present design science research (DSR) theory building, methodology and evaluation
processes. Finally, we introduce our own research process and the resulting contents of this
thesis.
3.1 Introduction
The nature of the problems we intend to solve in this thesis naturally leads us to consider
using a design science (DS) approach.
According to Weber [169], design science offers IS a much needed paradigm, carving out
a niche for that research discipline. Moreover, according to March and Smith [113], there
are two legitimate kinds of scientific interest in the information systems domain: (1) a
natural and social sciences approach seeking to understand reality, (2) a design science
approach aiming at creating artifacts that serve human purposes. The second one is also
named “science of the artificial” by Simon [148] and defined as “a body of knowledge about
artificial (man-made) objects and phenomena designed to meet certain desired goals”.
Moreover “rather than being in conflict, however, both activities can be encompassed under
a broad notion of science that includes two distinct species termed natural and design
science” [113].
Information Systems Design Research (ISDR) emerged in the 1980s and became a distinct
line of research in IS in the late 1990s. Even though ISDR has gained in importance
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during the past 20 years, there is still no widely accepted definition. For Vaishnavi and
Kuechler [166], “design research involves the analysis of the use and performance of designed
artifacts to understand, explain and very frequently to improve on the behavior of aspects
of Information Systems”. These artifacts could be IS, but could also take the form of
algorithms, human/computer interfaces and system design methodologies or languages.
Thus ISDR should not be limited to artifacts, but should also explore “design environments,
design education, cognitive processes of design as relevant to the support of the design
process and much more topics” [95]. They conclude: “if the core of information systems is
the artifact then surely its heart is increasing understanding of every aspect of the design
process by which these artifacts are brought into being”.
3.2 Understanding DSR
In their widely read paper, Hevner et al. [84] “describe the performance of design-science
research in IS via a concise conceptual framework and clear guidelines for understanding,
executing, and evaluating the research”. The conceptual framework, illustrated in Figure
3.1, consists mainly of three distinctive loops: (1) the relevance loop (addressing a class of
problems [167]), (2) the rigor loop (building from and contributing to the knowledge base)
and (3) the develop/build and justify/evaluate loop. In this framework, the relevance and
rigor loops support and entertain the design activity represented by the develop/build and
justify/evaluate loop. During the design process, this loop will be iteratively run, assessing
and refining the design, to meet the desired goals.
To support researchers, Hevner et al. [84] developed seven guidelines for “understanding,
executing, and evaluating the research”. By definition, design science research must produce
a viable artifact (Guideline 1) to address important and relevant problems (Guideline 2).
This artifact must yield utility, and its quality and efficacy must be rigorously evaluated
(Guideline 3). Furthermore, design science research must provide innovative contributions
in both areas (Guideline 4) and use rigorous methods to support the build/evaluate process
(Guideline 5). The search process induced by this loop, should lead to an effective solution
(Guideline 6). Finally, the findings from the design science research should be able to be
communicated to both technical and management audiences (Guideline 7). They also state
that these guidelines should be carefully used, given the particular research that one would
conduct. They are not a checklist to follow step by step to guarantee a successful design
science research.
3.3 Building a DSR theory
Following Gregor [59] presentation of the five types of theory in IS, and inspired by
the work of Walls et al. [167] on the specification of information systems design theories
(ISDT), Gregor and Jones [60] developed an anatomy of design theories in IS to address
the research conducted using the theory type V (theory for design and action). Their goal
is to support “specifying design theory so that it can be communicated, justified, and
developed cumulatively” but also to “address explicitly problems associated with the role of
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Figure 3.1: Information systems research framework
instantiations and the specification of design theories for methodologies and interventions
as well as for products and applications” [60].
For this purpose, they identified eight components of design theories: (1) purpose and
scope, (2) constructs, (3) principles of form and function, (4) artifact mutability, (5) testable
propositions, (6) justificatory knowledge (kernel theories), (7) principles of implementation
and (8) an expository instantiation. “The listing of the theory components gives some
guidelines to what might be included in an article or thesis that reports constructive
research” [60]. They also expect that all components would be present in an achieved
theory.
3.4 DSR methodology
Peffers et al. [125] present, demonstrate and evaluate a methodology for conducting
design science research in IS, that they call a design science research methodology (DSRM).
The aim of the DSRM is to provide principles, practices and procedures to researchers to
carry effective design science research. The process includes six steps or stages: (1) problem
identification and motivation, (2) definition of the objectives for a solution, (3) design and
development, (4) demonstration, (5) evaluation and (6) communication. Even if their goal
is to formalize the DSRM, the authors also warn that “researchers should by no means
draw any inference that the DSRM is the only appropriate methodology with which to
conduct such research”. They stress this point presenting five alternatives to their DSRM
that could be used in the design science research context.
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3.5 DSR evaluation
Design science artifacts allow many types of evaluations depending on their form. The
rich phenomena that emerge from the interaction of people, organizations and technology
could be qualitatively assessed to yield an understanding of the phenomena adequate for
theory development or problem solving [93]. As field studies enable behavioral science
researchers to understand organizational phenomena in context, the process of constructing
and exercising innovative IS artifacts enables design science researchers to understand
the problem addressed by the artifact and the feasibility of their approach to its solution
[117].
Pries-Heje et al. [136] propose a strategic DSR evaluation framework (Table 3.1)
which supports researchers in selecting evaluation strategies. The framework expands the
traditional ex post perspective embraced by the majority of the researchers. It “encompasses
both ex ante and ex post orientations as well as naturalistic settings (e.g., case studies)
and artificial settings (e.g., lab experiments) for DSR evaluation” [136].
Table 3.1: Strategic DSR evaluation framework
Ex Ante Ex Post
Naturalistic Design process / design product Design process / design product
Artificial Design process / design product Design process / design product
3.6 Our DSR process
During the research which resulted in this thesis we followed a DSRM. Inspired by
Peffers et al. [125] and Hevner et al. [84] we iteratively built and evaluated various
prediction market designs to support our goals. Given Peffers et al. [125], we mainly
followed the design, demonstration and evaluation steps iteration loop three times before
concluding.
These three iterations were the occasion to build, test and finally refine our design in
various contexts. Furthermore, we chose a different evaluation processes for each iteration
loop. This thesis is structured according the six main DSRM steps as summarized in Figure
3.2.
Identify problem and motivate In chapter 2, we briefly presented the problems we
intend to solve with our new design of prediction markets. We then motivated our choice
through an extensive literature review.
Define objectives of a solution In the first sections of chapter 4, we present the design
of a prediction market. Starting from the main functions of a marketplace and finishing
with a complete typology of prediction market design factors.
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Design and development The later sections of chapter 4 present our development
process, the main functions of our first prototype and its architecture. In part III, we will
further refine and evaluate our artifact in various contexts.
Demonstration and evaluation In part III, we iteratively design, develop, evaluate
and refine three artifacts to support various experiments and contexts. The first iteration
concludes by presenting five design propositions for prediction markets for technology
assessment. The second iteration proposes a new prediction market process to support
R&D portfolio management. Finally, we compare the efficiency of prediction markets to
traditional approaches like MCDM and propose a comparison framework for technology
assessment tools. Each chapter presents a particular usage and context in order to solve
one specific problem and finishes with the presentation of our contributions, both academic
and professional.
Communication The final part of this work summarizes our findings both for a pro-
fessional and an academic audience. We also compare our research process with the
seven guidelines of Hevner et al. [84], supporting design science research, and outline an
information systems design theory based on the eight components of Gregor and Jones
[60].
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This chapter determines the main requirements of a prediction market, based on the
electronic trading requirements as well as interviews with researchers working for a na-
tional competence center in research (NCCR). We then present the main functions and
the architecture of such software. Finally, we develop a typology of design factors to
support the development of prediction markets and present our own implementation named
MarMix.
4.1 Introduction
In 1992, Hanson [72] imagined running prediction markets to help researchers presenting
non-mainstream research ideas and getting funded. To achieve this goal, ideas should be
published on a marketplace and a fraction of the “value” of these ideas would be given to
the researcher to pursue his research.
Our main goal is to build and operate a prediction market to predict the emergence
and the evolution of mobile information and communication technologies. This implies
developing a modular platform that allows a great flexibility in the definition of the business
processes and which also enables us to track all the users’ activities and their behaviors on
the platform.
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To build such a platform, we first identified the general requirements of an electronic
trading platform like a stock exchange, conducted interviews with researchers and future
users of this platform and, finally, made an extensive literature review to identify the
main design factors of a prediction market. Combining these results with our previous
literature review in chapter 2 let us define 30 design factors that support the development
of a prediction market. Finally, we show how to instantiate these factors to build our first
prototype destined to predict the emergence and the evolution of mobile information and
communication technologies.
4.2 Electronic trading requirements
To identify the main functions of a prediction market platform, we first choose to rely
on the general electronic trading requirements. There are currently many electronic stock
exchanges, and their main functions are globally the same. As we have seen, prediction
markets are electronic marketplaces for trading securities, and they should support the
following functions [158]:
1. Order entry
2. Order execution
3. Order confirmation
4. Transfer of share ownership
5. Making payment
6. Market quotations
A prediction market also acting as a bank and a clearing house holding all the securities
and portfolios should also support:
7. Basic account management
8. Account endowment and guarantee
9. Statements of account
4.2.1 Order entry
Traders should be able to submit their orders in an efficient way, choosing between buy
or sell orders. An order is related to a particular security and contains a quantity of shares,
a type (limit or market) and, for limit orders, a limit price and a period of validity.
4.2.2 Order execution
The execution of the orders submitted by the traders is provided by the internal trading
mechanism of the market. As seen in chapter 2, there are different mechanisms available
such as CDA or CDAwMM. Given a certain trading mechanism, the market will try to
match the order with the best available opposite order in the book of orders. The book of
orders is the collection of all available orders at a given time.
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4.2.3 Order confirmation
Once executed, the order should be confirmed to the trader. The most important
information given to the trader in this process is the final transaction cost. Depending
on the trading mechanism and the size of the order, the order execution could result in
multiple transactions settled at different prices.
4.2.4 Transfer of share ownership
In a prediction market context, this action directly results from the order execution and
is made at the same time. This mainly consists in transferring shares from one trader
account to another.
4.2.5 Making payment
During the transfer of share ownership, the market also makes the appropriate payments
or withdrawals based on the final transaction cost. The clearing house is responsible for
guaranteeing enough liquidity for the withdrawal.
4.2.6 Securities quotations
The prediction market should also produce the necessary securities quotations to inform
the traders of the market evolution. These quotations are based on the final transaction
prices resulting from the orders’ execution.
4.2.7 Basic account management
Under account management, we include the trader’s identification, trader’s authen-
tication and opening and closing of accounts. These are basic features of electronic
marketplaces.
4.2.8 Account endowment and guarantee
The account endowment is very particular to prediction markets and other play-money
platforms. The goal of this endowment, as seen in section 2.7, is to provide initial liquidity
in the form of cash and/or shares to the traders. The account guarantee, on the other
hand, is a well-known mechanism in futures trading. It is managed by the clearing house
in order to guarantee enough liquidity for short orders (a trader selling shares that he does
not currently own).
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4.2.9 Statements of account
The statements of account are the final component of prediction market platforms.
They are the equivalent of the electronic or paper-based statements of account issued by
traditional banks. It gives the trader the possibility of knowing, at any time, the exact
value of its portfolio, as well as its history.
4.3 Electronic markets processes requirements
Kambil and van Heck [89] studied various forms of electronic markets, including prediction
markets, and defined five trade processes and five trade context processes. These ten
processes consist of the key processes underlying electronic trades. The first ones are
required in all transactions of goods and services (search, valuation, logistics, payments
and settlements, authentication) and the second ones are facilitators that help the course
of the transaction (communications and computing, product representation, legitimation,
influence and dispute resolution).
4.3.1 Search
This process supports buyers and sellers to identify opportunities. This results in the
publication of real-time price information for each claim, as well as the current book of
orders, in an open market.
4.3.2 Valuation (price negotiation)
This process supports the reaching of a price equilibrium through the buying and selling
actions. This process could be supported by a market maker in order to guarantee a
minimum liquidity on the market. Again, depending on the market settings, an open book
of orders can provide useful advice on how to reach this equilibrium.
4.3.3 Logistics
This process specifies and coordinates the delivery of goods or services from sellers to
buyers. In our case, this process presents no major challenge, all deliveries being supported
by the marketplace and being mostly done for informational purposes.
4.3.4 Payment and settlements
This process ensures the settlement of payments. There are some key issues in this area.
First, depending on the settings (short selling allowed), we should ensure that all traders
have enough liquidity in order to process the payments at the settlement of the claims.
This is traditionally supported by the clearing houses. Second, we have to ensure that all
relevant information can be aggregated in the market, providing enough liquidity to the
traders.
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4.3.5 Authentication
This process covers a broad range of activities in the case of goods or services exchanges.
In our context, this covers the authentication of the traders, strictly enforced or not, and
the judgment of the claims at the settlement date.
4.3.6 Communications and computing
These processes support the operation of the marketplace. In our case, as everything is
done electronically, this set of processes constitutes the core of the artifact.
4.3.7 Product representation
This process determines how the product attributes are presented to the traders. This
consists of the claim definition and representation. A standardized process could help traders
discover trading opportunities and thus improve the whole aggregating mechanism.
4.3.8 Legitimation
This process is used to validate the exchange agreement. This has little importance
in our context, transactions being processed by the platform without interference of the
traders.
4.3.9 Influence structures and processes
These processes implement mechanisms to enforce obligations. In our context, the
main part is undertaken by the payment and settlements process, more precisely, by the
clearing house. The second part of this process, the actions taken to enhance or create a
good reputation, are part of the incentive mechanisms deployed to attract and retain the
traders.
4.3.10 Dispute resolution
This process supports the resolution of disputes among parties. In our context, the
disputes concern the judgment of the claims at their settlement date. An open process
should guarantee to each trader access to the facts on which the settlement is based.
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4.4 Specific requirements in a research community
Prediction markets are currently not widely deployed within R&D centers and universities,
so we were unable to use existing literature to define the properties of a prediction market
dedicated to research forecasting. In order to define the main characteristics of the
platform, we carried out a series of six interviews with professors of the EPFL involved in
the MICS project. These discussions enabled us to evaluate the difficulties which might be
encountered when running this platform in the framework of a research project like MICS.
They informed us of their reservations, but also gave us example claims which could be
tested on such a market.
The outcome of these interviews is that in order to support the greatest possible
interaction with the researchers, the prediction market must be (1) easy to use without
prior knowledge of stock exchange mechanisms; (2) offer complete anonymity to the users;
(3) restrict access to research community members and (4) carry out the transactions in
an automated way, not requiring user intervention once the orders are submitted. From a
more technical point of view, the market should be accessible at any time and any place
by the project community while preventing access by external people.
4.4.1 Anonymity
For a research community, it is essential to guarantee the anonymity of both the
transactions and the contents of the portfolio. This is required to avoid problems inside
research teams as well as between them. Once successfully guaranteed, anonymity will
enable the market to significantly aggregate information. Disclosure of the trader’s identity
during a transaction would either result in speculation based on the knowledge of a
prominent actor instead of the knowledge of each individual trader at a time t, or in
tensions between teams or researchers seeing their work undervalued by their peers. The
same applies regarding the composition of the portfolios. The disclosure of their composition
would allow every trader to precisely know the opinion of a particular trader regarding
the chances of success of their own project or idea. This could lead to social strains or
bias, traders being encouraged to compose their portfolio based on their superior beliefs
or feeling disparaged by a colleague granting little interest to their project. In addition,
anonymity protects the credibility of the traders who made poor predictions or predictions
going against the mainstream.
Moreover, researches on the use of anonymity in group decision support systems (GDSS),
show that groups working anonymously produce better results–in this case, decisions–than
groups working without anonymity [34]. Jessup et al. showed that in a GDSS context,
anonymity reduce behavioral constraints on group members and led them to contribute
more freely [87].
Thus, it is mainly for social reasons that the market will have to guarantee the complete
anonymity of the traders. Anonymity is easy to integrate into such a platform and it could
be compared with the relative anonymity granted on traditional stockmarkets.
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4.4.2 Confidentiality
Two main issues regarding confidentiality were raised during the interviews: the guarantee
of the intellectual property and the confidentiality of the internal evaluations as regards
external (funding) partners.
Intellectual property Researchers are very cautious about sharing early research as-
sumptions with others, and even more so when it is within a marketplace. Thus, to facilitate
the emergence of new ideas, concepts or applications, it is imperative that the market
should be restricted to members of the research community. However, to be introduced
onto the market, a new claim will have to be precisely described, allowing its evaluation at
settlement. This supposes, in many cases, a scientific publication accessible by everyone.
It will thus be the responsibility of the user to decide what to reveal and what information
to release onto the market, knowing that this information could be misused. Furthermore,
describing an emerging research field in a marketplace is more sensible than publishing
papers. Given the number of publications, these papers can be lost in the flood. Displayed
in a marketplace, the new and promising research field suddenly gets more attention, maybe
more than expected.
Backers The second issue regarding confidentiality is toward backers of the projects.
Most of them already know the content of the projects, sometimes in a very complete
way. The issue here is more towards the aggregated information available on the market.
Researchers periodically give progress reports to their funding partners. These reports
represent the official view of the project lead concerning a given research topic. Opening
the prediction market information to these partners could change their view of the projects,
resulting on unexpected consequences for their funding.
4.4.3 Contracts
The project management and researchers interest is more focused on the emergence of
new ideas or applications than on the optimization of their own profit on the marketplace.
Thus it is important that the submission process remain as easy as possible. For researchers,
a prediction market must become one tool among others to test their ideas among their
peers. Furthermore, the platform will have to integrate collaborative tools for discussion,
allowing discussions regarding each claim, such as adding new (private) information or
sharing doubt concerning its outcome. Filling this constraint, we can reasonably hope that
the market would be able to act as an information aggregator within the community.
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4.4.4 Trade
From an academic point of view it is obvious that the more ludic part–consisting of
buying and selling shares according to information at the trader’s disposal–will probably not
motivate the majority of the researchers being active in the marketplace. For this reason,
we will have to carefully design the trading process, allowing participants to spend as little
time as possible to carry out their trades. Moreover, we should investigate alternative
trading interfaces such as PDAs or mobile phones to enable the trading during presentations
and seminars, allowing an immediate interaction with the market. Furthermore, we will
have to pay attention to designing an adapted incentive mechanism. More information
concerning the incentive mechanisms will be presented in section 5.5.4.
4.5 Interfaces and use cases
According to the needs and specifications detailed in the previous section, we can draw
the principal use cases of a prediction market.
There is only one principal user type, the trader. Beside traders, we find two more
user types: visitors—users without an account or users not yet authenticated—as well as
system administrators (Figure 4.1). To pass from one status to the other, users have to
authenticate themselves on the platform. Thus, all traders are also visitors, when they
reach resources not requiring authentication.
Figure 4.1: Representation of the roles and their interdependence
The principal functions of the marketplace can be divided into four groups (Figure
4.2):
– user account management
– portfolio management
– claims management
– performance measurement
All other use cases could be deduced from their <<include>> or <<extend>> rela-
tions.
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Figure 4.2: MarMix principal use case
Figure 4.3: User account management use case
Table 4.1: User account management
Activity Description
Account creation Users can create a new personal account on the platform
Alerts management Users can set and manage alerts based on the price of a given
claim
Password recovery Users can retrieve their password, sending it to the email
address they used during the registration process
Personal information
management
Users can edit the information they submitted during the
registration process (username, real name, email address,
etc.)
Account cancellation Users can close their account and delete their personal in-
formation. Their past activities on the platform will remain
available as past transaction cannot be deleted
48 CHAPTER 4. DESIGN OF A PREDICTION MARKET
4.5.1 User account management
User account management includes all activities covering personal information manage-
ment (creation and modification of the user profile), access management (account creation
and deletion, password recovery) as well as information management (alarms, interesting
links). All these activities are restricted to the trader type. Visitor type has access to
account creation and password recovery.
4.5.2 Portfolio management
Portfolio management is the core of the system. This module supports the consultation
of the account value (shares held and available cash) as well as trading by passing buy or
sell orders. The trader is also able to consult the claims’ quotes and to review his pending
orders.
Figure 4.4: Portfolio management use case
Table 4.2: Portfolio management
Activity Description
Account statement Users can view their portfolio, their balance and the history
of their wealth
Open orders Users can review, edit or delete their open orders (mostly
LIMIT orders)
Buy Users can buy contracts of a given claim
Sell Users can sell contracts of a given claim
Quotes Users can view the various quotes and their history
4.5.3 Claims management
The claims management process is distributed between the trader submitting a new
claim and the market administrator publishing the new claim on the market. The first one
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proposes a new claim and chooses its terms following an appropriate ontology as the second
one is charged to formally accept the proposal before beginning the IPO process.
Figure 4.5: Claims management use case
Table 4.3: Claims management
Activity Description
Quote Users can view the quote of the claim and its history
Claim creation Users can create a new claim based on a predefined template
Claim edition Users can edit and review the claims they previously submit-
ted and that are not yet published on the market
IPO Users can start the IPO process, publishing the claim on the
market
IPO process As soon as the new claim is published by the administrator, the status is
changed to a new state, Awaiting bids. During this phase, the traders can place LIMIT
orders on the claim. These orders are related to an auction, each trader indicating through
their order their maximal belief in the outcome of the underlying claim. As soon as the
orders’ quorum is reached, the claim passes automatically in Open mode and becomes
available for all traders and all orders’ types—limit or market.
4.5.4 Performance measurement
The user has two performance indicators at their disposal. The first one is their ranking
on the marketplace compared to the overall ranking of all traders, which indicate the
reliability of their information regarding claims on the market. The second one is the
global performance of the market and of the various claims in particular.
4.6 Internal software architecture
In this section, we will describe some significant sequence diagrams issued from the
uses cases presented in section 4.5. These diagrams illustrate the interaction between the
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Figure 4.6: IPO process
Figure 4.7: Performance display use case
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Table 4.4: Performance display
Activity Description
Users’ ranking Users can view their overall ranking on the platform, based
on their past performance
Market’s perfor-
mance
Users can view and compare the market’s performance with
their own one
Claim’s performance Users can view the performance of a given claim
trader and the marketplace. They also illustrate the internal software architecture and the
interactions between the various components.
4.6.1 User account management
Using the mod apache auth module to authenticating users, register.py receives the
necessary information to create the new user account from the web server. After reviewing
this information and making the necessary changes, the user validates their entry. The
account is created and a confirmation is issued to the user.
Figure 4.8: User account management sequence diagram
4.6.2 Portfolio management
Displaying a user’s portfolio is done in two steps. First, we get all the claims owned
by the trader, as for a traditional account statement. This gives us the claims and the
quantity owned. For each of them, we then collect the current quotes and the general
terms of the claim. As a result, the trader gets a list with all claims, their properties and
their current price.
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Figure 4.9: Portfolio management sequence diagram
4.6.3 Order issuing
Buying or selling contracts from a given claim is achieved in multiple steps. The user
issues an order containing a claim, a quantity and a type (LIMIT or MARKET). The price
of the transaction is calculated and displayed to the user. Finally, the user confirms the
order and the order is processed. A confirmation is displayed with the effective price of the
transaction.
Figure 4.10: Order issuing sequence diagram
The transaction itself is a complex process. The order is activated, to appear in the book
of orders. If the claim is not currently in an IPO process, we get the market maker offer
for this order. Then we try to match the order with orders already in the book of orders
or with the market maker offer. When the matching is done, we update the price function
of the market maker and the quote. Finally, we update the portfolio of the trader.
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Figure 4.11: Order transaction sequence diagram
4.6.4 Claim management
The two main parts of this process are the creation of the claim and its IPO. Most public
prediction markets use very basic claim descriptions mostly based on the schema: “Will X
append before t”. Even if this scheme could conduct to unsettable claims or could lead
to dispute concerning the settlement, it could satisfy most basic requirements. In order
to support complex claims, we need an improved claim description. We will describe, in
depth, our results in section 5.5.1, but we can already present some constitutive parts of a
claim description in Table 4.5.
We will see in section 5.5.1 that these descriptions can be adapted based on the context
and on the assessment goal.
The following diagram contains all actions linked to the publication of a new claim and
its IPO process. It includes the creation of a claim, its edition, the opening of the market
and the creation of the market maker.
Sequence 1 to 10 consists of entering a new symbol and creating a contract using
propose.py. As we saw (Figure 4.12), the administrator must then validate the contract
and put it in mode AWAITING BIDS (11–14). From this point, the users can pass LIMIT
orders until the threshold quantity is reached (15–20). As soon as the threshold is reached,
the opening of the market begins. The wallets are upgraded (22–27) and the market maker
is created (28–35). Finally, the user receives the confirmation that the order was correctly
passed and that the market is open.
4.6.5 Performance measurement
User ranking is done at regular intervals via a cron job which upgrades the values of
the table account history. The value returned by ComputeReturn() is issued by the table
account history.
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Figure 4.12: Claim management sequence diagram
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Table 4.5: Constitutive parts of a claim description
Symbol The symbol of the claim that will be displayed in the market
Name A carefully selected wording that presents the claim
Author The author of the claim or a person who could explain the terms
if necessary
Type The underlying prediction type (binary, index, etc.)
Project The project from which the claim is issued
Settle date The settlement date (defined or undefined)
Jury Who will determine the status of the claim at the settlement date
Source The source of information that will be used to settle the claim
Price The price range (usually from 0 to 100)
Payment How the final payment will be calculated
Field of research The research fields from which this claim is issued
State of the art Some results obtained in the research fields regarding this claim
Expected results The propositions that will be validated if this claim succeed
Measure of success The indicators and their values that will be used to determine the
claim’s settlement
Figure 4.13: Performance measurement process
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4.7 Design factors
During our literature review, we identified many design factors that should be considered
to design a prediction market. Thus, there is currently no study identifying these factors
and testing them against the outcome of the market.
Some authors attempt to identify all or parts of these factors. Currently, the most
complete contribution is the one of LaComb et al. [97] about their implementation of the
Imagination Market at GE.
Many laboratory studies dealt with the financial and economic design of these markets
and tested their outcome, but–with some exceptions–never dealt with the overall design of
these markets.
Our aim here is not to cover the extensive laboratory experiments and their outcomes.
This was dealt with in section 2.8. It is more to identify the main design factors and their
various implementations in known field studies and—if available—their impact on the
overall performance of the platform.
We identified 30 different design factors summarised in Table 4.7. Some of them are
independent and others are dependent. We then made four main categories: (1) incentive
mechanisms, (2) trading process, (3) investor management and (4) clearing house. For each
of these main components, we then itemized each factor with more or less granularity.
This itemization made, we constructed an ontology with our design factors. The
first step of this construction was to supply a shared framework to assist the design
of a prediction market. The next step was to define different sets of rules for different
implementations (political markets, sport markets, ideation markets, R&D markets, etc.)
allowing the derivation of a set of design factors with their settings relative to the chosen
implementation.
Following the itemization, we defined for each design factor their characteristics and
their possible settings.
4.7.1 Incentive mechanisms
The incentive mechanism provides motivation to participants to actively be involved
with the platform. There are three main components: (1) performance evaluation and
measurement, (2) rewards and (3) involvement. Several studies [107, 147, 151, 85] discussed
various incentive schemes, but none of them proposed a set of working mechanisms. This
is mainly due to the fact that each market configuration and organization type need an
adapted incentive scheme [147].
However, Wolfers and Zitzewitz [171] show the importance of a robust incentive mecha-
nism. This mechanism should motivate participants to be involved on the market, as well
as to share their own private information with the market.
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Table 4.6: Prediction market design factors
Incentive mecha-
nisms
Performance Performance evaluation Wealth: portfolio value
based
Accuracy: best predic-
tors
Effort: trading behaviora
Performance measure-
ment
Last trading price
VWAPb
Specific algorithm
Reward Reward type Non-monetary (prize)
Monetary
Corporate supportc
Reward base Tournament: perfor-
mance based
Lottery: luck based
Involvement Trading sessions
Workshops
Trainings
Other involvement tech-
niques
Trading process Fees Trading fees
Expiration fees
IPO fees
Trading mecha-
nisms
Double auction Open order book
Closed order book
Market maker MSR
DPM
CDAwMM
Trading time 24/7
Trading sessions
Selected opening hours
Investor manage-
ment
Market Market policy Open market
Closed market
Market transparency Display all information
Restrict to some indica-
tors
Investor Investor anonymity User ID
Username
No anonymity
Investor unicity Enforced (LDAP, . . . )
Trust
Investor selection Quantity
Diversity
Informed vs non-
informed
Benefit from the outcome
of the market
a A fixed number of trades required to participate
b VWAP: Volume weighted average price
c Project funding, team funding, resources for idea development
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Table 4.7: Prediction market design factors (Continued)
Clearing house Order Order matching rules Price and submission
Price and quantity
Order spending caps Enforced
No caps
Order type Market
Limit
Short selling Allowed
Not allowed
Asset Asset type Real money
Play-money
Inflation Play-money only
Borrowing Margin purchases
Endowment Initial endowment
(money and/or con-
tracts)
Weekly endowment
(money and/or con-
tracts)
Claim Claim IPO Fees and rewards
Screeningd
Initial claims Starting quotes
Quantity
Claim ontology
Claim type Winner-take-alle
Conditional
Index
Spread
Claim structure Bundlef
Independent
Payoff Settlement date Public
Random
Settlement judge
Settlement price “Truth” (if available)
Proxy measure (expert,
objective value, etc.)
VWAP
Final market price
d Screening by experts or by the market
e Also called Arrow-Debreu
f Mutually exclusive or multiple outcome
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Performance
As we will see later, the performance could be or not be used to reward the participants.
Thus, to situate themselves on the market, traders need some comparison indicators.
Performance evaluation When talking about performance in this context, it is generally
supposed that the performance is based on the actual wealth of the participants. This
assertion supposes that the current value of the portfolio represent the participant’s
capabilities to accurately predict the outcome of the markets. This is not quite true. It
represents the ability of the trader to take advantage of the market fluctuations. Moreover,
on long-running prediction markets, especially if weekly endowments are paid, this could
just be an indicator of the duration of the trader’s participation.
Dahan [38] proposes to use other evaluations like accuracy—the percentage of accurate
predictions made by the trader—or effort—the trading behavior of the trader in terms
of the number of transactions, the intensity of participation or the number of new claims
submitted.
Performance measurement The measurement of performance is the way we compute
the performance indicator. It is linked to performance evaluation, each different evaluation
basis implying another measure. In the case of a measurement based on the wealth of
the trader, the most common measure is the sum of the payoff of the different claims.
Thus LaComb et al. [96] tried to use a scheme for calculating the payoff that was different
from the one for calculating performance, due to technical reasons, which led to confusion
between the traders.
For other evaluation schemes, we will have to define a way to measure performance and
to explain it carefully to the participants.
Reward
For Wolfers and Zitzewitz [171], “even well-designed markets will fail unless a motivation
to trade exists”. It is also agreed that it is more difficult to motivate traders to participate
in a corporate prediction market than in a “for fun” public prediction market.
Reward type We identified three types of reward: (1) monetary rewards—induced by
using real-money liquidity, (2) non monetary rewards—generally prizes, and (3) corporate
support—funding of teams, projects or personal evaluation.
As we will see later, there is no proof that monetary rewards—playing with real-money—
led to better predictions. Moreover, given the legal restrictions on using real money [10],
we will not further develop this type of reward.
Prizes seem to provide good motivation as seen in various studies [157, 27, 147]. Fur-
thermore, they are compatible with most organizations’ policies. Prizes could be vouchers,
gadgets, electronic devices, trips, etc.
In a corporate environment, we should also study the opportunity of using corporate
support as reward. This could be linked to the traded claim in the form of the allocation
of resources to pursue the idea. This also could be linked to business units or teams,
allocating more resources given the team’s performances. Finally, this could be taken into
account during the annual performance evaluation of the participant.
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Reward base Given the choice of one or more reward type, we should now decide on what
basis to give the reward. The two main bases are the tournament and the lottery.
A tournament-based reward is given to the best traders, given the performance measure
defined previously while a lottery-based reward randomly selects the traders to be rewarded.
We can also reduce the number of participants taking part in the lottery, by selecting only
the best traders. In this case, we have a performance-based lottery.
There are currently not many results concerning these two rewarding bases. However,
James and Isaac [86] show that “repeated, shared trading experience when tournament
incentives are in place promotes divergence from intrinsic value pricing”. Furthermore,
Luckner [107] studied the incidence of various payment schemes on the performance of the
markets and found that “performance-compatible payment schemes seem to perform worse
than fixed payments and the rank-order tournament”.
Involvement
Unlike public prediction markets, enterprise markets can use various involvement schemes
to commit the participant to trade on the market. LaComb et al. [96] used various
schemes such as group trading sessions, workshops or training sessions. Siegel [147] and
Soukhoroukova et al. [154] extended these schemes with methods such as reports on the
corporate intranet or meetings with executives.
4.7.2 Trading process
There are three considerations to take into account regarding the trading process. First
of all, the trading mechanism, which is the heart of the platform and determines how the
trades will be made on the market. Directly related, we should determine the trading fees
and the trading time.
Trading fees
To our knowledge, there are no experiments exploring the effects of trading fees on the
accuracy of the market. Some real-money or play-money public prediction markets are
charging fees on transactions 1 but the majority of the platform do not. If enabled, one
will have to decide to which transactions fees will be applied. This could be, for example,
a transaction fee on orders, on the settlement of the claim or on the process of submitting
a new claim on the market.
Trading mechanisms
Many trading mechanisms are available on prediction market platforms. We distinguish
two main categories, with or without an automated market maker. All mechanisms have
been exhaustively tested in various experiments.
1. For example, Intrade (http://www.intrade.com) or HSX (http://www.hsx.ch)
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Double auction Probably the easiest to set up, the double auction mechanism is used
on multiple platforms [145, 171, 65]. It is the mechanism driving the majority of the stock
exchanges such as NYSE and AMEX.
One should also choose the way to deal with the order book. The most common
implementation is the open order book. [3] proposes the use of the closed order book to
reduce traders’ insight into policy markets. Baruch [7] shows “that, on average, prices in
an open-book environment are more informative”.
Market maker Automated market makers have been heavily studied in the prediction
market literature [1, 12, 81, 71, 75, 99, 126, 163] and are known to bring additional liquidity
to the marketplace, increasing the accuracy of the market. Furthermore, they are an
additional way to motivate traders, allowing them to pass orders as they like, without
waiting for corresponding orders.
The most famous is Hanson’s Market Scoring Rules (MSR) [75]. It is widely implemented
in prediction market software 2. A combination of MSR and CDA was proposed by Hanson
[71] and then successfully implemented in various software too 3.
Pennock [126] proposes another implementation based on horse race betting, the Dynamic
Pari-Mutuel (DPM). The DPM algorithm is not much discussed, but was implemented in
Yahoo! Tech Buzz Game 4.
Trading time
Large public prediction markets are almost open 24/7. For various reasons some market
close for one hour each day 5. On the other hand, most experiments restrict the timeframe
in which the traders can be active [27, 96, 133].
The main issue is keeping the traders engaged and generating enough trades to properly
aggregate trader’s private information.
4.7.3 Investor management
Traders are the main element of the marketplace. Currently there are not many studies
dealing with design factors about the traders. Some researchers are analyzing the accuracy
of the markets in regard to the number of active traders. It is agreed that a large community
of traders has a positive impact on prediction market results [15]. However, Christiansen
[33] and Plott and Chen [133] showed that small markets were also able to run effectively.
Christiansen [33] showed the importance of the ratio of claims to traders.
2. Prediction market software implementing an MSR automated market maker: InklingMarkets
(http://www.inklingmarkets.com/), CrowdCast (http://www.crowdcast.com/), Wisdom Hive (http:
//www.wisdomhive.com/), Ask Markets (http://www.askmarkets.com/), Microsoft PredictionPoint (http:
//www.microsoft.com/)
3. Prediction market software implementing an MSR automated market maker with a CDA: Zocalo
(http://zocalo.sourceforge.net/), Nosco (http://www.nosco.dk/)
4. The Tech Buzz Game is now closed (http://research.yahoo.com/node/2359)
5. This is, for example, the case with Intrade (http://www.intrade.com/)
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Market
Market factors often result from organizational considerations. This is true for both
market policy and market transparency.
Market policy By their very nature, public prediction markets are open markets and
most corporate markets are closed markets. Gruca et al. [65] show “that open markets do
a better job of prediction than closed markets” but could not identify the main reason for
this performance difference (greater dispersion of information, greater liquidity or better
informed traders).
Market transparency Normally prediction markets give traders all the available infor-
mation and let them effectively aggregate their beliefs. Thus, in certain configurations,
one would want to reduce the available information to a subset of all available information.
This could be the case in public policy and decision markets [77].
Investor
When there are no restrictions due to the confidentiality of the claims traded, more
traders and greater diversity of traders would lead to more accurate predictions. This is
due to the automatic weighting of each trader’s influence on the market regarding their
wealth.
Investor anonymity As discussed earlier, anonymity is a real issue on prediction markets.
Hanson [78] shows that “secret accounts, trader anonymity, and complex shared interests,
however, might conspire to make it difficult for advisors to reveal credibly their relevant
holdings”. Thus the large majority of all experiments made guarantee the anonymity of
traders.
Investor unicity Unicity of the traders accounts could become a problem in anonymous
markets and be used to manipulate the market [91]. However, in an enterprise context,
one could easily exclude this risk by linking the prediction market to the enterprise
authentication infrastructure.
Investor selection Even if the markets are very efficient at aggregating information,
they cannot aggregate more information than is submitted by the traders. For this reason,
one should carefully select the participants playing on the market. As said earlier, the
more the better. Thus if it is not possible for various reasons, one has to pay attention,
allowing enough uninformed traders to participate in order to provide incentive for the
better informed traders to release private information [172].
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4.7.4 Clearing house
“A clearing house is a financial services company that provides clearing and settlement
services for financial transactions, usually on a futures exchange, and often acts as central
counterparty (the payor actually pays the clearing house, which then pays the payee). A
clearing house may also offer novation, the substitution of a new contract or debt for an
old, or other credit enhancement services to its members.” 6
This definition does not exactly correspond to our implementation, which is broader,
but it gives a good idea of the function of a clearing house. For this reason, one should not
take the term “clearing house” in too strict a sense.
Order
This is the heart of the platform. It defines the main characteristics of the transac-
tions.
Order matching rules There are currently two established matching rules driving most
CDA stock exchanges, the price–time priority and the price–size priority 7.
The price–time priority matches the orders by first sorting them by price and then by
their time of entry. Priority is given to the oldest orders.
The price–quantity priority matches the orders by first sorting them by price and then
by quantity. Priority is given to the smallest orders. As stated by LaComb et al. [97], the
Foresight Exchange use a reverse price–quantity matching rule, giving the priority to large
orders.
Order spending caps By default, traders are allowed to spend all their money in shares,
related to their beliefs. One could decide to place spending caps on amounts spent or on the
number of same shares possessed. This could be necessary to prevent market manipulation
in play-money marketplaces [2]. However, the large majority of the prediction markets do
not enforce spending caps.
Order type The orders type depends on the chosen market mechanism. In the case of a
CDA market, only limit orders are allowed. Using a market maker, one could implement
market orders. And in the case of a CDAwMM, one could implement both, limit and
market orders. But in CDAwMM, one should pay attention to clearly informing the traders
on the differences between the two types of order.
In the case of limit orders—combined or not with market orders—one could also define
an order expiry value. Thus, after a given timeframe, the orders are automatically
deleted.
6. Wikipedia, retrieved June 22, 2009 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clearing_house_(finance))
7. For example, see the “Matching Rules for the order driven part of the Exchange System” published
by the Swiss Exchange (SWX) (http://www.six-swiss-exchange.com/download/trading/training/3_
match_en.pdf)
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Short selling Short selling—the ability to sell shares that the trader does not possess—is
implemented in prediction market software. Chan et al. [27], Gruca et al. [66] and Spears
et al. [157] restricted short selling in their experiments for various reasons. Spears et al.
[157] “removed short selling since earlier participants had found it to be confusing”.
Thus, it seems that constraints on short selling could lead to speculative bubbles [171],
though even Noeth et al. [116] assert that “removing the short selling restriction does not
improve information aggregation”.
Asset
There are two different types of assets: play-money and real-money. Currently, the large
majority of the prediction markets are based on play-money, with the exception of the
Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) 8 and Intrade 9.
Asset type Since 2004 several studies have tried to compare the incidence of play-money
or real money on the outcomes of prediction markets [140, 146, 151]. Currently, they shows
that a reward mechanism is necessary to guarantee market accuracy, but could not prove
that real money led to better accuracy than prize-based rewards. Moreover, there are some
important issues using real money prediction markets [10].
Using play-money on the platform, one should define the settings of the three following
factors: inflation, borrowing and endowment.
Play-money inflation We found an interesting quote from LaComb et al. [97] proposing
to introduce inflation to “increase liquidity in the market by penalizing participants who
sit on cash”. However, this should be more deeply investigated.
Play-money borrowing Here again, this is a new idea from LaComb et al. [97] and
should be further investigated. The reason allowing borrowing play-money from the market
is to provide similar functionality to that of traditional markets. However, this could lead
to inaccurate predictions, traders having lost their cash in poor predictions would exert
too much weight on the market if they are allowed to borrow more money.
8. http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/
9. http://www.intrade.com/
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Play-money endowment As the traders are not putting their own money on the
market—as in real-money markets—we should endow them in order for them to be able to
play. The endowment could takes place at the beginning of the play—or during account
creation—and in certain cases, weekly or monthly during the game.
Even if Seemann et al. [144] showed “that the stock endowments significantly foster
liquidity in the market”, we found that most play-money markets use exclusively play-money
endowments.
The allocation of stocks could therefore solve the issue raised by LaComb et al., concerning
traders sitting on their cash, by forcing them to make transactions in order to achieve a
balanced portfolio.
Regarding current experiments [6], it seems that a mix of shares and cash could lead to
the best results. However, there are currently no studies concerning the perfect mix.
Finally one should consider weekly or monthly endowments if there are long-term claims
on the market. Traders will not recover liquidity to trade on new claims before the
settlement of their current claims, forcing them to liquidate positions whereas information
in their possession did not change.
Claim
Claims are defined by the market purpose. It should be clearly defined in order to be
able to correctly describe the various claims.
Claim IPO The IPO process allows traders, but also the market owner, to add new shares
onto the market. The goals of this process are: (1) to attract new ideas or information from
the traders and (2) to keep the traders interested by regularly publishing new claims.
We discussed a proposition for an IPO process in [55]. There are currently different
implementations of this process, relying on the same basis [154].
The first step is the screening. One should decide whether the claims are to pass through
a screening process run by experts—some players, executives, field experts—or made by
the market—all players are allowed to place orders till the predefined threshold is reached.
This threshold is commonly a quantity of orders or shares.
The initial price could be fixed by the experts or be a uniform price for each IPO, or
could depend on the auctions during the IPO, resulting in a variable price.
We have summarized these different possibilities in Table 4.7.4.
Initial claims Siegel [147] and Wolfers and Zitzewitz [171] assert that the initial claims—
in the case of an ideation market—should be sticky enough to attract the traders. Therefore,
one should pay attention to putting enough interesting claims at the launch of the market-
place. More claims may be added during the game, but discouraged traders will probably
never come back.
Depending on the experiments, the number of claims initially published on the market
varies from 5 to 10.
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Table 4.8: Different IPO matrix
Screening Price Fees
Experts Uniform Flata
No
Variable Variableb
No
Market Uniform Flata
No
Variable Variableb
No
a Flat fees are fixed by the mar-
ketplace
b Variable fees are defined as a
fraction of the IPO value
Claim ontology Badly worded claims are a real issue in our context. Hanson [73]
wrote that “even if an issue becomes settled, a poorly worded claim on that issue may be
unresolvable. To avoid this, we need techniques for avoiding ambiguity and incentives for
players to use them”. Therefore, we propose to use a claim ontology to help traders to
better word their claims.
Claim type There are currently four different types of claims commonly used on predic-
tion markets. Their utilization depends on the underlying outcome (Table 4.7.4).
Table 4.9: Four claim types and their utilization
Type Description Example Outcome y
Winner-take-alla Contract pays 1 if event
occurs, 0 otherwise
Product x will be avail-
able on June 30
Probability that
event y occurs
Conditional Contract pays 1 if event
occurs and z is True, 0
otherwise
Product x will be avail-
able on June 30, and will
integrate the component
z
Combinatorial proba-
bility that event y oc-
curs
Index Contract pays 1 for each
percent of y
Market share y of prod-
uct x on June 30
Mean value of out-
come y
Spread Contract pays 2 if the
threshold y is exceeded
Market share of product
x will exceed y on June
30
Median value of y
a Also called Arrow-Debreu
Claim structure Given the selected outcomes, the claims could be bundled in mutually
exclusive or multiple outcome bundle. Mutually exclusive claims are based on two or more
binary claims assembled in a portfolio. This is the case, for example, if we want to predict
which product model will make the biggest sales during one month. Multiple outcome
bundle could be used with index or binary claims. At the settlement, more than one claim
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will be selected. This could be used, for example, to select the three best ideas out of
ten.
Payoff
The payoff factors define the way one settles the claim, as well at the settlement
price.
Settlement date On markets with outcomes bound to an end date, such as the winner
of an election, we should use this date as the settlement date. Otherwise, with the outcome
not bound to an end date, as on ideation or new product markets, one could adopt one of
two different strategies. The first, as in prediction markets applied to political elections,
is to define the settlement date at the claim’s creation. The second to avoid speculation
preceding market close by choosing a random closing date [92].
Settlement judge The judge is charged with settling the claim based on the defined
judging rules. These rules should be carefully written in order to restrict interpretation
issues. Markets not relying on concrete settlement rules, such as ideation markets, should
simply settle the claims based on the payoff function. Recently Intrade had a lot of trouble
regarding the settlement of a claim on whether North Korea would, by July 31, 2006,
successfully fire ballistic missiles that would land outside its airspace. They defined, in
advance, the DoD as the judging source, which made no comment on the July 5 test
whereas other US government source did.
Settlement price In the case of claims that could be settled regarding concrete facts,
the payoff depends on the claim’s type. The payoff is then $1 if True and $0 otherwise for
a winner-take-all claim.
In other cases, it is more difficult to choose a payoff function to mitigate the manipulation
risks. Even if it is agreed that the market closing price is a good payoff for prediction
markets, some experiments have tried other payoff functions. Soukhoroukova et al. [154]
used proxies—in this case, experts—to define the payoff for each claim depending on their
own appreciation. This led to some trouble between the traders and the experts regarding
the final evaluation. In other context, the proxy payoff function could be successfully used,
relying on concrete and verifiable facts such as market shares, number of sales, movie
visitors, etc. LaComb et al. [96] used a VWAP over the last five trading day, to mitigate
the risk that traders tried to made last minute profits.
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4.8 MarMix artifact
The implementation of MarMix was based only on free software, partly by interest of
the author, and partly to enable other people to take on all or part of the project and
carry on the development.
In order to accelerate the development of the prototype, it was decided to base MarMix
on an existing development. At the start of this work, only three software packages were
available under a free license: Ideosphere which is based on a succession of Perl scripts and
which is used daily in the Ideosphere marketplace; USIFEX, which is based on Python
scripts and has not been used since the beginning of 2000; and finally FreeMarket which is
written in PHP and is based on a MySQL database.
4.8.1 Typology of the MarMix artifact
Based on our typology of design factors, we derived the requirements for our MarMix
artifact. The resulting design factors are presented in Table 4.8.1. Our goal was to design
our prediction market in the simplest way, omitting all factors that might unnecessarily
raise the complexity of the software. Moreover, we also made design choices to follow, as
much as possible, real futures exchanges due to the lack of knowledge of non-real-life-like
setups.
Incentive mechanisms
During the design of MarMix we had little knowledge of the difficulties of motivating
traders to play on the platform, so we chose very simple settings for these factors. Given
the organization of our environment we planned trading sessions during conference breaks
and dedicated workshops.
Trading process
Resulting from our interviews, we choose to use a market maker with 24/7 trading time
to allow traders to pass orders at any time and to receive instant feedback from the market.
This setup allows a continuous aggregation of new information.
Investor management
The running context at our disposal drove our design choices. These choices are mainly a
transparent closed market restricted to traders, authenticated by a central repository.
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Table 4.10: MarMix design factors
Incentive mecha-
nisms
Performance Performance evaluation Wealth: portfolio-value
based
Performance measure-
ment
Last trading price
Reward Reward type Non-monetary (prize)
Reward base Tournament:
performance-based
Involvement Trading sessions
Trading process Fees No fees
Trading mecha-
nisms
Double auction Open order book
Market maker CDAwMM
Trading time 24/7
Investor manage-
ment
Market Market policy Closed market
Market transparency Display all information
Investor Investor anonymity Username
Investor unicity Enforced (Switch AAIa)
Investor selection All project members
Clearing house Order Order matching rules Price and submission
Order spending caps No caps
Order type Market and limit
Short selling Allowed
Asset Asset type Play-money
Inflation No
Borrowing Yes
Endowment Initial endowment: Play-
money
Claim Claim IPO Fees and rewards: No
Screening: Only for the
wording
Initial claims Starting quotes: IPO
Quantity: 5
Claim ontology Enforced for claim’s pro-
posals
Claim type Winner-take-allb
Claim structure Independent
Payoff Settlement date Public
Settlement judge Claim owner
Settlement price Final market price
a Swiss Universities Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure
b Also called Arrow-Debreu
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Clearing house
Given our academic context and the difficulties of using real money on the platform, we
chose to implement play-money. We also made design choices to follow as much as possible
real futures exchanges. This implies the ability to sell short, to allow borrowing and to
support a full IPO process. Moreover, we used traditional settlement with a public closing
date.
4.8.2 Choice of software
For the author, beside supporting most of our requirements, the software selection
criteria were the following:
– licensed under free software (GPL or related license) to allow code changes and free
distribution;
– running on a GNU/Linux server;
– object-oriented programming to facilitate the maintenance and development of the
platform;
– based on a database to allow various kinds of reporting;
– good documentation of the code;
– complete separation of logic and presentation.
We made a comparison of the different platforms and decided to use USIFEX as the
basis for our prototype. Despite the fact that it lacks good documentation, it has more
functionality than Ideosphere. This also involved a lot of work in upgrading the code, made
necessary by the age of the code (5 years) and the new versions as well of Python of as
PostgreSQL.
Table 4.11: Comparison of the free prediction markets softwarea
Criteria Ideosphere USIFEX FreeMarket Zocalo
License IFPLb Mozilla BSD MIT
Language Perl 5 Python 2.1 PHP 4 Java
Database Text file PostgreSQL MySQL Hibernate
Programming Object Object Procedural Object
Code documentation Very good Poor None Very good
Separation
Logic/presentation
Complete Complete None Complete
Installation Confirmed user Expert Beginner Beginner
Release date 24/03/05 01/04/00 08/08/05 31/05/05
Latest release 26/08/05 01/04/00 29/09/06 06/06/09
a Started summer 2005, updated summer 2009
b Idea Future Public License
After the project start, Zocalo was launched in September 2005. Zocalo is a Java
application designed for running prediction market experiments in classes. The first
releases did not support a database backend, preventing this platform keeping a history
of the transactions, nor could it run more than a one-day session. Currently, Zocalo is a
unique free software platform, still in development, and includes many features such as an
MSR market maker, CDA or CDAwMM book of orders.
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4.8.3 Diagram of the database
The database is organized around the trader and claim tables. To meet our need for
information on the users’ behavior, we record all events in an event table. The tables bak *
are used with a daily script to back up the data, removing confidential information, in order
to be able to transmit the database for further research, guaranteeing the confidentiality
and anonymity of the market. The tables are in principle managed by a class of the same
name.
Figure 4.14: Entity-relation diagram of the database
4.8.4 Diagram of the classes
The application, developed in Python, rests on an IF package, which includes all the
principal classes of the platform. These classes are called by Python pages composing the
user interface.
The classes are derived from the developments of USIFEX by Peter McCluskey. After
some tedious adaptation work in order to be able to run the platform on current systems, we
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Figure 4.15: Classes diagram of the package IF
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began to completely document all the code to mitigate the complete lack of documentation
of the system. This initial adaptation and documentation work, although not very visible,
currently enables us to have a transparent and comprehensible system.
After this first phase, we began to adapt the platform to our needs, regarding our
design requirements. That led us to partially rewrite some classes such as IFMarketMaker,
IFMarginRules and IFQuote. Furthermore, we had to change the interface and the
authentication stack to suit our design requirements.
We will now briefly present the main classes of the package IF. Other classes, in particular
the classes used for the user interface, as well as more detailed information, can be retrieved
from the application’s current source code.
IFAlert This class handles emails sent to traders informing them of price variations
concerning contracts they are subscribed to. It also generates a weekly summary of the
transactions.
IFClaim Manages the claims on the market (proposal, validation, modifications and
deletion).
IFComment Handles the comments and information linked to the claims. It is used
mainly during the page creation.
IFHolding Manages the trader’s claims portfolio. This class also supports the portfolio
update after a transaction.
IFMarginRules Calculates the margin resulting from the trader’s portfolio at time t.
It also calculates the daily profits.
IFMarketMaker While being based on Hanson’s work, this class manages an automatic
market maker which guarantees enough liquidity on the market.
IFOrder This class manages buy and sale orders submitted by the traders. It is also
called by the cron to process stop or LIMIT orders.
IFQuote Calculates the value of a claim at time t.
IFQuoteHistory Allows recall of the evolution of a claim’s quote and can graph the
result.
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IFServer Handles the engine of the platform. It manages access to all the other modules
and supports the principal functions (user management, claims management, portfolio
management and performance calculation).
IFTrader Manages the traders (inscription, validation, modifications and deletion).
IFTransaction This class carries out the transactions between two traders (or market
maker) according to the submitted orders.
4.8.5 Infrastructure
The MarMix platform was installed on a virtual host VMWare ESX 2.5 with a Debian 4
distribution. This choice was made partly because of the author’s knowledge of Debian
distributions as well as their relatively few attack risks due to their package’s policy and to
support—at any time—moving the virtual host onto another server if a power increase was
needed.
For maximum security, only official Debian packages were used for the installation of
the platform. The principal packages used were:
– Apache 2.0.54
– PostgreSQL 7.4.7
– Python 2.3
– PyGresql 3.6.1
Over the years, the platform has evolved to run on updated versions of the infrastruc-
ture.
4.8.6 Development
The development tools used were Eric3 (and then Eric4), a Python IDE running on
Windows, OSX and GNU/Linux. It offers the advantage of having a very good debugger
and of being interfaced with version control systems (CVS or SVN).
4.8.7 Prototype
The MarMix platform is based on three different pieces of software, the most important
being the prediction market itself, based on IF.
We also use MediaWiki to support the documentation, the help, and the presentations
and discussions of the claims. MediaWiki—the engine of Wikipedia—supports the creation
and editing of content in a very intuitive way. This community-edited wiki allows each
trader to add information, increase the handbook or describe its strategies. We also use
the discussion tabs to keep track of the emergence of information connected with various
claims. This should help us to correlate the evolution of the market price according to the
emergence and the relevance of information at the disposal of the users.
Finally, we used the Shibboleth infrastructure to integer the authentication on MarMix
with the Swiss Universities Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure (AAI).
For more information on the prototype, please see [50], which presents the first MarMix
prototype in a very detailed way.
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4.9 Contributions
4.9.1 A design artifact
We designed MarMix as a prediction market tailored to the needs of an academic research
community. Our prototype could be used to support multiple experiments in various fields.
Moreover, our artifact could easily be adapted to other types of outcomes due to its flexible
construction. We also designed an IPO process to support the creation and proposition of
new claims by the active traders, without an external review process.
In this case, our academic contribution is the generic specifications of a prediction market
artifact that can be further used and developed for various prediction market applications.
It follows Gregor and Jones [60] ISDT definition, “allowing the prescription of guidelines
for further artifacts of the same type”.
4.9.2 An exhaustive typology to support the design of a prediction mar-
ket
To support our design, we developed an exhaustive typology to assist the selection of the
various design factors. This complete repository of design factors and their relations could
greatly improve the overall design process to run various prediction markets in different
contexts. Moreover, we assume that this typology could be successfully adapted to support
the generation of various configurations based on different sets of rules. Given Doty and
Glick[43], a typology is an academic contribution if it is exhaustive and supports all the
various representations of the studied body, which we have done in this chapter.
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This chapter summarizes our first iteration, studying prediction markets for collective
forecasting. We build, instantiate and evaluate a prediction market in an academic context.
The evaluation of these experiments led us to formulate five design propositions.
5.1 Introduction
Currently, the main part of the literature on applications of prediction markets concen-
trates around three main topics: sport events, elections and the box office success of movies.
These studies show that prediction markets are a good way of incorporating information
concerning the outcome of these events. However, there are very few studies on applications
in the field of science or business. We aim to determine the key success factors for the
implementation of prediction markets for these new topics. Our aim is not to make an
empirical validation of the results of predictions in these domains, but rather to validate
the design of a prediction market adapted to this type of forecast. After describing the
usage, and the context in which we will evaluate our design, we present the experiments
we made and the results we obtained. Finally, we present five design propositions resulting
from our design experiments.
1. The content of this chapter was partially published in [55]: C. Gaspoz and Y. Pigneur. Preparing
a Negotiated R&D Portfolio with a Prediction Market, 41st Hawaii International Conference on System
Science (HICSS-41), Hawaii, 2008.
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5.2 Usage
Prediction markets have been shown to be reliable at predicting simple events in a near
future as seen in section 2.8. Our goal is to explore usages of prediction markets for a new
set of claims. These claims should differ from traditional political or sports claims in that
they are far more complex.
Taking a political claim like “Will candidate C be elected...” is rather trivial to
understand. On the other hand, “Will ultra low band (ULB) sensor networks be deployed
in real life situations before...” is much harder. It supposes thorough knowledge of
ULB, sensors networks and their possible usages. It also supposes knowledge of current
experiments and their results, as well as the issues relating to the mass production of these
devices. Given these criteria, there should be only a handful of people able to answer this
question.
Prediction markets used for technological foresight should help to overcome these
limitations. Due to their ability to aggregate large amounts of dispersed information in an
efficient way, prediction markets should be able to answer complex questions, collecting
bits of information held by a large crowd. Taking our previous example, this could be
collecting information held by various stakeholders such as scholars, engineers, designers
and politicians, all working on parts of the subject. The scholar could be working on ULB
transmissions, the engineer on sensors networks, the designer on a sensor product and
the politician on the regulation of ULB. Bringing together and efficiently aggregating this
information could lead to an informed prediction.
Wolfers and Zitzewitz [172] showed that uninformed traders are necessary to bring
enough liquidity to prediction markets; we make the assumption that taking a large crowd
of partly informed traders could help to solve complex predictions in corporate or academic
contexts.
5.3 Context
Inspired by previous experiments made with political, sports and box office prediction
markets, we want to study the feasibility of implementing prediction markets for business
and science forecasting.
Although innovative, these new applications of prediction markets can be based on the
encouraging results of experiments made in other fields. In order to test the implementation
of the design factors that we defined in chapter 4, we ran four experiments in order to test
different design settings.
Our objective was to evaluate the feasibility of using prediction markets in a corporate
or academic context. This comprises two parts: the aptitude of prediction markets to
forecast corporate or academic claims and the adequacy of the tool for the corporate or
academic environment.
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5.3.1 Aptitude
Prediction markets have shown that they are reliable at predicting sports or political
events. These events are characterized by the fact that they are very easy to understand
(candidate X will be elected or team Y will win the match) and are the subject of a mass
of publicly available information.
On the other hand, business or R&D events (how many sales of product X will be
made during time T or which R&D project has the greatest potential on the market)
are much more difficult to define and are the subject to little or no publicly available
information.
Our experiments must show whether if it is possible to apply a prediction method that
was designed for relatively basic claims to complex ones and whether the aggregation and
information retrieval mechanisms are powerful enough to collect sufficient information to
obtain significant predictions.
Table 5.1: Prediction markets claims
Political or sport PM Corporate or academic PM
Type of claims Basic Complex
Information characteristics Abundant and public Limited and private
5.3.2 Adequacy
Although recent studies, as we saw in section 2.5, show that the motivation of the traders
on political prediction markets is sufficient to obtain reliable results, it is not yet proven
whether the motivation of corporate or academic players is sufficient to obtain significant
results too.
On public prediction markets, traders play in the hope of future profits that could take
a pecuniary form, the form of prizes or simply the form of recognition by their peers. In
addition, the information that they have has, in general, little or no value for the trader.
The potential profits on the market generally represent the best profits that they could
expect from this information.
On the other hand, the applications we plan to study will be addressed to people who
have a well-defined activity and who will be asked to invest time on an extra activity.
Moreover, they will mostly not directly benefit from the outcomes of the market for their
professional activities, apart from the few people who could benefit from the results of
the markets. In addition, the value of information held by traders is definitely higher in
this context. This value can be pecuniary, but also personal, for example, for a future
promotion. So the motivation process of the players must be much more advanced than in
public markets.
Our experiments must show which requirements are necessary so that employees and
researchers invest time on prediction markets and share sufficient and qualitatively good
information to reach a significant equilibrium price.
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Table 5.2: Prediction markets incentives
Political or sport PM Corporate or academic PM
Incentive to play Direct profit (money, prize) Indirect profit
Incentive to reveal Strong Weak
5.4 Evaluation > Four design experiments
We chose to follow Hevner et al. [84] design science methodology in an iterative process
of building and evaluating artifacts. With this intention, we successively created and
operated four prediction markets with different populations (see Table 5.3). The contracts
were related to economic, scientific and political forecasts, as well as to sport events. These
four iterations enabled us to evaluate our design, adapt it, and implement it in a new
experiment. This chapter presents the four iterations and describes the resulting five design
proposals.
Table 5.3: Presentation of the four prediction markets
Prediction Market Description
MarMix(I) Experimental prototype – Run with 28 traders among
the Information Systems Institute staff at HEC Lausanne.
Contracts on votations, science findings and mobile informa-
tion technologies.
MarMix(II) Large-scale market – Run with 114 undergraduate stu-
dents in business and economics at HEC Lausanne. Contracts
on financial indices, mobile information technologies, general
science challenges as well as FIFA World Cup matches.
2014candidates.org Topic-focused market – Run with 52 traders among na-
tional and international sport federations as well as sports
consultants. This market was designed to predict the orga-
nizing city of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games.
MarMICS Technological foresight market – Run with 150 PhD
students working for the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF) project MICS (Mobile Information and Communica-
tion Systems). Contracts on MICS projects outcomes.
5.4.1 An experimental prototype
We started our first iteration with the design of an experimental prototype for a small
number of traders. This first prototype was used for an experiment within the Information
Systems Institute of the University of Lausanne. The main goal of this experiment was to
test our design in a real-life environment and to explore the incentive mechanisms.
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Experimenting with a simple prediction market
This first iteration began with the design of a prediction market, based on the design
constraints addressed in chapter 4. We then operated the prediction market and conducted
several exploratory interviews with the actors having participated in the experiment at the
end of October 2005.
The intention of this first experiment was above all to test our prediction market in a
real-life context. This experiment gave us the opportunity to test the various components
of the prediction market. It also enabled us to implement and test the design choices
elaborated during the previous design phase (chapter 4).
We tested a simple prediction market with a small number of actors, given that researchers
such as Chen et al. [28] or Christiansen [33] found that small markets are also able to make
accurate predictions. This configuration gave us the ability to run the test with well-known
participants. Furthermore, due the few traders involved, we had the ability to get feedback
from all participants during the experiment.
First implementation of the design
The main design options resulting from the interviews carried with the MICS project
leaders and other associated researchers were implemented in this prototype.
Confidentiality The main fear regarding the use of a prediction market in a research
community is the confidentiality of both the claims and the predictions. For the project
leaders, the willingness to participate and share information on such a platform is dependent
on the guarantee of this confidentiality. The feeling in the academic community is that only
published ideas have real value. Given that, sharing research intuition on a market could
be potentially risky for researchers. Therefore we decided to only trade on claims relating
to published papers. Furthermore the disclosure of predictions regarding running projects
could have a negative (or positive) impact on the allowance of research subsidies from
the sponsors. To assess this issue, we linked our prediction market to the authorisation
infrastructure of the swiss universities.
Anonymity In the same vein, the market has to guarantee the anonymity of all traders
and transactions. This is related to the eventuality of hierarchical and group pressures on
the traders. Solving this issue is very easy, and we chose to use nicknames freely chosen by
the traders. At the first login, traders are asked to choose a nickname and are informed of
its use on the platform.
Attractivity In a research community, the ideation process is very important. To support
it, the market should be able to attract these new research intuitions. The goal of such a
market being to suppress the established peer review process, we chose to implement an
initial public offering (IPO) process, allowing each participant to submit new claims on
the market.
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Liquidity As previously discussed in section 2.7 the market operator has to guarantee
enough liquidity to improve the accuracy of the prediction market. Furthermore, traders
should be able to make transactions independently from other traders’ counter orders.
From the different options, we chose to implement a simple continuous double auction
mechanism with a market maker (CDAwMM). The market maker orders are illustrated by
the suffix mm coupled with the claim name (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: The order book of the ANIMALERIE claim with the market maker positions
Adding the design choices previously described to the main options retained in chapter
4, we obtain the specifications for our first prototype as stated in Table 5.4.1. These
specifications were already presented in section 4.8 and are repeated here to simplify the
reading.
Operating the prediction market
We used the prediction market for a one-hour laboratory experiment with 15 researchers
trading five binary contracts (Table 5.5), followed by a two-week experiment during which
about 30 traders (including the first 15) were able to trade the same five contracts. The
contracts were not specifically designed for technological forecasting, but were selected for
their estimated capacity to motivate the players to take part in the experiment. Given our
main research goal, we voluntarily neglected contracts on sport events or elections.
The prediction market was available through a web browser from anywhere. This allowed
traders to play as they like. Its interface (Figure 5.2) was strongly inspired by traditional
stock markets, with multiple options like selling short, limit orders and market orders.
As we will see later, this gave us great flexibility, sometimes to the detriment of the
traders.
Figure 5.2: The user interface of the first prototype
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Table 5.4: Design specifications of the first prototype
Incentive mechanisms Performance Performance evaluation Wealth: portfolio-value
based
Performance measure-
ment
Last trading price
Reward Reward type Non-monetary (prize)
Reward base Tournament: performance-
based
Involvement Trading sessions
Trading process Fees No fees
Trading mechanisms Double auction Open order book
Market maker CDAwMM
Trading time 24/7
Investor management Market Market policy Closed market
Market transparency Display all information
Investor Investor anonymity Username
Investor unicity Enforced (Switch AAIa)
Investor selection All project members
Clearing house Order Order matching rules Price and submission
Order spending caps No caps
Order type Market and limit
Short selling Allowed
Asset Asset type Play-money
Inflation No
Borrowing Yes
Endowment Initial endowment: Play-
money
Claim Claim IPO Fees and rewards: No
Screening: Only for the
wording
Initial claims Starting quotes: IPO
Quantity: 5
Claim ontology Enforced for claim’s pro-
posals
Claim type Winner-take-allb
Claim structure Independent
Payoff Settlement date Public
Settlement judge Claim’s owner
Settlement price Final market price
a Swiss Universities Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure
b Also called Arrow-Debreu
86 CHAPTER 5. COLLECTIVE FORECASTING TOOL
Table 5.5: Claims used for the first iteration
ANIMALERIE Result of the vote on the construction of a breeding farm
for the university
MOB First-large scale mobile payment experiment in Switzerland
in 2006
MSCBIS More than 15 masters students registered for the new
MScBIS
SENSOR Large-scale sensor network to predict the risks of avalanche
in the swiss alps
WEATHER Rain in Lausanne on November 11
First observations from our implementation
To evaluate our design, we conducted several exploratory interviews with the traders
who participated in the experiment at the end of October 2005.
During this first experiment we collected various pieces of information about the use
of the market by the traders. These data enabled us to determine the participation rate
of the users, the movements on the various claims as well as the return rate of the users,
as seen in Table 5.6. After analyzing the data we note that there are very few users who
played regularly apart from the one-hour workshop and almost no users played during the
two weeks if they had not taken part in the workshop. At the contract level we see that
most of the transactions were carried out during the workshop, although we also see a
peak of activity before the expiration of the ANIMALERIE claim, which was linked to the
results of a vote on the construction of a new breeding farm for the university.
Table 5.6: Key numbers resulting from the first experiment
Number of traders 28
Number of active traders (> 3 orders) 11
Average orders by trader 26
Number of claims 5
Number of orders 286
Number of contracts 5093
The considerable variation in the participants’ involvement between the two parts of the
experiment (synchronous and asynchronous trading) showed us that the basic mechanisms
of futures markets were not known by the IS researchers and that, consequently, without
direct supervision and a well-defined incentive mechanism, IS researchers were not motivated
to trade on such a market.
This analysis helped us to illustrate the use of a prediction market in a concrete and
observable setting. However, it had several limitations that prevented us from obtaining a
deeper understanding of the problem.
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Cultural shift The first observation resulting from the interviews was that the researchers
are by no means familiar with the concepts necessary for playing on a prediction market.
The underlying concepts such as limit orders, selling short and compensation of the
portfolios are not mastered by the traders, which results in errors or discourages them
from playing on the market.
Interface design The second observation is related to the interface. The study of the
use cases led us to develop a multi-part prototype so as to cover the various functions. This
resulted in a highly partitioned interface, presenting each function independently. This
disturbed the traders, who did not find the necessary information to take the right decision
of investment and who did not have the overall picture of their individual performances on
the various titles, nor a comparison with the other traders.
Based on these considerations, we revised our design and developed a second prototype.
In the following subsection we show the results of a highly improved prediction market
that will give us more insights.
5.4.2 Improving interaction for a large-scale experiment
After our first small-scale experiment, we decided to run a second large-scale experiment
to test the design of the prototype. This second experiment took place at the Business
School of the University of Lausanne with 114 traders, playing during six weeks on 16
claims in summer 2006. During the whole experiment, we had a total of 3071 transactions,
representing 144248 contracts.
An improved human–computer interface
Based on the results of the first experiment, we decided to completely rewrite the user
interface to improve the user experience. Our goal was to develop a very intuitive interface
in terms of usability, hiding the excessively financial aspects of the marketplace, in order
to reduce the learning curve, as illustrated in Figure 5.3.
An open-source application framework
This second iteration gave us the opportunity to improve the design of the market’s
functionalities. Based on the four use cases presented in section 4.5, we improved the
interactions between the market and the traders.
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Figure 5.3: The MarMix prediction market with a new user interface
Development of the trader’s cockpit In order to play on the market, the trader
needs enough private information to optimize his return on investment, and also enough
information from the market to take the right investment decision. For this purpose,
we provided a range of decision support information such as graphics with daily, weekly,
monthly and complete quote histories, historics of the daily quotes with trends and
summaries, various top ten lists such as the biggest movements, gains, losses and the
most active traders and claims. We also extended the real-time quotes with short- and
long-term trends for each claim. Most of this information is included on the new trader’s
cockpit (Figure 5.3). This personal cockpit summarizes in one place all the important
information needed to play on the market, e.g. actual quotes, individual performance on
each claim, most active claims, daily, weekly and monthly exchange volume and the overall
performance of the trader. The last indicator is used to reward the best players at the end
of the experiment.
Performance per contract This new interface also allowed us to introduce the concept
of performance per contract, which, to our knowledge, is not available on the current
prediction markets. If the total performance enables us to obtain information on our global
capacity to predict the results of the claims on the market compared to other traders, the
individual performance on each claim enables us to measure in detail the quality of each of
our forecasts. This indicator also enables traders to obtain the necessary information to
optimize the value of their portfolio, this value not only depending on the quality of the
information related to the underlying claim, but also depending on short-term profit-based
fluctuations in the price.
Reduced order types Concerning the cultural shift resulting from the absence of
knowledge regarding stock market concepts, we tried to find a compromise between the
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complexity of the financial instruments and the absence of financial knowledge among the
traders, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. For this reason, we removed the notion of stop orders
on this new interface, to keep only market and limit orders. These two order types are
mandatory to use both double auction and automated market maker ways of placing orders
in our CDAwMM implementation.
Figure 5.4: The order screen of MarMix
One-click trading We also added a one-click trading option to allow traders to pass
market orders by directly clicking on a quote or to pass limit orders by clicking on the
reverse transaction on order books.
Finally, we tried to remove as far as possible financial terms from the interface. It was
not possible to do this altogether and we had to maintain some financial concepts, such as
the notion of limit orders.
A large-scale experiment
To evaluate our second design, we operated a large-scale prediction market with 99
active traders, most of whom were students in economics at the University of Lausanne.
For this experiment, we decided to choose more generic claims, based on finance, society,
technology and sport (FIFA World Cup).
Table 5.7: Key numbers resulting from the second experiment
Number of traders 114
Number of active traders (> 3 orders) 99
Average orders by trader 31
Number of claims 16
Number of orders 3071
Number of contracts 144248
Among the 16 claims (Table 5.8), the market correctly predicted the outcome of eight.
Seven were not settled at the end of the experiment and the last claim missed the prediction.
This claim was a sports claim relying on the rank of Switzerland at the FIFA World Cup,
predicting that Switzerland would be eliminated during the quarter-finals, based on
probabilities calculated by UBS Wealth Management Research.
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Table 5.8: Claims’ used for the large-scale experiment. We do not present the five claims
concerning the outcome of various FIFA World CUP games. Each FIFA claim was in the form: Team A
will win the game Team A vs Team B.
ITALIE Italy to be World Champions 06
SUISSE Switzerland eliminated in quarter-final
IMPULSE SolarImpulse first night flight in 2009
ALINGHI Alinghi wins America’s Cup 07
LDA Law on royalties voted in by parliament
MOBILE First large-scale mobile payment experiment in Switzerland
in 2006
SWISSID Numerical identity provided on Swiss ID cards in 2009
VISTA Windows VISTA released at the end of 2006
STARACH Switzerland be part of the 6th StarAc
SMI-06 SMI exceeds 7800 in June
SMI-07 SMI exceeds 7800 in July
This large-scale experiment gave us the opportunity to see how the market reacted to
the information. As stated in many papers, prediction markets should quickly react to new
information. We did indeed observe this rapid reaction for many claims. The easiest way
to notice it is by comparing the quotes of the SMI-07 claim on MarMix with the quotes of
the Swiss Market Index (SMI). The SMI-07 claim was opened June and settled on 31 July.
In Figure 5.5, we can see both quotes and how the SMI-07 curve slightly anticipated the
variations of the SMI. Around 15 July, we note that the prediction market anticipated the
rate’s recovery two days in advance.
Figure 5.5: Variation of the Swiss Market Index and the SMI-07 claim on MarMix
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Improved user experience
In comparison with the first design, we noticed that 89% of the registered traders were
active during the six weeks. This result confirms that a better user interface was crucial.
With a ten-minute presentation, most of the traders understood the principles and how to
play on the market. We also tried to communicate the information to the traders via many
different channels such as email and information displays at the university. The latter
played an important role in motivating the traders, and in some cases was more important
than the prize itself.
Market maker failure We rapidly realized that the chosen automated market maker
algorithm, was not designed to support large-scale experiments. The market price over-
reacted if many small orders and, in particular, short orders were put in, allowing traders
to make disproportionate profits. Although this algorithm worked well on a small market,
the number of concurrent orders placed on this large market showed the limits of our
choice. Entering 20 buy or sell orders was enough to change the market price by up to
40%. Moreover, this function did not take into account the open orders in the book to
establish the market price.
– Choose a function M(i) from integers to [0, 1] such that M(i) > M(i + 1) and
M(0) = 1/2
– Choose a transaction quantity Q
– Market starts at j = 0
– Offer “$Q if A” → $(Q ∗M(j)) and if taken j → j + 1
– Offer “$Q if A” ← $(Q ∗M(j + 1)) and if taken j → j − 1
– If M(i) = 1/(1 + exp(i/k)), total loss <˜$Q ∗ k/2
For this experiment, we kept the previously implemented price function.
P (x) = minvalue + (maxvalue −minvalue) ∗ 1.0/(1.0 + exp(0.1 ∗ j)) where −125 < j <
125
After reviewing the literature we chose the design proposition of Robin Hanson based
both on a combinatorial market maker algorithm and on a book of orders [71]. This
proposition is based on two other publications by Hanson, the Logarithmic Market Scoring
Rules [80] and the Combinatorial Information Market Design [75]. This implementation
is currently used in many prediction markets, including Zocalo 2. Recently Berg and
Proebsting [12] presented their implementation of Hanson’s automated market maker with
a complete mathematical model.
Finally, this second experiment gave us the opportunity to test our prototype over a
long period of time, with a large market and a huge number of transactions. Except for
the market-maker algorithm problem, we consider this second prototype robust enough to
run more experiments.
2. Zocalo is a free java prediction market software available at http://zocalo.sf.net
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5.4.3 Redeploying the market for policy analysis
In collaboration with the Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration, we ran an
experiment based on the same prototype, dedicated to the prediction of the organizing city
of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games, with 52 traders coming from various international
and national sport federations and specialized media.
A highly sensitive topic
Due to the sensitiveness of the topic for our partner, we set up an invitation only
prediction market with national and international key players. They were invited to play
on seven claims concerning the selection of the candidates’ cities for the organization of
the 2014 Winter Olympic Games (Figure 5.6). The aim of the market was to predict the
two to four cities retained on the short list during the June 22, 2006 IOC meeting.
Figure 5.6: 2014candidates.org – Claim quotes during the experiment
An aborted initiative
During the experiment, our partner had to leave the project for political reasons and we
decided to let the market run till June 22, but to stop the experiment at that point. We
did however, notice that the market found the three nominated cities but overevalued the
chances of Sofia, which settled with a price over 50%.
In conclusion, we started this project based on numerous contributions on prediction
market applications for public policy and decision making [44, 67, 100], which show
that prediction markets could sucessfully be used to solve these problems. However,
we encountered totally new issues, namely that the policy makers were not disposed to
publicly inform on these topics. Until now, the unique case concerning a failure in the
implementation of a prediction market for public policy was the Policy Analysis Market
(PAM) developed by Hanson [79, 137]. Hovewer, we now know that the main consideration
in aborting the project was not directly a problem with the project itself [77].
5.4. FOUR DESIGN EXPERIMENTS 93
5.4.4 Assessing mobile information and communication technologies
We had promising results with our second experiment, and therefore decided to pursue this
research, exploring the ability to assess and forecast mobile information and communication
technologies using prediction markets (Table 5.9). This fourth experiment took place
within the MICS project with more than 100 researchers and potential traders. We assessed
new problems such as trader incentive, claim description and considerable participation
variations during the whole experiment. Although the market was open during the
whole experiment, we thought of having participation peaks during the bi-annual project
events.
Table 5.9: Claims list at the beginning of the third iteration
CAR Large-scale (10 vehicles) vehicular network test
AVALANCHE Sensor-networks deployed by the Swiss Federal Institute for Snow
and Avalanche to detect the risks of avalanche in Alpine regions
RFID Mobile phones with RFID in Switzerland
ROBOTS Robots detect a ringing phone among a hundred faster than humans
MPAYMENT At MICS meeting of 2009, the majority of the participants will
pay for their train ticket by mobile phone
BUILDING Users helped by ludic interfaces are better than intelligent buildings
in energy saving
Improved design
We improved our second prototype slightly for this fourth experiment, based on a better
automated market maker and a more adapted ontology for technological claims. Moreover,
we included the possibility of playing by mobile phone, allowing us to run experiments
during workshops and conferences.
Ontology for technological claims To asses more complex topics such as technological
claims, we developed a sort of specific ontology to describe technological claims. The goal
of this ontology is to standardize the description of the claims so as to allow researchers
coming from other fields to quickly understand the underlying concepts. Our ontology
takes the concepts of the futures markets and adds the specific concepts of the description
of scientific research. A more detailled presentation of this ontology follows in section
5.5.1.
Ubiquitous access For the last iteration we added the possibility to trade via cellular
phones, based on the short text messages (SMS) exchange. In addition to the advantages
in terms of portability, this development allowed us to simplify the interactions between
the traders and the platform. We developed a language syntax to reduce the instructions
to the minimum, and to ensure that the exchanged messages conform to the SMS format,
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Table 5.10: Example of text messages used to trade by cellular phone on MarMix
BUY To buy a certain number of contracts at the market price or to
place a limit order
For example: MICS BUY 23 RFID [LIMIT 0.67 ]
QUOTE To get a particular quote or all the active claim quotes
For example: MICS QUOTE RFID or MICS QUOTE LIST
HOLDINGS To get an overview of the portfolio
For example: MICS HOLDINGS
ORDERS To manage open orders (delete or change the limit price or the
quantity)
For example: MICS ORDERS DELETE 78787
as presented in Table 5.10. This enables the user to send, for example, MARMIX BUY 25
SENSOR to pass an order for 25 contracts of the claim sensor at the market price on the
MarMix prediction market.
Finally, to assure the confidentiality of the market, we completely anonymized the
platform, and also restricted access to only members of the project community.
First experiment with researchers
To ensure that the study was relevant, we started the market during an MICS workshop
in the presence of 100 researchers. We proceeded in the same way as for the initial prototype
(section 5.4.1) with a workshop in the presence of computer scientists and telecoms engineers
without any financial background, followed by a long-term experiment. However, we did
not have permanent direct access to the whole research community and hence had only a
few active traders (Figure 5.7).
Figure 5.7: MICS — Claim quotes during the experiment
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We tried different strategies for motivating the scientists to trade on the prediction
market such as presentations and demos at workshops, monthly information in the project
newsletter and direct contacts when available. After a first series of interviews we noticed
that was a reasonable level of interest within the community for this type of technology
but that the teams were centered on specific problems, and it was difficult to get them
interested in questions outside their field of work.
This experiment gave us the incentive to redesign our platform and to further develop our
knowledge of running prediction markets in different contexts. We aborted the experiment
at the end of 2008, with a new understanding of the incentive mechanisms.
5.5 Findings from four experiments
Following a design science methodology as stated in section 5.1, we ran four different
implementations of our prediction market. Each implementation was the occasion to
improve and test our design. From the evaluation of these design–evaluate loops, we
noticed five relevant issues related to our design choices as well as our test environment:
the description of the claims (sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.4), the IPO process (5.4.1 and 5.4.4),
the abstraction of the financial concepts (5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.4), the support of
synchronous and asynchronous trading (5.4.1 and 5.4.4) and the presence of a market
maker (5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.4).
5.5.1 A standard framework for supporting claim formulation
As seen on other prediction markets, it is difficult to formulate a scientific or technological
claim that will be equally well understood by all traders. Taking for example the claim
Machine translation by 2015 from Foresight Exchange 3 (Table 5.11), a scientist not coming
from computer science, will have more difficulties in understanding the context, even if the
main issues are in linguistic and natural language.
As main goal of a technological prediction market is to assess current and new technologies,
it is of great importance that all traders get the same comprehension of the underlying issues.
We propose a claim ontology to support the formulation of technological claims.
The goal of this ontology is to standardize the description of the claims to allow traders
coming from other domains to quickly understand the underlying concepts. Our ontology
takes the concepts of the futures markets and adds the specific concepts of the description
of R&D projects. Currently, the focus of the presented ontology is on research projects
rather than on development ones.
To our knowledge, there is currently no ontology applicable to prediction market claims.
The closest ontology could be in the financial fields or in the commodities futures. The
design of a clean ontology exceeds the framework of this work and could be the subject of
future research on prediction markets.
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Table 5.11: Machine translation by 2015
Category Science and technology
Owner Mats
Judge Loophole
Created 1995/01/26
Due date 2017/12/31
The claim By the end of the year 2015, there will be a program that can trans-
late written material into English from one of French, German,
Russian, Japanese or Chinese. The program will work well on ordi-
nary non-fiction prose, newspaper and magazine articles, ordinary
non-legalese business letters and scientific and technical writing.
The translations will be of comparable cost and turnaround time,
and equal or better then average quality, as professional human
translations. Source text may be entered in any convenient way –
this isn’t an OCR claim
Judge’s statement I will judge based on the wording of the claim unless it is found
to be ambiguous. Such ambiguities will be resolved based on my
perception of the author’s intent.
I interpret “Comparable cost and turnaround time” to mean equal
or lower cost and turnaround time compared to typical human
translation services
Initially, we studied the correspondence with the commodities futures, which are closely
linked to prediction markets. Take, for example, a future on cocoa traded on the New York
Board of Trade (Table 5.12).
Most information is related to the terms of the agreement: symbol, name, market, unit,
market’s opening and value of the contracts. One will note the description of the due
dates, which are coded by letters and are associated with one day of settlement. Thus the
contract CCZ5 is a cocoa contract that will expire on 15 December 2009.
This information is directly applicable to the prediction markets and can be used to
describe the structure of the claims. However, as the commodity markets could not
be the subject of controversy, the description of the commodities is defined in external
standards.
3. http://www.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=Tran
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Table 5.12: CCZ5 cocoa future traded on the New York Board of Trade
Symbol CC
Name Cocoa
Exchange NYBOT
Trading months H,K,N,U,Z
Trading unit 10 metric tons (22,046 lbs)
Tick size $1.00 per metric ton ($10.00 per contract)
Daily limit None
Trading hours 8:00a.m. to 11:50a.m. EST
Last trading day Eleven business days prior to last business day of delivery month
Value of one futures unit $10
Value of one options unit $10
Delivery/settlement terms
Grade/standards/quality Established by Exchange licensed graders in accordance with spec-
ified tolerances for defects, bean count, bean size and other stan-
dards
Deliverable growths The growth of any country or clime, including new or yet unknown
growths. Growths are divided into three classifications: Group A,
deliverable at a premium of $160/ton (including the main crops of
Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, among others); Group B, deliverable
at a premium of $80.00/ton (includes Bahia, Arriba, Venezuela,
among others); Group C, deliverable at par (includes Sanchez,
Haiti, Malaysia and all others).
Delivery points At licensed warehouses in the Port of New York District, Delaware
River Port District or Port of Hampton Roads
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International Cocoa Standards
The International Cocoa Standards require cocoa of merchantable quality to be fermented,
thoroughly dry, free from smoky beans, free from abnormal or foreign odours and free from any
evidence of adulteration. It must be reasonably free from living insects, broken beans, fragments
and pieces of shell and foreign matter and reasonably uniform in size.
Throughout the world the standards against which all cocoa is measured are those of Ghana
cocoa. Cocoa is graded on the basis of the count of defective beans in the cut test. Defective
beans should not exceed the following limits:
Grade I
– Mouldy beans, maximum 3% by count;
– Slaty beans, maximum 3% by count;
– Insect-damaged, germinated or flat beans, total maximum 3% by count.
Grade II
– Mouldy beans, maximum 4% by count;
– Slaty beans, maximum 8% by count;
– Insect-damaged, germinated or flat beans, total maximum 6% by count.
Furthermore, we also studied the composition of prospectuses on financial markets,
which are also rather close to the creation of claims on a prediction market. We based
ourselves on the Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 issued by the European Union
concerning information contained in prospectuses.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004
A. Identity of directors, senior management, advisers and auditors
B. Offer statistics and expected timetable
C. Key information concerning selected financial data; capitalisation and indebtedness; reasons
for the offer and use of proceeds; risk factors
D. Information concerning the issuer
– history and development of the issuer
– business overview
E. Operating and financial review and prospects
– research and development, patents and licences, etc.
– trends
F. Directors, senior management and employees
G. Major shareholders and related-party transactions
H. Financial information
– consolidated statement and other financial information
– significant changes
I. Details of the offer and admission to trading
– offer and admission to trading
– plan for distribution
– markets
– selling shareholders
– dilution (equity securities only)
– expenses of the issue
J. Additional information
– share capital
– memorandum and articles of association
– documents on display
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In this directive, points B and I can be connected to the previous cocoa example. We
also find a part that describes the details of the offer, namely the assets of the firm, its
evolution, its activities. Unfortunately, the most specific part does not help us to draw a
parallel with prediction market claims.
We decided to split the definition of the claims into two parts. The first relates to the
elements described as structural, which define the claim’s terms, and the second defines
the claim’s proposal.
Structural elements
The structural elements are defined in such a way that all traders are rapidly able to
understand the main properties of the contract. We can define these in a formal way and
use a proper ontology to describe, for example, the manner of calculating the settle value of
the contract and the terms of payment. The structural elements consist of the description,
the judgment, the price and the type of the claim.
The description contains the symbol, the name, the underlying project, the author and
the type of contract (binary, index, . . . ).
The judgment section describes the settle time, the manner it will be judged and by
whom, and the trusted information sources for the judgment. It is also necessary to specify
the applicable rules if there is no possibility of judging the claim or if the judgment cannot
be settled. For example, if there is a claim about the discovery of the Higgs particle by
CERN or Fermilab 4, it is necessary to specify the value of the contract if a third laboratory
discovers the particle first. This particular claim states that the value of the contract will
be $50 if neither of the two laboratories discovers the particle.
The price section describes the price range in which the contract will evolve, as well as
the method of calculating the price at the settle time. Claims could be of the type binary,
but could also be indexes, logarithmic functions or winner-takes-all in the case of multiple
outcomes. The date of payment should also be specified if it does not take place directly
after the judgment.
Claim proposal
Due to the diversity of the prediction markets and the related claims, it is difficult to
propose a generic framework for defining a claim’s proposal. We tried to characterize MICS
claims based on the interviews carried out at the beginning of the project as well as on
the active claims on the other markets. We noticed five important concepts: the sphere of
activity, the state of the art, the goal of the research, the expected results and the measure
of success, illustrated by the SLF claim in Table 5.13.
The state-of-the-art section gives a short presentation of the research history. In this
category we describe the previous steps necessary to formulate the goal of the research,
4. http://news.us.newsfutures.com/market/market.html?symbol=HIGGCERN
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Table 5.13: The SLF claim on MarMix
Symbol SLF
Name Sensor-Network deployed by SLF
Author Ce´dric Gaspoz
Type Binary
Project Real-time avalanche and landslide analysis through sensor networks
Settle date 31.07.2009
Jury Made up of two members of the SLF, two members of the project
and one person in charge of MICS
Source SLF report the tests carried out. If there is no report, raw data of
the SLF can be used
Price Minimum price: 0, maximum: 100
Payment Winner-takes-all (if the contract is TRUE: 1, if not: 0)
Field of research Research on sensor-networks
State of the art The fluid-dynamics models used so far in predicting mass move-
ments such as avalanches rely on speculative equations and very
little is known about the internal structure of avalanches. Field
measurements only provide insight into shape characteristics (e.g.,
avalanche speed).
Goal of the research The sensor network measures the displacement/velocity field inside
a flowing bulk. Before the material is released, the sensor nodes
are spread onto the surface or inside the material. After release,
the information of each node is monitored to determine the flow
structure. The main tasks are twofold: constructing a sensor
network and interpreting the data to build more accurate fluid-
dynamics models.
Expected results Deployment of a sensor-network under real conditions to predict
the risks of avalanche
Measure of success The SLF deployed a network of 100 nodes in an Alpine area to
predict the risks of avalanche. The results obtained by the sensors,
as well as the treatments using fluid-dynamics models, allow us to
obtain valid results with an error margin of 20% during a season
(01.11 to 30.04).
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detail the related work and present some major publications in the field. Such information
will enable each researcher to situate the claim in its field of research.
The goal of the research describes the expected outcome of the research after a given
time. These are global, long-term and not precisely defined goals, as they represent research
in progress.
The expected results are the concrete elements, in the mid term, that will result from
the research. They may be products, demonstrations, patents, algorithms, creation of
start-ups, standards or RFCs.
The measure of success must precisely express the methods of evaluation of the awaited
results. This evaluation should be objective and factual. We could, for example, specify
the product’s market share, the acceptance of a demonstration by the scientific community,
the use of a patent and the publication of the results by the press.
5.5.2 An easy IPO mechanism to support the innovation process
We propose to deal with the claims management in a different way from other prediction
markets, which use a top-down process. Indeed, to guarantee the transmission of information
between the researchers and the market, each trader should be allowed to trade on the
available claims as well as to propose new claims. The ideation process should be as smooth
as possible to guarantee the best performances.
A trader is able to add a new claim, in connection with their field of research, to test
their research proposal on the market. To find a way in-between a peer-review process
and a flood of claims, a fee mechanism could be put in place. With such a mechanism, a
trader has to pay a fee (in the market’s money) to submit a new claim. Furthermore, they
should also earn a percentage of the shares at the settlement of their claim. This process
guarantees a low entry barrier on the market for new ideas and thus promotes the sharing
of new ideas and concepts on the platform. We defined an IPO process in four stages:
(1) claim proposal, (2) discussion on the formulation of the claim, (3) price determination,
by putting limit orders on the claim and (4) opening of the trades on the market (section
4.7).
5.5.3 A simplified trading interface
In response to the evaluation of our first implementation, we decided to move from
the traditional stock exchange interface. This unnecessarily increased the complexity of
the trader’s experience as stated by a trader at GE: I felt that the tool obfuscates the
very opinions it seeks to gather due to the inherent complexities of market behaviour. 5
Our new trading interface moves away from the traditional stock exchanges interfaces. It
consequently allows an easier use for uninitiated people. Thus, it was necessary to carefully
make design choices in order to avoid an over-simplification of the interface. This could
have tended to transform our prediction market into a voting or polling system. We then
decided to keep the main concepts of purchase and sale, as well as limit and market types
of orders (Figure 5.4). Moreover, in the current version, we keep the concept of quantity.
It would be interesting, in future research, to develop an interface that allows the trader to
determine a probability and then to suggest an order (quantity and price) that can make
the market price evolve to the expected new price.
5. http://www.grcblog.com/?p=378
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5.5.4 A combination of group and individual sessions
Various incentive mechanisms were discussed in section 4.7. However, to provide a
good participation rate on scientific or technology prediction markets, we accompanied the
experiment by group sessions. As stated by LaComb et al. [96], the group sessions during
the launching of the market or in the course of the experiment, increased the interaction
between the traders. Consequently and according to our experiments, it is recommended
to set up such group sessions. Incentives such as iPods or other gadgets are not always
sufficient to bring the traders on the market, as shown in our fourth experiment.
5.5.5 An automatic market maker
On this point, there is a consensus within the community. It is essential to have a market
maker when using prediction markets in such contexts. However, we did not study, the
use of other automated market maker mechanisms such as Pennock’s dynamic pari-mutuel
[126]. An inherent problem using automated market maker mechanisms is their tendency
to act as a money pump if they are not correctly calibrated for the market. A thorough
study concerning the calibration of these mechanisms not having been made yet, it was
difficult for us to fully control it. However, as our markets were play-money based, this did
not have a direct influence on the experiments.
5.6 Contribution > Five design propositions
In conclusion, our design science process, composed of four build-and-evaluate loops,
supported with our artifact, led us formulate five propositions to design a predictions
market for technological forecasting.
Proposition 1 A prediction market for technological forecasting should integrate a
standard framework to support claim formulation. Using an indicator incorporated in
the form of a price makes the evaluations comprehensible by all actors. Consequently,
it is advisable to make sure that, independently of their activity, the traders have the
same claims comprehension. Moreover, a structured framework helps in defining claims or
structuring interviews with concerned people.
Proposition 2 A prediction market for technological forecasting should integrate an
easy IPO mechanism to support the innovation process. The prediction market should allow
researchers to test their research ideas among all actors, without needing a review process
or preliminary validation. This direct access to the market removes internal barriers to
innovation without requiring modification of the usual selection processes.
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Proposition 3 A prediction market for technological forecasting should occult the fi-
nancial mechanisms to reduce the traders’ learning curves and increase their incentive.
Observations resulting from our interviews showed that the researchers are by no means
familiar with the underlying concepts such as limit orders necessary to play on a prediction
market, which results in errors, and discourages them from playing on the market. This
implies specific usability requirements on the human–computer interface.
Proposition 4 A prediction market for technological forecasting should allow the combi-
nation of group sessions with individual sessions to increase the incentive of the traders.
Group sessions allow an evaluation of the portfolio to be obtained very quickly, generating
a specific dynamic. Siemens used this configuration during one-hour meetings, but it could
also be used in a distance synchronous trading way (e.g. by opening the market for one
hour every month).
Proposition 5 A prediction market for technological forecasting should integrate a
market maker to increase the quality of the evaluation. The market maker makes the
market more reactive and fluid, allowing the traders to buy or sell each time new information
is available. Thus the evaluation will aggregate more information, compared to a double
auction market were the traders must wait for a similar offer to make the deal.
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Based on the promising results from the first iteration, this chapter discusses the adop-
tion of prediction markets to partially support the R&D portfolio management process.
Our findings are that prediction markets are powerful tools for addressing various issues
encountered during the selection process.
6.1 Introduction
The R&D project portfolio management is a periodic activity that aims at optimizing
the research effort of a company, while enabling it to select a portfolio that corresponds to
its strategic objectives and without exceeding the resources available. Several studies have
evaluated the practices in “Fortune 500” companies, finding that there is neither a single
method nor a solution applicable to all companies [35, 102].
1. The content of this chapter was partially published in [52]: C. Gaspoz. Prediction Markets As an
Innovative Way to Manage R&D Portfolios, 15th Doctoral Consortium at CAiSE-2008, Montpellier, France,
2008.
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6.2 Usage
The most recent investigations showed that, to be effective, portfolio management
must apply a mix of various qualitative and quantitative methods [32, 36]. However,
the use of quantitative methods presents weaknesses, mainly for (1) selecting the right
criteria, (2) collecting the data, (3) and negotiating the portfolio between the different
stakeholders.
Many authors have proposed different frameworks for selecting R&D project portfolios
[4, 32, 36]. The invariants of these different frameworks are: (1) maximizing the value of
the portfolio, (2) achieving a balanced portfolio and (3) building strategy into the portfolio
(Figure 6.1).
Achieving
a blanced 
portfolio
Maximizing 
the value of 
the portfolio
Building 
strategy into 
the portfolio
Figure 6.1: The global R&D portfolio management process
Since many stakeholders, such as the different business units, are involved in the portfolio
decision process, a “negotiation support system” could be the appropriate solution for
speeding up the process. However, it will not significantly reduce the communication
efforts. We suggest a paradigm shift with a new tool to address the portfolio management
issues.
Our statement is that a specifically designed prediction market could improve the R&D
portfolio management process. Prediction markets collect information coming from different
actors, who trade on the market, and aggregate this information in an automatically
negotiated equilibrium price, corresponding to the valuation of the project. All actors
directly or indirectly linked to the project can trade (buy or sell) contracts concerning the
projects, based on their own appreciation of the project. The traders are both the leaders
and the teams of the project, and also the senior management, people from marketing and
finance, as well as from all the other businesses units concerned with R&D. Their expertise
within a specific company activity like research, but also marketing, sales, customer care
or finance, will enable them to build their own opinion of the project, in the lighting of
their particular field of activity.
The result of all aggregated appreciations will de facto include a multitude of implicit
criteria related to all company activities. Such a market mechanism addresses the three
weaknesses mentioned above: (1) no extra more criterion to be explicitly selected, (2) less
data to be collected, and (3) fewer issues to be explicitly negotiated between actors. These
three activities are implicitly replaced by the trading (buying and selling) of claims concern-
ing the projects within the portfolio. In addition, prediction markets are a very powerful
tool for discovering and aggregating information disseminated between many people. Thus,
using prediction markets should not only make the whole process more effective, but also
increase the quality of the decisions, based on more complete information.
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6.3 Context > R&D portfolio management
The selection of a powerful project portfolio is a delicate exercise which requires wide
competencies of strategic management and the associated tools regarding the objective
criteria and also very good competencies in negotiation regarding the subjective criteria as
well as the final choice of the portfolio composition.
The portfolio decision process is characterized by uncertain and changing
information, dynamic opportunities, multiple goals and strategic considerations,
interdependence among projects, and multiple decision makers and locations.
Robert G. Cooper [36]
Chien [32] provided an extensive literature review on portfolio selection and showed the
inherent limitations of the existing R&D project selection models as follows: (1) inadequate
treatment of multiple, often interrelated, evaluation criteria; (2) inadequate treatment
of interrelationships among projects; (3) inability to handle non-monetary aspects; e.g.
diversity among projects; (4) no explicit recognition and incorporation of the experience
and knowledge of the R&D managers (i.e. the decision makers) and (5) perceptions by
R&D managers that the models are difficult to understand and use.
Cooper et al. [36] showed that the combination of individually good projects does not
necessarily constitute the optimal portfolio for the firm. This is often the case with firms
having too many trivial projects and not enough projects that yield major competitive
advantage. As seen in section 6.1, many authors proposed different frameworks for selecting
R&D project portfolios [4, 32, 36, 159], resulting in three invariants: (1) maximizing the
value of the portfolio, (2) achieving a balanced portfolio and (3) building strategy into the
portfolio.
The two last stages are relatively well documented and supported by different frameworks,
and use a wide range of visualization techniques such as bubble diagrams and scoring
models. By contrast, the first stage is subject to a plethora of different methods requiring
large investments in time and resources to collect the necessary data.
Liyanage et al. refer to more than 200 quantitative and qualitative methods for selecting
R&D projects in their study [106]. The most often used methods are: the net present value
(NPV), the expected commercial value (ECV), the productivity index, the options pricing
theory and the dynamic rank-ordered list (Table 6.1). All these methods rely on various
data that must be collected, evaluated or estimated before being used in the models. The
principal issue concerning these data is their inaccuracy or unreliability, resulting in the
financial methods yielding the worst portfolio results [36]. This is not so much from the
fact that these models lack rigor; rather, it results from very poor data and forecasting in
new product projects.
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Table 6.1: Principal methods used for selecting R&D projects
Method Description
Net present value Seeks to maximize the future net cash flows of the port-
folio, minus the initial investment needed to develop
the projects
Expected commercial value Seeks to maximize the expected value, or expected
commercial worth of the portfolio, subject to certain
budget constraints
Productivity index A variant of ECV in that it considers risks and proba-
bilities of projects success
Options pricing theory Like the ECV method, it seeks to maximize the ex-
pected value using the trade of options regarding the
project’s future outcomes
Dynamic rank-ordered list Seeks to maximize the portfolio rank-ordering projects
according to several concurrent criteria
6.3.1 Selecting the right criteria
To be able to compare different projects at different stages with different goals, the senior
managers first have to select the right criteria, applicable to all projects. These criteria
may be financial like NPV or ECV, commercial like market shares, based on the consumed
or planned resources, related to the pricing or the probability of technical success, etc. To
select the right set of criteria, the company uses the experience of its senior managers but
has to follow some intern guidelines, principally financial ones, needed for the budgeting
process. This set of criteria can be elaborated iteratively by the experts with Delphi-like
or NSS methods or be determined by quantitative methods. The output of this process is
very important, influencing the whole selection of the portfolio.
6.3.2 Collecting the data
Once the criteria are determined, it is necessary to collect the quantitative information
necessary for their evaluation. During the initial stage of the project, the lack of concrete
information leads the various experts to make projections, estimates or extrapolations to
quantify the various indicators, more reliable data being only available at a later time,
according to the project advance. Consequently, their use of a sophisticated mathematical
model has only little significance at the initial stage and could lead to very inaccurate
results. However, this initial phase is of great relevance for the decision whether or not to
incorporate the new project in the overall portfolio.
The second problem concerning the data collection is their constant update during
the whole project life. Even if the data tend to approach reality as the project advances
and becomes more concrete, their acquisition remains tiresome. Whereas certain data
can easily be extracted from the company’s reporting tools, others require a lot of work.
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Thus, for example, data concerning the acceptance of new technologies, future market
shares, product lifespan, competitors’ actions and so on must be the subject of a new
study for each portfolio actualization. This renders the process inflexible and often leads
managers to use obsolete data, having neither time nor resources to gather more up-to-date
information.
6.3.3 Negotiating the evaluation
Since R&D portfolio management is often a team activity and involves several stakeholders
(i.e. business units), the decision issues and positions are often the result of a negotiation
process. Coupled with the previous comment on criterion selection, it means that R&D
portfolio management could be considered as a multi-actor negotiation or multi-criterion
decision-making process [26]. Several models have been proposed in the negotiation
literature. Kersten [90] suggests a negotiation model with five phases:
1. search for arena and selection of communication mode (synchronous or not)
2. agenda setting (decision attributes)
3. exploring the field (best alternatives for negotiation agreement)
4. narrowing the difference and searching for the agreements (with compromises, offers
and counter-offers, etc.
5. agreement assessment and fulfillment
This kind of model and the associated negotiation support systems (NSS) tools facilitate
the communication activities. However, although they obviously speed up the process
and eliminate ambiguities, they do not reduce the communication intensity. Our claim is
that, with another paradigm, we could drastically reduce the communication effort itself,
substituting the multi-stakeholder negotiation process by a market mechanism.
6.4 Evaluation
To evaluate this new usage of prediction markets, we choose to use an ex-ante evaluation,
due to the fact that it is very complicated to design a good ex-post evaluation. To be able
to run an ex-post evaluation, we would have to build and test our market in a real-life
context, but this would only be possible in an artificial situation. Indeed, evaluating such
a market would imply running two experiments in parallel: a traditional R&D portfolio
management technique and a prediction market. Moreover, we would need to develop
and pursue all projects from both methods to be able to evaluate the correctness of the
two approaches. Such an experiment would considerably exceed the boundaries of our
research.
Inspired by Pries-Heje et al. [136], we made an ex-ante evaluation, i.e. on the design of
our prediction market, regarded as a new process to manage R&D portfolios. Furthermore,
we followed a naturalistic approach for this evaluation. In the following sections, we present
the issues solved by our new process, an extensive justification based on past results from
the literature and finally a proposal to incorporate our new process in the global R&D
portfolio management process.
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6.4.1 Issues addressed by prediction markets
Using a prediction market in parallel with qualitative methods would allow managers to
obtain discrete data in a relatively economic and fast way. In addition, by their nature,
prediction markets render not only one discrete value at a given time, but also the evolution
of this equilibrium value during the whole project life, making it much more significant
than a simple discrete value.
Selecting the right criteria
Spann et al. [156] evaluate the potential use and different design possibilities as well as the
forecast accuracy and performance of virtual stock markets compared to expert predictions
for their application to business forecasting. Furthermore, they propose a new validity
test for prediction market forecasts. Plott and Chen [133] analyze markets as information
gathering tools, report on the deployment of such an information aggregation mechanism
(IAM) within Hewlett-Packard for the purpose of making sales forecasts, and show that
IAMs performed better than traditional methods employed within Hewlett-Packard.
Used for R&D portfolio management, prediction markets enable – once the project
proposal has been released – the creation of a new claim tied to the project, which will be
released on the market. As of this time, all actors directly or indirectly linked to the project
can trade (buy or sell) contracts concerning the project, based on their own appreciation of
the project. It thus becomes easy to obtain a discrete evaluation of each project, allowing
them to be classified in order of importance or as clusters.
Using implicit comparison criteria, prediction markets enables the combining of a great
diversity of appreciation criteria in a completely transparent way and to aggregate them in
a price, representing the actual consensus on the claim. This is particularly true when an
ontology, shared by all actors, is used to describe the project claims, enabling each trader
to have the same frame of reference.
Collecting the data
Wolfers and Zitzewitz [171] describe early experiments concerned with prediction markets,
raise some market design issues and conclude with some evidence as to the limitations
of prediction markets. They also find that prediction markets prices typically provide
useful (albeit sometimes biased) estimates of average beliefs about the probability of an
event occurring [173]. Chen et al. [29] propose and experimentally verify a market-based
method to aggregate scattered information so as to produce reliable forecasts regarding
uncertain events; they empirically demonstrate that nonlinear aggregation mechanisms
vastly outperform both the imperfect market and the best informed traders. Wolfers
and Zitzewitz [173] show that the success of the prediction market in generating trade
depends critically on attracting uninformed traders. To test how much extra accuracy
can be obtained by using real money versus play-money, Servan-Schreiber et al. [146] set
up a real-world on-line experiment showing that play-money markets performed as well
as real money markets. They speculate that real-money markets may better motivate
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information discovery while play-money markets may yield more efficient information
aggregation.
In an R&D portfolio management context, prediction markets enable each actor, at any
time, to integrate their private information by buying or selling contracts according to the
difference between the equilibrium price and their own confidence. In this manner, the
equilibrium price, while undergoing constant adjustments, will gradually incorporate more
and more information due to the aggregating mechanism of the market. The trader’s goal
being to maximize their personal performance on the market, they will try to make profit
each time they are in possession of information enabling them to adjust their position.
To motivate them to be reactive, the prediction market enables the company to rank
the traders obtaining the best performances, performances that can be rewarded by the
company in the form of prizes or bonuses.
Finally, the use of prediction markets for R&D allows the solving of another problem
concerning the portfolio maximization: the update of the data. Very often, data cannot be
regularly updated in terms of the portfolio reviews, and the senior management has to deal
with progress reports on which to base their analysis. With prediction markets, the quote
of the contract fluctuates throughout the whole project life, after each transaction carried
out by the traders. Thus, any modification of an internal or external factor related to the
project will initiate a buy or sell order by the actor in possession of new information. This
transaction will make the price evolve to a new equilibrium. In this manner, the senior
managers can base their decision not only on the contract’s price at a given time, but
also on its evolution over a given period. This concept of the continuity of the evaluation
also allows a better comparison between projects since in addition to one discrete value, it
provides a comparison of the trend of the price of each project, enabling them to discover
which projects are in a growing or declining phase.
Using a relatively basic mechanism, based on the buying and the selling of contracts,
prediction markets can aggregate very efficiently, and in real time, the information dissem-
inated between a wide range of actors, making superfluous the implementation of a specific
actualization process. In addition, this quote not only represents the actualized consensus
concerning the value of the project, but also represents the evolution of this consensus
during the whole project life.
Negotiating the evaluation
Prediction markets can incorporate various trading mechanisms. Whereas the simplest
use a continuous double auction mechanism, the most advanced implement a market maker
in order to fluidize the transactions and to optimize the information aggregation mechanism.
Various market maker mechanisms are studied in the literature. After introducing market
scoring rules, Hanson [75] considers several design issues, including how to represent
variables in order to support both conditional and unconditional estimates, how to avoid
becoming a money pump via errors in calculating probabilities, and how to ensure that
users can cover their bets, without needlessly preventing them from using previous bets
as collateral for future bets. Berg et al. [19] show how prediction markets can be used
for decision support. Rhode and Strumpf [138] studied a century of manipulations of
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prediction markets. Their work suggests that it is difficult and expensive to manipulate
prediction markets for more than short periods of time. Studies on TradeSport point out
that manipulations are reverted within minutes by other traders.
On an R&D prediction market, the negotiation of each project’s relative value is the
result of the various sell or buy orders placed by the traders. These orders are processed by
a market maker in a completely automatic way, allowing the carrying out of the transaction
and the establishment of the new equilibrium price. Thus instead of using an inter-actors
negotiation support system, we use a transparent system allowing each actor, at any time,
to negotiate a new equilibrium price with the marketm maker.
In addition, as with the stock exchange portfolios, the traders do not rely on unlimited
resources. Following this, their relative influence on the market will evolve according to
their performance. Thus, the best-informed traders will benefit from the appreciation
errors of the less informed ones or from those trying to manipulate the quotation to make a
profit, allowing them, using the additional resources acquired, to increase their influence on
the market. At the same time, relative to their losses on the market, the others traders will
see their possibility of influencing the course reduced. For that reason and in spite of the
number of significant actors, the equilibrium price is the result of a consensus between all
the actors, according to their relative influence, not based on their position in the company,
but on of their overall performance.
Using an automatic market maker, prediction markets enable continuous negotiation
of the value of each project of the portfolio between all the actors, according to their
relative influence on the market. In addition, this mechanism provides a greater cohesion
of decision-making since the price at a given time is the result of the negotiation of all
actors concerning the advisability of carrying out a given project.
6.4.2 Various experiments in related fields
We have seen in section 6.3 some issues affecting the R&D portfolio management process.
We also saw in section 6.4.1 how a carefully designed prediction market could solve or
ameliorate some of these issues.
Currently, there are no studies reporting on experiments in this field. However, some
studies (see below) present very similar applications, such as new product development,
idea generation and group decisioning and to create and evaluate new product ideas. We
will therefore compare three different studies on applications of prediction markets in
related fields and will highlight their principal design choices. This overview will then
enable us to determine the necessary design choices to implement a prediction market for
R&D portfolio management.
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Securities trading of concepts (STOC)
The securities trading of concepts (STOC) was developed and used by Chan et al. [27]
in 2002 to collect consumer preferences on product concepts. Consumers are asked to
express their preferences for new product concepts by trading virtual securities, i.e. claims.
STOC could be used to complement or replace traditional methods of collecting this
information. Well known and used methods are surveys, conjoint analysis, concept tests or
focus groups.
STOC could improve these methods in four ways: (1) accuracy—participants are
motivated to express their opinion as often as needed, (2) interactive learning—participants
not only act on their own behalf, but adapt it from the valuation of other participants,
(3) scalability—STOC markets can handle an unlimited number of participants and products
and (4) unarticulated needs—like other computer-supported tools, the STOC market can
handle virtual products [39] such as movie scripts or fashion items that cannot be handled
by traditional surveys.
Design Chan et al. ran multiple trading experiments to predict the market share of nine
concept bike pumps and eight crossover vehicles (Table 6.2). Participants were asked to
evaluate the company share price if a company was going public with its product, assuming
that all companies have the same cost structure. In this case, all factors other than the
quality and desirability of the products could be ignored in valuing the stocks.
Traders were asked to trade for 10 minutes in a trading room or 60 minutes over the
Internet. Participants were not allowed to submit their own product idea or attributes.
They had to trade on 11 predefined claims representing various bike pump designs.
Table 6.2: STOC market design
Participants 18/26* MBA students
Initial claims 11
IPO Not available
Final payout Sum of cash and total worth of the stocks at the closing
market price
Money Play-money
Market duration 10/60* minutes
Initial grant Cash and shares for each claim
Anonymity Through self selected username
Short-selling Not allowed
Incentives Prizes for the three best players
Information All information is available on the STOC market (prod-
uct description and attributes)
Trading CDA
Evaluation Comparison with survey study
*Respectively for the first/second experiment
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Results The results of the experiments—the closing market price of each share—were
compared with a survey study, and Chan et al. found significant correlation between the
results of the two methods.
The Imagination Market
The Imagination Market was developed inside GE as a support tool for idea generation
and group decisioning by LaComb et al. [96]. Participants were able to trade shares of
technology ideas over the course of three weeks, resulting in the market identifying the
“best” idea as the highest-priced security. Based on the observation that new ideas could
emerge from anywhere within the organization, LaComb et al. tried to use a prediction
market for collaborative brainstorming and idea ranking. Such a market could solve some
recurring issues in idea generation and group decisioning such as the need for simultaneous
participation by all participants.
LaComb et al. [96, 97] define the most important features for such a system as: (1) sup-
port for large, globally distributed teams with potentially thousands of contributors,
(2) continuous idea contributions and ranking, (3) idea spring boarding, allowing contrib-
utors to be inspired by ideas from others, (4) responsiveness to new information such
as the release of a new product line by a competitor and (5) correct ranking of ideas
by participants. Furthermore, they added three more constraints to foster participation:
(1) real-time feedback on ideas as they are generated, (2) visibility of the ideas and the
process to all contributors and (3) consensus building, where all participants have a voice
in the ranking process.
Design LaComb et al. ran the Imagination Market for three weeks, with employees from
GE’s Computing and Decisioning Sciences Technology Center (Table 6.3). The market
started with five preselected ideas and ended with a total of 62 ideas. Participants were
asked to judge each idea by whether it would: (1) have a high monetary impact to one or
more GE businesses, (2) utilize advanced technology compatible with GE’s focus areas,
(3) demonstrate impact within 13 years and (4) be focused on growth-related ideas. In a
second experiment [157] they slightly adapted their design, and participants where asked
to evaluate how closely ideas fitted the criteria. This approach allowed participants to not
only evaluate ideas in a similar manner to each other, but to use criteria that management
would ordinarily use to evaluate ideas. The criteria were: (1) ideas that our customers will
value, (2) ideas that will produce the best return on investment and (3) ideas that should
be included for funding next year.
Results The results of the experiments—the VWPA of each share—were compared with
an independent ranking of ideas by 11 members of the leadership team, and LaComb et
al. found that the market and the leadership team did not differ in their rankings of the
securities. Furthermore, the Imagination Market generated more ideas than those methods
that they had been used in the past, such as brainstorming and suggestion boxes.
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Table 6.3: Imagination Market design
Participants 85 employees
Initial claims 5
IPO All securities IPO’d 100 shares at $50
Final payout Volume weighted average price (VWAP) during the
final five trading days
Money Play-money
Market duration 3 weeks
Initial grant Cash plus a weekly cash allowance
Anonymity Trader id
Short-selling Allowed
Incentives Prizes for the best players, lottery, group sessions
Information Blogs to share information or discuss the ideas
Trading CDA
Evaluation Independent ranking of ideas by 11 members of the
leadership team
Creating and evaluating new product ideas with idea markets
Soukhoroukova et al. [154] proposed the concept of idea markets as a new method
of creating and evaluating new product ideas. The findings were that the creation and
evaluation of new product ideas are influenced by (1) a large number of ideas and idea
creators involved, (2) group decisions instead of individual decisions, and (3) methods that
combine the creation of ideas with their evaluation. Combining these three factors, idea
markets should be able to accurately support these processes.
Current methods utilized for idea creation and evaluation differ according to the tasks of
idea generation (creation, evaluation or both), the number of participants and the degree
of interaction among participants. Idea markets are characterized by an integration of a
large number of participants, their interaction and the combination of both tasks, namely
idea creation and evaluation.
Design Soukhoroukova et al. ran a real-world idea market for five weeks at the beginning
of 2006 involving 642 participants from all hierarchical levels in a high-tech company (Table
6.4). The idea market consisted of three categories to explore the level of task specificity
best for idea markets (a) new technologies for the company, (b) new product ideas for a
specific product category and (c) innovative product and business ideas for the company.
For category (a), the price of an idea stock reflected the estimated percentage of revenues
influenced by the respective technology in ten years. In category (b), the price of an idea
stock depended on the estimated number of units that will be sold of such a product in ten
years. Category (c) was a miscellaneous category for product and business ideas of any
kind, of which the ten best ideas were worth $100, and $0 otherwise [154].
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Table 6.4: Idea market design
Participants 642 employees
Initial claims 10 ideas collected by the innovation team
IPO Expert screening with uniform price IPO mechanism
Final payout Expert committee determine a pay-off value for each
idea stock
Money Play-money
Market duration 36 days
Initial grant Cash
Anonymity Through self-selected username
Short-selling Not allowed
Incentives Prizes for the best players
Information All information is available on the market with the
possibility of adding external links
Trading CDAwMM
Evaluation Management survey with 25 senior managers
Results The idea market actively evaluated the idea stocks, but the consensus between
the evaluation of the idea markets, the one of senior management, the individual participants
and the expert committee is only moderate. There were 252 idea were submitted, more
than half coming from participants not involved in new product development. Of these,
100 ideas went through the screening and IPO process and were actively traded on the
market. The results suggest that idea markets are a promising method for supporting the
idea generation process.
First findings from past experiments
We studied the various design of STOC, information and idea markets mentioned above,
which are all based on the same principles with very little differences. So, for the purpose
of this comparison, we will use the common denomination “prediction market” for all of
them.
All studies found that prediction markets are able to accurately determine the value
of a project or an idea. Moreover, they are particularly well designed to leverage new
ideas, projects or collaboration among the disparate group of employees. Therefore, by
analogy, they should be able to accurately assess the value of R&D projects, which are—in
effect—the formalized result of an ideation process.
Using a participative process to leverage the knowledge about R&D projects in an
organization—aggregating bits of widely dispersed information in a non-intrusive manner—
leads to the same results as traditional methods. In addition, a prediction market should
support no restrictions in the number of participants and duration but should also support
an IPO process to integrate new research ideas.
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6.5 A proposal
Retaining the most significant design choices from the previous section, we can extrapolate
the design characteristics of a prediction market for R&D portfolio management, as
presented in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Main characteristics of a PM for R&D portfolio management
Characteristic STOC Imagination Idea R&D
Participants 18/26 85 642 open
Claim product descrip-
tion
framework free text framework / on-
tology
IPO no yes (fixed price) yes (screening) yes (auction)
Final payout market price VWAP experts VWAP
Market dura-
tion
10/60 min 18 days 36 days open
Initial grant cash & shares cash cash cash
Trading CDA CDA CDAwMM CDAwMM
6.5.1 Main design choices
Based on our previous experiments (chapter 5) and on the results of Chan et al. [27],
LaComb et al. [96] and Soukhoroukova et al. [154], we can derive the principal design
factors of a prediction market applied to R&D portfolio management.
Participants Various empirical studies [28, 33] as well as the results of the previous
experiments tend to confirm that the size of the crowd playing on the market is not
particularly relevant. However, the more players that are active on the market, the more
liquidity they will bring in.
Claim None of the experiments uses a specific claim description. Claims are either
traditional product descriptions with texts and pictures or ad-hoc frameworks resulting
from a trial-and-error process. Based on our own results, presented in chapter 5, we
would argue that a claim description based on a framework and ontology provides better
results, allowing each participant to have the same understanding as others. The framework
described in section 5.5.1 could be used without modification. Nevertheless, the underlying
ontology should be adapted to the context of the company, mostly to reuse already shared
ontology.
IPO The use or not of an IPO process is discussed in LaComb et al. [96] without a
definitive statement in favor of its use. However, we tend to consider that such a mechanism
could improve the overall investment in the market. As seen in Soukhoroukova et al. [154]
half of the ideas were proposed by participants outside the traditional innovation process.
Thus, opening the market to every idea seems to be beneficial. Nevertheless, it is important
to avoid a flood of ideas by implementing an appropriate mechanism as discussed in section
5.5.2.
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Final payout As discussed in Soukhoroukova et al. [154], the choice of the final payout
should be carefully selected. We feel that any external intervention in the fixing of the
market price or the payout would add bias to the results. Thus, previous studies as well
as our own experiments tend to show that traders could be motivated to manipulate
the market at the end of the trading period in order to maximize their portfolio’s value.
Therefore, it seems that a payout based on the VWAP of the final trading days would be
the most appropriate, as used by Gruca et al. [65].
Market duration There are two underlying issues connected with the market duration.
The most important is the quality of the results. Chan et al. [27] and Plott and Chen
[133] ran prediction markets for short time interval (from 10 minutes to 1 hour) with good
results. We can conclude that there is no minimum duration to take into account. The
other issue is the engagement of the participants in the long term. If prediction markets
like Hollywood Stock Exchange or Foresight Exchange succeed in keeping their traders
engaged by continuously adding new claims, there is no guarantee that it will be the
case in our configuration. LaComb et al. [96] and Soukhoroukova et al. [154] both ran
experiments for longer periods with mixed results. LaComb et al. had to distribute more
prizes and organize “trading parties” in order to keep the engagement of the participants to
a supportable level. We suggest designing an experiment not exceeding a couple of weeks
with a large collection of diverse incentives to provide more information on the effects of
the measures used to motivate traders.
Initial grant We saw two different types of initial allocation. The most used in ex-
periments was the allocation of a cash amount at the beginning of the game, with or
without weekly allocations. This is easy to implement on each market type. The second
solution is the allocation of a mix of shares and cash. This solution has the advantage that
participants have to trade on every share available on the market. Thus, it could become
unmanageable in markets with a large number of shares. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that one solution has a significant effect on market accuracy [124]. As a design choice, we
propose to use a cash-only initial allocation.
Trading As discussed in section 5.5.5 the use of a CDAwMM mechanism, and though
Chan et al. [27] and LaComb et al. [96] did not use such a mechanism in their experiments,
there is a consensus that an automated market maker improves the liquidity of the market
without negative side effects on its accuracy.
6.5.2 Running a PM for portfolio
Let’s look again at the main issues we should cover with our prediction market: (1) select-
ing the right criteria, (2) collecting the data, and (3) negotiating the portfolio between the
different stakeholders. If we try to translate these issues into a roadmap for implementing
prediction markets for R&D portfolio management it becomes:
1. Ask the right question of the participants to make sure that they all have an equal
comprehension of the evaluation that they are asked to give.
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2. Give enough incentives to motivate participants to reveal and aggregate their own
private information on the market.
3. Manage enough liquidity on the market to ensure an optimal price equilibrium.
Comprehension The more participants we would like to involve on the market, the
more attention should be given to this topic. In fact, restricting the market to a handful
of participants sharing the same comprehension of the topic would probably result in a
common perception of the task to be done. However, there is a major risk that the market
would not be as effective as desired, because these participants would probably share the
same belief on the outcome of the different shares. To avoid this, we should integrate
“noise traders” on the market to add sufficient opportunities for the best informed traders
to reveal all their information, continuously adjusting the market prices [82, 163, 6].
This is why we should take great-care with the editing of the claims’ descriptions—using
the previously developed ontology—and of the questions asked. From an R&D portfolio
management perspective, we should consider the impact of the different projects on the
company. Bitman and Sharif [22] propose using five perspectives to assess the portfolio’s
projects, allowing us to define the questions to be answered by the traders:
Reasonableness Can the project be successfully completed?
Attractiveness Will the employees want to take part in the project?
Responsiveness Are there any ethical, moral, environmental or legal consid-
erations that make it especially attractive or, conversely, inadvisable to
carry out?
Competitiveness In what ways and to what extent does the project improve
the firm’s capability and competency?
Innovativeness To what extent will the project help the firm to sustain its
competitive advantage?
Incentive Many experiments—including those in chapter 5—suffered from the traders’
lack of willingness to actively participate on the market. There are many factors influencing
the engagement of traders in real-life experiments. The most important is the fact that they
are not paid—in contrast to participants in experiments—to participate on the market,
but to do their daily business. Siegel [147], CEO of Inkling Incorporated, 2 made extensive
trials on incentive techniques to achieve a sufficient participation on the market. His main
findings are:
Length of markets Should be a mix of long-term and short-term, or all
short-term to guarantee enough activity
Loud and often Inform widely on the accurately predicted outcomes to raise
the role of the prediction market from a game to a business tool
2. http://inklingmarkets.com
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Ongoing communication Use blogs, newsletters or mailing-lists to catch the
attention of the traders
Introducing new markets Regularly create new markets to maintain inter-
est
Interesting insights Use the data created by people trading to discover other
insights
Profile/interview your users Use the best players as vectors for your com-
munication
Champions Make sure that the top management is involved, and communicate
its involvement
Cash and prize incentives Lottery systems picking a winner from the pool
of users are better than allocating a prize to the best trader
Competition as incentive Take advantage of the natural organizational ri-
valries that already exist
Exclusive access as incentive Create a separate marketplace for those who
have performed particularly well
Run provocative markets Ask tough questions because these get people
talking and create a good deal of interest
Let traders create their own markets Letting traders create their own
markets motivates them to drive participation within their own market,
attracting new traders
“The most important lessons learned is what incentives work are highly dependent on
the existing culture of the company and the trading community” (Adam Siegel [147]). Due
to the lack of empirical studies on this topic, we would suggest picking some elements, or
using all of them, during the implementation of the prediction market, tailoring them to
the company’s culture.
Liquidity Comprehension and incentive having been solved, liquidity should not be
an important problem. As seen before, the implementation of some trading mechanisms
coupled with the right provisioning of traders’ accounts—in cash and/or shares—should
guarantee enough liquidity on the market. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge,
there are no experiments failing due to illiquid markets.
6.5.3 A roadmap
We have identified several design specifications as well as some implementation guidelines.
These can be summarized in a roadmap for running prediction markets for R&D portfolio
management.
1. Carefully select the traders among the stakeholders. If in doubt, select them all.
2. Formulate the claims and their evaluation criteria in order to make them unequivocal
for all trader.
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3. Design the market following the design principles presented in section 6.5.1.
4. Publicize your market through multiple communication channels. Use key players to
support your message.
5. Start the market, allocating each of the traders a sufficient endowment to express
their opinion.
6. Manage the market, communicating results, adding new shares, distributing prizes,
organizing trading sessions.
7. Close the market by paying the traders according to the chosen payoff function and
distribute more prizes.
8. Ask the management to give a feedback on the results of the market: are they useful
for the company, what will be used, etc.
This roadmap is a short summary of our main findings and propositions resulting from our
experiments and an extensive literature survey. As we chose to use an ex-ante evaluation
for our new R&D portfolio management process, we are confident that this approach
should successfully solve some issues of the traditional R&D portfolio management process,
noting that these guidelines should be carefully challenged and adapted to each particular
context.
6.6 Contributions
In this chapter, we designed a new R&D portfolio management process supported by an
extensive use of prediction markets. As we saw in the previous sections, using a prediction-
market-supported process in this field solves three main issues encountered by traditional
R&D portfolio management processes.
1. selecting the right criteria
2. collecting the data
3. negotiating the portfolio between the different stakeholders
Overcoming these issues, using a simple tool, should improve the overall decision process:
the decisions will be more accurate, and the main stakeholders will identify with those
decisions.
Moreover, we present the main design factors that should be retained to build such a
tool as well as giving a roadmap to implement such a process.
Finally, we make some recommendations using such a process to support the R&D
portfolio management activity. However, we were not able to set up an experiment to
test the success of our approach in a real-life context mainly due to the boundaries of
our research area and the difficulties of finding a context where both traditional and
prediction-market-selected projects could be pursued to their end, to be able to measure
their individual success.
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The final iteration of our design process summarizes our previous findings and studies
the adequacy of prediction markets for technology foresight. To support our idea, we
benchmarked a prediction market with an MCDM approach. We then developed a comparison
framework to highlight the characteristics of prediction markets and MCDM. This led us to
summarizing key success factors for each of our approaches.
7.1 Introduction
According to McKeen and Smith [115], one of the critical issues in IT management is to
“situate the challenges facing the IT managers regarding emerging technology. . . ”. This
requires companies to adopt a systematic process to stay up to date and to assess new
technology for potential integration into modern organizations. Different management
tools and techniques have been proposed in the scientific community and in the literature
(scenario planning, technology roadmap, ROI and real option) but few of them have been
widely adopted by companies.
This chapter focuses on two approaches that support the assessment and foresight of new
technology in order to evaluate how businesses can take advantage of them: multi-criteria
decision-making (MCDM) and prediction markets. In addition, we also propose a number
of critical success factors that make one or other of the approaches more appropriate to be
used in certain corporate conditions. We used and validated both approaches during the
assessment of mobile payment technologies.
1. The content of this chapter was partially published in [54]: C. Gaspoz, J. Ondrus and Y. Pigneur.
Comparison of Multi-criteria and Prediction Market Approaches for Technology Foresight, 13th Conference
of the Association Information and Management (AIM), Paris, France, 2008.
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7.2 Usage > Presentation of the approaches
The two selected approaches for our research differ in many aspects. Before comparing
them, we briefly describe their aim and context of usage.
7.2.1 MCDM: A management science approach
MCDM methods aim at supporting decisions in an effective way by analyzing a problem
using either quantitative (e.g. cost, weight) or qualitative (e.g. quality of service, beauty)
criteria simultaneously. The idea behind MCDM methods is not to find the single optimal
solution (like a mathematical programming model) but rather to try to determine which
solutions are the closest to optimal in terms of the various criteria and to see how they
compare with existing solutions. To collect the data, decision-makers (i.e. experts) need
to express their preferences by evaluating the alternatives and giving each criteria a
weight.
Previous research indicates that MCDM methods are not only used for decision-making
but also for technology foresight [142]. Three distinct phases of the decision have been
characterized by Simon [149]. These are intelligence, design and choice. Bui [25] argues
that MCDM methods usually focus on the final two phases. In our case, the objective is
to use MCDM methods for the intelligence phase of the decision process. The idea is to
examine the current environmental conditions and uncover potential future issues before
the establishment of the decision.
7.2.2 Prediction markets: an emerging approach
As discussed in chapter 2, prediction markets enable everybody to trade by aggregating
the information disseminated among all actors in a corporate crowd (e.g. employees, business
partners). Furthermore, they allow actors to trade based on their own assumptions, without
worrying about hierarchy or other social pressures. Hanson [72] made the assumption that
prediction markets should improve the progress of science based on the absence of social,
economic and political pressures.
Previous research has also shown that the information disseminated in the crowd is
not the same as the information reported to the hierarchy. This difference was partially
explained by the anonymity of the traders on the prediction market and by the reward
process, based on the best performances (i.e. the quality of the information supplied).
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7.3 Context > Related work
Several authors studied the choice and usage of technological forecasting methods in
different types of organizations. Porter et al. [135] introduced technology futures analysis
(TFA) as a field grouping all forms of analyzing future technology and its consequences. After
presenting and classifying more than 50 methods, they present two scoping issues of TFA:
the content issues (i.e. time horizon, geographical extent, level of detail) and the process
issues (e.g., participants, decision process, study duration, resources available).
Martino [114] presents a review of recent advances in technological forecasting based on
eight methods and shows the resulting possibilities from these new approaches.
Presenting the implementation issues of technology intelligence systems, Savioz et al.
[143] note the importance of the specific character of each organization in setting up such
a system.
Levary and Han [101] identify six main factors affecting technological forecasting and
the choice of a method: (1) money available for development of technology, (2) data avail-
ability and validity, (3) uncertainty surrounding the success of technological development,
(4) similarity of proposed and existing technologies, (5) number of variables affecting the
development of technologies and (6) prerequisites for use of specific technological forecasting
methods.
Lichtenthaler [104] conducted an exploratory case study research in leading multinationals
that identified the most influential contingency factors for the selection of technology
intelligence methods and assessment forms.
He [103] also presents the importance of the type of coordination of the technology
intelligence process (structural, hybrid and informal) as well as the selection of information
sources in the choice of a specific method.
We found that none of this previous work elaborates a comparison of selected approaches
with their strengths and weaknesses related to their contextual implementation.
In this chapter, we propose to establish a comparison framework based on characteristics
derived from past research previously presented. This framework aims at helping us to
compare our two approaches and identify their key success factors.
7.4 Evaluation > Benchmark
To evaluate the usage of prediction markets in a technological forecasting context, we
made a benchmark between prediction markets and MCDM, comparing the results of both
methods. This benchmark was made in the field of mobile payment technologies and was
supported by a dedicated comparison framework inspired by [104].
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7.4.1 Design of the artifacts
In order to support our research, we designed two artifacts implementing the MCDM
and prediction market approaches. As a research methodology, we adopted a design science
paradigm and rigorously followed the recommendations prescribed by Hevner et al. [84].
More details about the artifact implementing MCDM methods can be found in earlier work
[119].
MCDM: A group decision support system
The requirements for a multi-actor multi-criteria analysis are not easily fulfilled, as a
large amount of data has to be collected, computed and visualized. Obviously, a digitization
of the processes is necessary. In other words, we decided to use an IT artifact (a group
decision support system, GDSS) integrated with the processes of an MCDM approach. As
none of the existing MCDM tools surveyed encompassed the features needed, we designed
a new and original prototype with unique characteristics required for our research. We
concentrated our efforts on the development of an interactive user interface in order to
improve data collection, computation and visualization.
Our prototype, PylaDESS, implements side-by-side two formal MCDM methods: ELEC-
TRE I [11] and the weighted sum model (WSM) of Fishburn [47]. To collect the data, we
selected an interactive process based on the “Pack of Card” technique proposed by Simos
[150] and later improved by Pictet and Bollinger [130]. We programmed this technique in
PylaDESS in order to facilitate data collection. Experts can evaluate technologies using a
five-value scale – weak (1), fair (2), average (3), good (4), excellent (5) – for each criterion
they estimate as relevant.
To improve the visualization and analysis of the data, we implemented many different
data cross-analysis modules. All of these features make PylaDESS a unique MCDM tool
to support multi-actor and multi-criteria analysis.
The iterative and incremental development of the IT artifact was done in the laboratory,
and its testing was organized in a real environment. The design iterations allowed us
to better manage the different constraints encountered during the analysis. In total,
three distinctive iterations have been conducted. First, the artifact has been used in the
back-office for manual data input and computation the data. During the second design
iteration, the artifact was used by the experts to collect the data with a card game and
give real-time feedback of the results computed. The third iteration consisted of using the
artifact as a group support system in a round-table setting. During each of these iterations,
numerous improvements were made in order to adapt the artifact to each context with its
constraints.
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Table 7.1: Design constraints of the prediction market
Design Constraint
Trading MSR
Final payout Sum of cash and total worth of the stocks at the closing
market price
IPO Not available
Initial grant Cash (play-money)
Short-selling Allowed
Shares type Winner-takes-all
Prediction market : e-trading market
As the technology foresight activity partially corresponds with the assessment of projects
in an R&D portfolio, we chose to keep the same design constraints as described in chapter
6. The main difference lies in the definition of the portfolios. In the previous case, traders
had to evaluate the “value” of each project in an R&D portfolio, given that there were
no constraints on the number of projects selected. In this case, we have a portfolio of
multiple technologies, but the outcome had to be unique—it is a winner-takes-all market.
We summarize some key design constraints in Table 7.1.
As prototype did not support multiple winner-takes-all markets at that stage, we decided
to use a different platform for this experiment. After a brief survey of the different
marketplaces, we chose to use the InklingMarket 2 prediction market for our experiment.
At the time of our experiment, it supported all our design constraints, as presented in Table
7.1. Furthermore, as discussed in section 5.5.3, they followed the same idea—removing
the stock market concepts from the trading interface—which resulted in a very intuitive
trading interface as seen in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Trading interface at InklingMarkets
The only weakness of the platform, at the time of the experiment, was its inability to
specify a payoff function. So we had to use a final payout based on the sum of the cash
and the total worth of the stocks at the closing market price in place of a VWAP, which
could have been better, as proposed in section 6.5.
2. http://inklingmarkets.com
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Comparison of the artifacts
The designed artifacts are quite different in their nature. PylaDESS is a standalone
application coded in the Python programming language. It runs on most popular operating
systems (MS Windows, Mac OS X and GNU/Linux). In terms of specific algorithms
to compute the data, it implements two formal MCDM methods and produces visual
outcomes (rankings and outranking graphs). Moreover, there are different visualization
modules to conduct cross-data analysis. More details of PylaDESS features can be found
in [119].
The prediction market architecture requires a web server and an Internet connection.
The user interface is based on web standards such as HTML, which is compatible and
reachable with any computer using a web browser. It supports buy and sell operations and
displays current trading information (e.g. price, volume).
7.4.2 Settings of the experiments
To explore our approaches for technology foresight, we applied them in the field of mobile
payments. Based on previous research, [120], we selected several possible alternatives for
future technology developments in the Swiss mobile payments market.
In order to conduct a foresight process, we assessed current payment technologies and
added possible future technologies. By mixing both current and future technologies, we
were able to estimate more precisely the impacts of future trends based on the existing
market conditions.
For the technology alternatives, we selected three types of cards: (i) SmartCards (chip-
based), (ii) contactless cards (RFID-based), and (iii) magnetic cards (with magnetic
strips). We also included two phone-based technologies, one using a phone remote network
(e.g. GSM, GPRS) and another one based on phone proximity networks (e.g. Bluetooth,
infrared). In a second phase we added an upcoming technology, near field communication
(NFC). This technology is a fusion of the mobile phone and the contactless card. More
information about RFID and NFC can be found in [168]. A summary with examples of
the technologies and their uses is presented in Table 7.2.
MCDM: Visiting Swiss experts
During a first phase, we assessed the current technologies present on the Swiss market.
We started this phase in November 2005 and finished it in May 2006. We selected 20 of
the major companies involved in payments in Switzerland and visited each of them once or
twice; depending on how much time they could give us.
The structured interviews lasted on average between half an hour and an hour, sometimes
more. In general, we had between one and three experts representing the companies. All se-
lected experts were leaders of mobile payments projects in their respective companies.
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Table 7.2: Different alternatives considered for our experiment
Description Example Use case
Magnetic card
Card having a magnetic strip that is
readable/writable when inserted in
a card reader
Photocopy or gift
cards
Use a gift card to pay at the
register
SmartCard
Card having a chip able to perform
simple operations such as cryptogra-
phy when inserted in a card reader
Bank cards such
as EC, Postcard,
VISA or Cash
Make a call in a public phone
Contactless card (RFID)
Kind of smartcard whose chip is
activated by the proximity of the
reader’s magnetic field
CampusCard,
Mobility, Mobilis,
Path, Skidata
Buy a coffee on the campus
Mobile phone “remote”
Use the WAN capabilities of the mo-
bile phone, using the operator’s in-
frastructure
SMS/WAP Buy a drink by SMS in a vend-
ing machine
Mobile phone “proximity”
Use the PAN capabilities of the mo-
bile phone, without using the opera-
tor’s infrastructure
Bluetooth/WiFi Send and print a photo from
a mobile phone to a vending
machine
Mobile phone “NFC”
Integration of smartcard and con-
tactless technologies (RFID) in a mo-
bile phone
Suica/Edy Pay for purchases by passing
the phone near the register
and typing a pin number on
the phone
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During the interviews, we used our computerized Pack of cards technique to elicit the
preferences of the experts. The computerized process enabled direct input in PylaDESS
and a real-time feedback of the results.
The second phase of the research (i.e., NFC assessment) consisted of a real-time group
setting. This round-table session aimed at inviting all the companies that participated
during the first phase of the project. There were 16 experts representing 14 different
companies at the round-table in October 2006. This round-table had two distinctive parts.
The first part consisted of a presentation of the results obtained previously. During the
second part, we distributed individual forms for each expert to evaluate NFC using the
five-value scale, as done before. After having inserted and computed the data in PylaDESS,
we immediately presented the results to the experts.
Prediction market: Gathering the crowd
We ran a prediction market based on the selected mobile payment technologies with
29 masters students in business information systems. The one-month experiment took
place in May 2008. Twenty students were active on the platform. We recorded 390 trades
representing 6291 shares from four markets containing 13 claims. Six of these claims
were directly related to the technologies used in the MCDM approach as seen on Figure
7.2.
Figure 7.2: Mobile payment technologies’ quotes
The setup of the experiment took three working days. This includes the setup of the
markets and user accounts. Furthermore, a presentation of the platform, its markets and
claims was made in class. On the students’ side, the investment is tightly linked to the
number of trades made during the month. This includes the research of an investment
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opportunity based on information available to the trader, passing an order and looking at
the new portfolio’s value.
The incentive to play on the prediction market was a prize for the trader with the
highest worth at the end of the experiment. This incentive alone was not sufficient to have
a continuous trading volume on the market, so we introduced two short-term contracts
during the experiment, resulting on trading peaks on the market.
Finally, to insure sufficient trades to extend the market accuracy, we used two strategies.
First, we presented all markets and claims in details during the class, allowing students to
ask questions about the claims and related issues. We completed this presentation with
on-line material presenting each claim in detail, accompanied with presentation videos.
Second, we used a market maker to allow the traders to quickly get their information
aggregated on the market.
Comparison of the settings
As can be seen in Table 7.3, the settings for both approaches differ in several as-
pects.
Table 7.3: Differences of experiments’ settings
MCDM PM
Who Selected experts Students (crowd)
Where One or two individual in-
terviews with each com-
pany.
One round-table for all
the experts to meet, dis-
cuss the results and eval-
uate NFC
One group meeting to
start the market and
some trading activities.
Later, the participants
continue to trade alone
anytime and anywhere.
When Nov. 05 to May 06 +
Oct. 06
May 08 (1 month)
How Several months for
setup, trips, phone calls,
analysis
A few days for setup and
analysis
A considerable effort is required for the MCDM approach compared to the PM approach,
especially for the data collection process. Each company and its experts need to be met
individually. The experts need more support while we elicited their preferences than the
traders, who just buy or sell.
A multi-criteria analysis requires a relatively large amount of data to collect. The best
way to proceed is to meet the experts face to face. The advantage of this direct contact is
the personalized assistance and interaction during the whole process. This should prevent
erroneous data sets.
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In the prediction markets, the participation of the players is self-organized. This
facilitates the overall management of the analysis. However, the success of the prediction
market’s outcome depends on the goodwill of the players to participate and trade without
the pressure of the project managers.
Lastly, the first experiment lasted 8 months in 2005 and 2006, while the second lasted
only one month in 2010.
7.4.3 Analysis of the results
MCDM: Ranking and outranking
From the results obtained, it was quite clear that card technologies were preferred
to phones for payment purposes. The general ranking obtained with the WSM method
shows that cards, especially smartcards and contactless cards, were preferred, with a high
ranking.
Phone-based solutions remain in lowest positions of most rankings. This could be
explained as mobile phone-based payment schemes are still in an early stage of development.
Our results show that there is still progress to be made in terms of ease of use, cost,
reliability and user/market acceptance (i.e., awareness). However, phone-based schemes
already perform well in terms of flexibility and value proposition improvement. The
three national mobile network operators consider value proposition improvement to be an
important aspect, which explains why they believe that mobile phones have a future as a
payment instrument. A complete description of the results of the first phase can be found
in [120].
During the second phase, the results showed that NFC is highly valued. Its ranking is
high and comparable to contactless and smartcards. It is clearly performing better than
the other mobile phone technology tested in the first phase. A deeper analysis of the results
is given in [121].
PM: Price of contracts
Given that the students were relatively well informed on this topic and made an intensive
use of information disseminated, the results are the expression of a good consensus between
the traders. We could observe that after a period of important variations during the first
two weeks, the prices tended to reach a consensus at the end of the experiment while the
volume of trades stayed at the same level.
On the mobile payment technologies market, we can distinguish two groups of claims.
The first group, composed of NFC, SmartCard and RFID, was the most active in term
of trades and all technologies reached a “price” over 50%. The second group consisted of
claims with few trades and probabilities under 50%.
Our results indicated that NFC could be considered to be the next successful technology
in the mobile payment field. The price history shows a regular adaptation to reach the
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consensus of 57.2%. We also saw a convergence of SmartCard and RFID technologies to
reach a probability just above 50%.
At the other end of the scale the mobile phone proximity and remote technologies had
few trades. The reason for this lack of interest could be the shortage of information or
the lack of confidence of the traders. In any case, the results of these two claims are not
significant.
Finally, magnetic card made a low score, supported by many trades. We can interpret
this result as a clear sign of the gentle eviction of this technology on the payment market.
Even thought the magnetic strips are still available on most cards, these cards also contain
a chip, which put them in the SmartCards category.
Comparison of the results
The results of the prediction market are globally similar to the ones obtained with
the MCDM approach. Table 7.4 summarizes these results. Due to the particularities of
the methods used, we chose to not harmonize the two scales, prediction markets results
expressing a probability, as MCDM results express the strength of various preferences.
Table 7.4: Summary of the results (ranking)
MCDM Prediction market
1. SmartCard (3.8/5) 1. NFC (57.16%)
2. NFC (3.6/5) 2. SmartCard (52%)
3. Contactless Card (3.6/5) 3. Contactless Card (52%)
4. Magnetic (3.3/5) 4. Phone proximity (51.20%)
5. Phone proximity (2.7/5) 5. Phone remote (49.51%)
6. Phone remote (2.7/5) 6. Magnetic Card (47.01%)
Two groups clearly emerged. The first group contains NFC, SmartCard and RFID, and
the second one contains mobile phone proximity, remote and magnetic card.
The main difference discovered is the rank of technologies within the two groups.
Magnetic card falls from rank four to rank six with the prediction market approach. After
verification, the high trade volume compared to the two other technologies of the second
group indicates that the result is significant in expressing the beliefs of the traders. A
possible explanation of this lower ranking is the time lag between the two experiments. In
the two years between the studies, most magnetic cards have been replaced by SmartCards
in Switzerland. Also, the excellent performance of NFC in the prediction market could be
explained by the increasing popularity and visibility of initiatives in Asia and the USA
during this period.
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7.4.4 Comparison and discussion
To compare our two approaches, we derived a framework based on the contingency
factors developed by Lichtenthaler [104] and the individual factors affecting technological
forecasting from Levary and Han [101].
Lichtenthaler found that the contingency factors influence the choice of assessment forms
and technology intelligence methods used in multinationals. Levary and Han designed a
framework to define the most appropriate forecasting method(s) for various combinations
of the degree/extent of individual factors affecting technological forecasting.
The combination of the two groups of factors enables us to embrace the technological
foresight activity globally and systematically from the organization characteristics to the
information collection through the assessment process.
The resulting framework contains three main components: organizational factors, assess-
ment properties and data attributes (Figure 7.3).
By organizational factors, we mean all factors determining the environment of the
assessment process. These factors could be resource availability, the organization’s internal
communication culture or their decision-making style.
The assessment properties are the characteristics of the assessment conducted in a given
organization. These properties could be the assessment’s goal, the time horizon of the
prediction or the uncertainty of the assessment field.
Organizational 
factors
Technology 
forecasting 
method
Assessment 
properties
Data
attributes
Figure 7.3: Comparison framework
Finally the data attributes are the characteristics of the data needed for the technology
forecast such as data quality and availability. We also distinguish between exogenous and
endogenous data collection processes. In the exogenous processes, we do not worry about
the provenance of the data and the channel used to collect them. The endogenous processes
imply that we integrate a data collection process into the method. The main properties of
each method are sumarized in Table 7.5.
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Organizational factors
These factors are specific for every organization. Even if they are not directly related
to the assessment made, they will define its conditions and modalities. Often, they are
implicitly embedded in the choice of a method. Time and human or financial resources
dictate more or less the conditions of the assessment. In the case of limited resources,
familiarity with the various methods will play an important role in restricting the choice of
options.
The MCDM approach is well suited for organizations with formal and less participatory
decision-making processes. This approach relies mainly on a few selected experts at
the expense of the crowd. MCDM methods may be difficult to implement in more
participatory organizations, as the number of possible participant is limited for practical
reasons. Likewise, the experts need a good knowledge of the method, both for the assessment
and the interpretation of the results.
To make efficient use of prediction markets, the organization must have a participatory
and informal decision-making style. We need to open the market to the most players in
order to aggregate more information. Due to their design, prediction markets do not require
in-depth knowledge of the method. Participants just have two possible actions: buy or sell.
Furthermore, the results are quite simple to interpret. Given the short implementation
time of this method, it is well suited for fast-moving organizations or for organizations
with limited resources. A challenge is to get participants to actively and regularly trade on
their own, otherwise the results might not be significant.
In the MCDM approach, the actors involved are usually a set of selected and relevant
experts who are motivated to participate in order to get access to the data and therefore
knowledge that would augment their expertise.
In prediction markets, the participants can be anyone interested in technology but are
not always experts—the crowd of Web 2.0. They constitute a community of players who
are driven by the game and its financial profits. In contrast to the MCDM approach,
prediction markets can easily indicate if players are good by considering the value of their
portfolio and their total profit.
Assessment properties
The main property is the goal, which specifies whether to assess the current environment
or to generate knowledge about the future. Properties also describe the nature of the
information to be generated. Depending on the needs, we might require a static or dynamic
picture of the trend studied.
The MCDM approach gives a posteriori results to support the resolution of a decision
problem. At a specific time, the MCDM analysis draws a rather detailed picture of a
situation benefiting from the granularity provided by the criteria. These criteria help to
explain precisely the reasons for the outcome.
By contrast, prediction markets are excellent tools for longitudinal studies due to the
inherent nature of the data collection process. However, they give the prediction (i.e. the
claim’s price) without further explanation. In other words, MCDM methods are detailed
snapshots taken at a specific time and prediction markets are movies shot over a period of
time, suitable for assessments requiring frequent or constant updates.
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Data attributes
In MCDM, the data collection process is endogenous since experts elicit their preferences
using criteria and alternatives previously established. As a result, a double risk of bias
exists during the establishment of the criteria and alternatives and during the elicitation
of the preferences. As the method cannot identify any bias introduced by experts, it
may be necessary to couple MCDM with a Delphi analysis to avoid having too large
disparities.
In the case of prediction markets, the data collection process is exogenous. Full interest
is given to the assessment. The rest of the process is left to the crowd. Prediction
markets are not affected by unreliable information, due to the aggregation mechanism.
Prediction markets are well suited in cases where information is not available or is potentially
unreliable.
Table 7.5: Summary of the comparison factors
MCDM Prediction markets
organizational factors decision-making style formal informal, participative
resources restrictions low mid to high
familiarity with the
method
high low
assessment properties goal scanning, forecasting forecasting
uncertainty mid to high (in conjunction with other methods)
time horizon mid (possibly long) short to long
type of results static dynamic
data attributes availability mid to high not relevant
origin experts crowd
validity relevant not relevant
Key success factors
Based on the comparison, we propose some key success factors for MCDM and prediction
markets applied in technology foresight. Our recommendations should support further
explorations of these approaches.
MCDM methods are well suited for situations where a group of relevant experts want to
challenge their own opinions in order to draw conclusions when technology trends are not
easy to discern. For their part, prediction markets need a crowd ready to trade and share
their beliefs. Their actions generate a prediction through an implicit data aggregation
mechanism relying on information disseminated among the crowd. This works particularly
well when the corporate crowd is familiar with the topic.
To set up an MCDM analysis, a facilitator should be hired to meet each expert individually.
Face-to-face meetings are essential for sharing the results, as they are usually centralized
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in standalone software. Prediction markets only need a facilitator who can set up a claim
on the platform. Then traders can play anytime and anywhere using a web browser. The
major challenge of prediction markets is to gather a motivated crowd that will trade
regularly.
The efforts required for the MCDM approach are rewarded with the assurance that the
set of data collected is valid since the facilitator supervises the whole process. To overcome
this issue in prediction markets, the crowd automatically regulates the market. Even if a
trader introduces a bias in the market by their irrational actions, the crowd will neutralize
it by doing opposite actions. At some point, the defective trader will be evinced, as their
financial resources for trading will vanish.
MCDM methods are used when experts need to have a precise explanation of the
phenomenon. The criteria, weights and evaluations are useful indicators for unveiling weak
signals. In our case, the results were rankings and outranking graphs. Looking at the
data collected, we could explain precisely how we reached these outcomes. As a result, a
consensus could be reached after several rounds of analysis (i.e. Delphi). The outcome of
prediction markets is by nature a consensus of the crowd based on many rounds of trading.
The aggregated results provide a simple but powerful indication of the probability that an
event will occur. In addition, one can analyze the evolution of the trends by just looking
at the history of the trading price. However, it is much harder to explain the behavior of
the traders over time.
7.4.5 Conclusions
Despite similar results, both approaches revealed some benefits and demonstrated their
complementarity. On one side, the MCDM approach bring an analytic explanation of the
phenomenon by a controlled and criteria-based evaluation. On the other side, prediction
markets provide a synthetic aggregation of numerous individual beliefs that is constantly
adjusted and made available for everyone. Therefore, we could not claim that one is better
than the other. Interestingly, we found that the drawbacks identified could partially be
solved by selecting the best aspects of the two approaches.
For example, we could take consecutive snapshots during a given period of time to follow
trends using a MCDM approach. Moreover, after few rounds of analysis, we could improve
the data collection process by building an online user interface that would draw out the
preferences without a face-to-face confrontation.
For prediction markets, the quality of the players could be ensured by opening the
markets only to a community of practice, including its experts. Furthermore, the outcome
of prediction markets could be enhanced by requesting more information about the actions
of the players. The objective would be to monitor the behavior of the players in order to
confirm that they are not just following the trend generated by the market.
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7.5 Contributions
7.5.1 Efficiency of prediction markets
Comparing two different approaches for technology foresight—prediction markets and
MCDM—we found that prediction markets are well adapted to solve technology foresight
issues. Moreover, running an experiment assessing mobile payment technologies, we showed
that prediction markets are as good as MCDM at assessing technologies, but are also more
efficient.
We showed that, even in the presence of non-expert participants, prediction markets
are faster to set up and more resource saving (time, education, costs) than MCDM, for
achieving the same outcome.
These findings would help practitioners to design better technological forecasting tools
and stakeholders to efficiently run their technology assessments or to improve their IT
investment decisions.
7.5.2 Crowd challenging experts
Running these experiments with two different participants groups, enabled us to confirm
that a crowd of graduate students is able to perform as well as selected and renowned
experts. This could seem to be counter-intuitive at first sight, but it only confirms the
findings from various experiments on prediction markets.
7.5.3 A comparison framework
In order to compare various approaches, we built a framework that contains three
essential dimensions to differentiate technology foresight methods: (1) organizational
factors, (2) assessment properties and (3) data attributes, as presented in Table 7.6.
Successfully used to differentiate prediction markets from MCDM, this framework will
enable researchers to compare, and derive key success factors and particularities from,
various technological forecasting methods. This framework will also support stakeholders
in selecting the best adapted technological forecasting method to support their assessment
needs.
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Table 7.6: Comparison framework
Organizational factors decision-making style
resources restrictions
familiarity with the method
Assessment properties goal
uncertainty
time horizon
type of results
Data attributes availability
origin
validity
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This final chapter summarizes our findings by using two approaches. The first one
presents our findings from a methodological point of view, following seven design guidelines
from Hevner et al. [84]. The second approach presents our findings from a theoretical point
of view, structured using Gregor and Jones’s information systems design theory [60]. Then,
we present some final thoughts concluding this thesis.
8.1 Conclusion
To conduct this research, we used a problem-solving process. We identified a problem
to be addressed from the perspective of the environment, in this case, from various
organisations. We then acquired knowledge and understanding of this problem during
our subsequent iterations, building and running our artifact in various contexts. This
knowledge was then used to refine our design during each iteration. This problem-solving
process could be difficult to predict and its results are less readable than traditional research
paradigms.
In order to structure our conclusion, we decided to follow two approaches. A method-
ological one, based on seven design guidelines from Hever et al. [84] and a theoretical one,
based on Gregor and Jones’s information systems design theory [60]. The two approaches
are developed in the following sections.
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8.2 A design science research process supporting technolog-
ical forecasting
This section presents our conclusions from a methodological point of view, following the
seven design guidelines of Hevner et al. [84]. These guidelines should help to show that we
followed a complete design-science research process and addressed all its facets. However,
these guidelines could not determine the quality of our research contributions. This will be
addressed in the following section.
8.2.1 Design as an artifact
Design-science research must produce a viable artifact in the form of a construct, a
model, a method or an instantiation
Our multiple iterations produced several artifacts in the form of constructs (claims),
models (design factors typology, claim ontology), methods (R&D portfolio management
process) and instantiation (MarMix). All these artifacts were instantiated and evaluated
in various contexts.
8.2.2 Problem relevance
The objective of design-science research is to develop technology-based solutions to
important and relevant business problems
During our interviews with other researchers, we identified the technological forecasting
problem as an important issue still to be solved for practitioners. This was confirmed by
our literature review, which allowed us to refine our research question to better address
the current issue with our artifact.
8.2.3 Design evaluation
The utility, quality and efficacy of a design artifact must be rigorously demonstrated via
well-executed evaluation methods
To evaluate our artifact, we used multiple methods during the various iterations. First
of all, we made field studies with large groups of participants to test our prediction market
design factors. We then used a descriptive approach which consisted of informed arguments
originating from related work and literature to evaluate our portfolio management process.
Finally, we used a benchmark to compare our artifact with a traditional forecasting
method.
8.2.4 Research contributions
Effective design-science research must provide clear and verifiable contributions in the
areas of the design artifact, design foundations, and/or design methodologies
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The design artifact During this research, we developed MarMix, a prediction market
tailored to support technology foresight, more precisely the first part of the R&D portfolio
management process. This artifact was successfully used in various contexts and provided
support for related contributions.
Foundations We made various contributions to the foundations. First, we contributed
to the prediction market literature, documenting and testing a new application of this
technique to technology foresight. Our research could help secure the adoption of prediction
markets into the business toolbox. We also made contributions in the form of our design
factors typology and our five design propositions, supporting designers in their development
of innovative applications of prediction markets.
Second, we contributed to the negotiation support system (NSS) literature, presenting
prediction markets as automated negotiation agents that could be instantiated to solve
multi-actor multi-criteria problems. This contribution could help researchers in the NSS or
decision support system (DSS) field to find new tools and techniques to solve issues in that
field.
Third, we made an important contribution to the R&D portfolio management field,
proposing an innovative way to solve some of the remaining issues. This contribution
can help researchers to develop integrated ways to support the whole R&D portfolio
management process, allowing practitioners to optimize and strengthen their process.
Design methodologies To assess the performance of both prediction markets and
MCDM for technological forecasting, we contributed a comparison framework that enables
us to characterize and evaluate various technological foresight techniques.
8.2.5 Research rigor
Design-science research relies upon the application of rigorous methods in both the
construction and evaluation of the design artifact
To insure the rigor of our research we made extensive use of the available literature and
models (knowledge base). Moreover, we exposed our results to other researchers in the
field through peer-reviewed publications to strengthen our results.
8.2.6 Design as a search process
The search for an effective artifact requires the utilizing of available means to reach
desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem environment
We adopted an iterative process to achieve the goal of our research. This process led us
to build and evaluate our artifact in various contexts and environments. These multiple
iterations led us to continuously refining our artifact based on the specifics of the context.
They were also the way to test our research assumptions. Finally, to test whether we had
found a satisfactory solution, we benchmarked our solution against an existing one.
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8.2.7 Communication of research
Design-science research must be presented effectively both to technology-oriented and
management-oriented audiences
We presented most of our results from the iterations in various scientific publications.
These publications presented our findings from chapters 4 to 7. They are summarized in
Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Academic publications
Title Published Reference
Technology Foresight for IT Investment: Multi-
Criteria Decision-Making versus Prediction Mar-
kets
AIM 2007 [118]
Preparing a Negotiated R&D Portfolio with a
Prediction Market
HICSS 2008 [55]
Prediction Markets As an Innovative Way to
Manage R&D Portfolios
DC CAISE 2008 [52]
Comparison of Multi-criteria and Prediction Mar-
ket Approaches for Technology Foresight
AIM 2008 [54]
We also communicated our results to various management-oriented audiences, in the
form of publications in newspapers and magazines, radio programs and public talks. These
communications are summarized in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: General public communications
Title Published Reference
Marmix, le site qui lit l’avenir dans les marche´s
financiers
24 Heures (Newspaper) [131]
Les sondages sont-ils fiables? RSR (National Broadcast) [40]
Mieux que les astrologues, les e´conomistes voient
de´ja` 2007
Allez-Savoir (Magazine) [24]
La Bourse s’invite au Palais fe´de´ral Le Matin (Newspaper) [56]
Pre´dire l’Avenir Bulletin HEC (Magazine) [51]
Me´te´o Impre´visible RSR (National Broadcast) [41]
Could Science Help Predicting the Future? UNIL (Public lecture) [53]
8.3 An information systems design theory supporting tech-
nological forecasting
As explained in chapter 3, design work and design knowledge are important for both
research and practice. Although we have already presented the contributions and com-
munications in practice, we still need to formalize our findings as research. We chose to
use Gregor and Jones’s ISDT anatomy to characterize our research and our results. This
section is structured according to their eight components of design theory.
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8.3.1 Purpose and scope
“What the system is for”, the set of meta-requirements or goals that specify the type of
artifact to which the theory applies and which also defines the scope, or boundaries, of the
theory
We defined the purpose of our research as being to design a prediction market to support
the assessment of new technologies. More particularly, from the R&D portfolio management
perspective, we studied the design factors, the underlying process and the efficiency of these
markets for solving issues within this field. Our artifact supports multi-actor multi-criteria
environments where data are nonexistent or difficult to collect and which do not imply
extensive methodological knowledge from the stakeholders.
8.3.2 Constructs
Representations of the entities of interest in the theory
The central construct we used is the claim. It represents the subject assessed by the
prediction market. We made some contributions in this context, regarding the claim’s
formulation, its IPO process and its settlement. Other main constructs are the traders, the
market and the knowledge. Traders are players who are willing to share bits of knowledge
with other traders through the market. The market is the information aggregator used by
traders in order to share their knowledge about the claims. It has some properties inspired
by traditional exchanges. Finally, the knowledge represents the information, private or
public, available to a trader about a given claim, and the incentive for sharing it is that
the trader can buy or sell, as appropriate, and then make a net gain on the basis of the
price changes that occur when they release the information.
8.3.3 Principles of form and function
The abstract “blueprint” or architecture that describes an IS artifact, either product or
method/intervention
In chapter 4 we described the architecture of our artifact, presenting its main functions
and their implementation: (1) user account management, (2) portfolio management,
(3) claims management and (4) performance measurement. Also, we developed and used
a design factors typology to represents its main capabilities: (1) incentive mechanisms,
(2) trading process, (3) investor management and (4) clearing house.
8.3.4 Artifact mutability
The changes in state of the artifact anticipated in the theory, that is, what degree of
artifact change is encompassed by the theory
Through our design factors typology, we already support artifact mutability by providing
the necessary knowledge to do it. Thus, we do not provide complete mutability rules to
guarantee the behavior of the artifact after its evolution. Further work should be done in
this field to support random changes in the design and to derive the necessary changes to
guarantee the faultless functioning of the artifact.
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8.3.5 Testable propositions
Truth statements about the design theory
We provide two categories of testable propositions. First of all, we made five general
design propositions in order to design a prediction market for technological forecasting:
(1) a standard framework to support claim formulation, (2) an easy IPO mechanism to
support the innovation process, (3) a simplified trading interface, (4) a combination of
group and individual sessions and (5) an automatic market maker. We also made specific
design propositions based on our design factors typology to build a specific artifact to
support the R&D portfolio management process. These propositions are summarized in
Table 8.3.
Table 8.3: Main characteristics of a prediction market for R&D portfolio management
Characteristic Design proposition
Participants open
Claim framework/ontology
IPO yes (auction)
Final payout VWAP
Market duration open
Initial grant cash
Trading CDAwMM
8.3.6 Justificatory knowledge
The underlying knowledge or theory from the natural or social or design sciences that
gives a basis and explanation for the design (kernel theories)
We made extensive use of the knowledge body to build our theory. The theories used in
this research come from the prediction markets field, requirement engineering, decision
support systems, technology foresight, R&D management, economics and various design-
science theories. These theories were used to iteratively design, build and refine our artifact
and are now parts of our construct.
8.3.7 Principles of implementation
A description of processes for implementing the theory (either product or method) in
specific contexts
To support practitioners, we contributed a roadmap to implement our artifact in a real
context. This roadmap should assist stakeholders to determine what the main steps are
to successfully run a prediction market for technological forecasting. Moreover, through
our comparison framework, we propose a decision support tool to assist stakeholders in
choosing the right tool to cover their needs. Aided by these two contributions, one should
be able to determine whether prediction markets are the appropriate tool for a particular
context and, if so, to implement it following the roadmap provided.
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8.3.8 Expository instantiation
A physical implementation of the artifact that can assist in representing the theory both
as an expository device and for purposes of testing
We provide five examples of physical implementations of the artifact in different contexts.
All these implementations were parts of our iterative process of building a better tool, and
they were refined as a result of the evaluation process. These implementations, derived
from our first MarMix prototypes, were used to test various design settings of our artifact
before being refined.
8.4 Research contributions
In the introduction, we defined our research questions as being to demonstrate that
specifically designed prediction markets are able to efficiently solve complex technological
forecasting issues. This involves studying the design principles of these prediction markets,
their adequacy for solving complex claims and their efficiency compared to other tools.
8.4.1 Adequacy
We found that prediction markets are able to solve complex issues, given that some
design propositions are followed. In chapter 5 we refined our design, presenting four design
experiments and showing that following five design propositions that we derived from our
experiments, prediction markets are an adequate tool for solving complex technological
forecasting issues.
8.4.2 Design
In chapter 4 we built and instantiated a prediction market prototype. In order to
support our design process, we defined a typology of design factors to support the design of
prediction markets. These design factors were successfully applied to our artifact to support
various forecasting issues. Based on these results, we showed that prediction markets are
able to solve some important issues of the R&D portfolio management process (chapter 6).
We also designed a comparison framework for technological forecasting methods in chapter
7 to support stakeholders comparing and choosing the best forecasting method for solving
issues in their particular context.
8.4.3 Efficiency
To conclude our research, we benchmarked a traditional technological foresight method
(MCDM) with a prediction market (chapter 7). We found that a crowd of students was
able to make the same forecasts as a selected group of experts, which seems to be counter-
intuitive, even if it confirms previous results. Furthermore, we showed that in order to
reach the same results, prediction markets are much more efficient than MCDM, in terms
of the resources needed to set up, run and evaluate the assessments.
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8.5 Final thoughts
In this research we designed an IT artifact and an approach for supporting technology
foresight. We confirmed that prediction markets are adapted and perform well in predicting
the emergence of new technologies. We have also shown that a design-science approach, with
its iterative build-and-evaluate loops, was suitable to tackle this sort of issue. Finally, we
have made some theoretical contributions that will probably be helpful for other researchers
confronted with the design of innovative prediction markets, as well as for stakeholders
looking at the best technological forecasting tool to implement in their organization.
For further research, we propose four possible extensions in line with our previous
work.
8.5.1 Design of prediction markets applications
Currently, prediction markets and other similar DSS tools are lacking an efficient method
of addressing the requirement analysis from the business point of view: the goal of the
assessment. We therefore propose to develop an ontology-based method to support the
design of prediction-market-based forecasting tools. This method should help managers
to design their tool based on their business needs, using and sharing business ontology.
Furthermore, design constraints should guarantee that the resulting application will follow
the necessary requirements for addressing the final objective.
8.5.2 Generation of prediction markets shares
To better address technological foresight using prediction markets, we should be able
to create the required shares based on the emergence of new technologies. We propose
to use artificial intelligence methods to detect these technologies and to formalize them
using ontology. More specifical, we propose to design an artifact using a classificator to
extract emerging technologies from various sources. These should then be formatted as
prediction market shares, using ontology-based transformations. Being able to discover
these emerging topics should greatly enhance the value of prediction market usage in this
context.
8.5.3 Instantiation of prediction markets as Green IS tools
Given the growing concern for sustainable development, our discipline has started a
new research field named Green IS. Following Green IT, which is interested in solving
hardware issues such as electrical consumption, active and passive cooling or recycling,
Green IS is about the interaction between people and information systems. It would be
interesting to design systems that provide enough information to support people in taking
sustainable decisions. A future research could test the assumption that prediction markets
would be better than other ideation methods for developing and evaluating sustainable
propositions.
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8.5.4 Analyze of participants’ motivation
Prediction markets are at the borderline of crowdsourcing applications. In a sense, they
are a typical crowdsourcing application, using a large group of unknown people to motivate
them to work on a given topic, in our case a prediction, at a lower cost. But they tend
to avoid remunerating participants in a traditional way, giving them the possibility of
making profits on their own investments. However, as seen in section 6.5, there is still
a need to uncover the players’ motivations to act on these marketplaces. Thus, it would
be interesting to use the recent research made to understand the motivations of people
engaging in crowdsourcing activities and to translate them to prediction markets, to become
better able to design their incentive mechanisms.
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